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Abstract
T h e  future role o f  nuclear p o w e r  w a s  evaluated a n d  the implications for environmental 
protection considered. Interdisciplinary research w a s  undertaken exploring; climate change, 
sustainable development, nuclear e x p a n s i o n  a n d  decline, nuclear skills education a n d  training, 
research a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  nuclear/radiological security.
T h e  analytical concepts o f  c h a n g e  a n d  response w e r e  u s e d  to r e v i e w  the condition o f  nuclear 
p o w e r  in t e r m s  o f  t i m e  a n d  s p a c e  a n d  to evaluate the strengths, w e a knesses, opportunities a n d  
threats feeing the industry.
It w a s  f o u n d  that published m o d e l s  o f  the future o f  nuclear p o w e r  w h e n  extrapolated a n d  
c o m p a r e d  s h o w e d  a  b r o a d  array o f  o u t c o m e s .  T h e s e  differences demonstrate the uncertainties 
in forecasting future nuclear scenarios.
T h e  E n e r g y  Footprint m o d e l  w a s  u s e d  to evaluate the environmental i m p a c t  o f  fossil fuels 
a n d  it revealed regional inequalities o f  global bio-productive land consumption. T h e  
e x p a n s i o n  o f  nuclear p o w e r  in regions o f  excessive fossil feel u s e  w o u l d  assist in the 
amelioration o f  those inequalities.
It w a s  a r g u e d  that nuclear p o w e r  provides a  m e t h o d  o f  energy production that offers security, 
reliability a n d  m i n i m a l  environmental i m p a c t  c o m p a r e d  to fossil feels.
C l i m a t e  c h a n g e  is the m o s t  significant environmental threat feeing societies. R e v i e w e d  
International Pan e l  o n  C l i m a t e  C h a n g e  ( I P C C )  research s h o w e d  that the climate c h a n g e  
hypothesis is valid a n d  mitigating action is necessary.
F o r  nuclear p o w e r  to u n d e r g o  rapid e x p a n s i o n  will require increases in nuclear skills, 
education a n d  training in t a n d e m  w i t h  g o v e r n m e n t s ’ financial support for nuclear research 
a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t  b u t  the prospect o f  nuclear or radiological terrorism is problematic a n d  if 
realised w o u l d  imp a i r  future prospects.
Sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t  is a  central tenet o f  environmental protection a n d  m u s t  p e r m e a t e  
local, national a n d  international responses. T h e  implications for environmental protection are 
that there are risks a n d  uncertainties w i t h  nuclear e x p a n s i o n  bu t  the threat o f  climate c h a n g e  is 
o f  a  higher m a g n i t u d e  necessitating a n  urgent international response that includes the rapid 
e x p a n s i o n  o f  nuclear p o w e r .
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C h a p t e r  1:
I n t r o d u c t i o n :
T h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  ( 2 0 0 6 )  e s t i m a t e d  that t h e  glo b a l  p o p u l a t i o n  in 2 0 0 5  w o u l d  g r o w  
f r o m  6 , 4 6 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  t o  7 , 6 8 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  ( l o w  estimate), 9 , 0 7 6 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  ( m e d i u m  
e s timate) o r  1 0 , 6 4 6 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  ( h i g h  estim a t e )  b y  t h e  y e a r  2 0 5 0 .  [1]. T h e  A u t h o r  
calculates e a c h  e s t i m a t e  to  r e p r e s e n t  a n  increase o f  1 8 . 8 % ,  4 0 . 4 %  a n d  6 4 . 7 %  
respectively. T h e s e  projections illustrate t h e  n e e d  t o  c o n s i d e r  g l o b a l  e n e r g y  
p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  c o n s u m p t i o n  in a  sustainable context.
G l o b a l  p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h  a n d  f u t u r e  e c o n o m i c  transition o f  d e v e l o p i n g  co u n t r i e s  
indicate i n c r e a s e d  e n e r g y  d e m a n d s .  W h a t  role will n u c l e a r  p o w e r  h a v e  in m e e t i n g  
future e n e r g y  d e m a n d s ?
T h e r e  will b e  risks a n d  uncertainties a t t a c h e d  to  a n y  de c i s i o n  m a d e  a b o u t  t h e  fut u r e  
e n e r g y  m i x .  E n e r g y  d e m a n d  m u s t  b e  m e t  to  e n a b l e  national e c o n o m i e s  to  f u n c t i o n  
a n d  g r o w  b u t  there a r e  implications for p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  y e t  t o o  often, 
d e b a t e  o v e r  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  is ch a r a c t e r i s e d  b y  sentimentality a n d  
d o g m a t i c  thinking.
“ O u r  i d e a  o f  dirt is c o m p o u n d e d  o f  t w o  things, c a r e  for h y g i e n e  a n d  r e s p e c t  for 
c o n v e n t i o n s ” . ( D o u g l a s ,  1 9 6 6 )  [2], Simplistic ide a s  a b o u t  h y g i e n e  a n d  c o n v e n t i o n  
h a v e  c a t e g o r i s e d  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  a s  t a b o o  t e c h n o l o g y  -  a n  object that is p e r c e i v e d  b y  
m a n y  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  g r o u p s  as a n  affront t o  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  purity 
a n d  a  d e g r a d e r  o f  h u m a n  health.
T h i s  d i s c o u r s e  o f ‘purity a n d  d a n g e r ’ that is c o m m o n  t o  all e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d e b a t e s  
will b e  resisted in this research. W h a t  f o l l o w s  p r e s e n t s  t h e  r e a d e r  w i t h  t h e  strengths, 
w e a k n e s s e s ,  op p o r t u n i t i e s  a n d  threats o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  c h a l l e n g e s  
fac i n g  f u t u r e  e n e r g y  p o l i c y m a k e r s .  T h e  implications fo r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  
will b e  c o n s i d e r e d  in that context.
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E n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  is cha r a c t e r i s e d  b y  c o n c e r n s  for public health a n d  h a z a r d  
r e d u c t i o n  c o m b i n e d  w i t h  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e  integrity o f  b i o - g e o p h y s i c a l  s y s t e m s  that 
s u p p o r t  life o n  Ear t h .
T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  this re s e a r c h  is to  critically e v a l u a t e  t h e  fixture role o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  
a n d  t h e  i m p lications for e n v i r o n m e n t a l  protection. T h i s  will b e  a c c o m p l i s h e d  f r o m  a n  
interdisciplinary e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  social, e c o n o m i c ,  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  (science a n d  
e n g i n e e r i n g )  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c h a n g e  a n d  r e s p o n s e  options. T h e  scientific e v i d e n c e  
u n d e r p i n n i n g  t h e s e  c h a n g e s  a n d  r e s p o n s e  o p t i o n s  will b e  i n t e rrogated a n d  analysis 
p r o d u c e d .
1.1: I s s u e s  that will I n f l u e n c e  t h e  F u t u r e  o f  N u c l e a r  P o w e r ;
S i x  issues will b e  e x p l o r e d  t o  establish t h e  f u t u r e  utilisation o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r :
•  G l o b a l  C l i m a t e  C h a n g e .
•  N u c l e a r  P o w e r  a n d  S u s t a i n a b l e  D e v e l o p m e n t .
•  G l o b a l  a n d  R e g i o n a l  N u c l e a r  P o w e r  D e v e l o p m e n t .
•  N u c l e a r  Skills, E d u c a t i o n  a n d  Training.
•  N u c l e a r  R e s e a r c h  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t .
•  N u c l e a r  a n d  R a d i o l o g i c a l  Security.
1.1.1: G l o b a l  C l i m a t e  C h a n g e :
G l o b a l  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  is a  natural p r o c e s s  that r e quires v i g o r o u s  analysis. H u m a n  
activity i n fluences cl i m a t e  c h a n g e  a n d  t h e  n e e d  t o  c o n s e r v e  a n d  d e v e l o p  c a r b o n  free 
s o u r c e s  o f  e n e r g y  a r e  t h o u g h t  t o  b e  pressing. C l i m a t e  c h a n g e  m a y  h a v e  s e v e r e  
c o n s e q u e n c e s  b u t  c o u l d  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  r e d u c e  t h o s e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  b y  p r o v i d i n g  a  
s o u r c e  o f  c a r b o n  free e n e r g y ?
1.1.2: N u c l e a r  P o w e r  a n d  S u s t a i n a b l e  D e v e l o p m e n t :
T h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p a c t  o f  e n e r g y  p r o d u c t i o n  f r o m  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  
fossil fuels is central t o  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  h o w  sustainable c u r r e n t  rates o f  e n e r g y  
c o n s u m p t i o n  a r e  a c r o s s  different regions. T h e  ‘E n e r g y  F o o t p r i n t ’ c o n c e p t  will b e
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u s e d  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  sustainability o f  regional e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n  a n d  th e  e x t e n t  to 
w h i c h  e x p a n s i o n  o r  decline o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  will affect regional e n e r g y  footprints.
1.1.3: G l o b a l  a n d  R e g i o n a l  N u c l e a r  P o w e r  D e v e l o p m e n t :
T h e  rate o f  e x p a n s i o n  o r  c o n t r a c t i o n  o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  in different r e g i o n s  o f  t h e  g l o b e  
is crucial t o  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  h o w  r e g i o n a l  g e o g r a p h y  will influence f u t u r e  n u c l e a r  
d e v e l o p m e n t .  C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  will b e  scrutinised a n d  u s e d  t o  c o m p a r e  a n d  
e x t e n d  predictive’scenarios.'
1.1.4: N u c l e a r  Skills, E d u c a t i o n  a n d  Training:
N u c l e a r  skills, e d u c a t i o n  a n d  training p r o v i s i o n  m u s t  b e  able t o  m e e t  t h e  n e e d s  o f  th e  
n u c l e a r  a n d  s u b - s e c t o r  industries. T h e r e  is a  large r a n g e  o f  p r o f e s s i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e s e  
industries. T h o s e  w i t h  n u c l e a r  skills include; r a d i o g r a p h e r s ,  n u c l e a r  scientists, 
n u c l e a r  engineers, radio-chemists, a c a d e m i c s ,  etc., a n d  all ar e  crucial to  t h e  
m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  industrial d e v e l o p m e n t .
1.1.5: N u c l e a r  R e s e a r c h  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t  ( R & D ) :
N u c l e a r  R & D  p r o v i d e s  solutions t o  p r o b l e m s  that affect t h e  utilisation o f  n u c l e a r  
resources. T e c h n o l o g i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n  t r a n s f o r m s  e c o n o m i e s  a n d  results f r o m  t h e  
tr a n s f e r e n c e  o f  scientific k n o w l e d g e  t o  practical application. T h e  futu r e  o f  n u c l e a r  
p o w e r  will b e  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  f u t u r e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n  
r e s p o n d s  t o  t h e  c h a l l e n g e s  fac i n g  t h e  n u c l e a r  industry.
1.1.6: N u c l e a r  a n d  R a d i o l o g i c a l  Security:
Se c u r i t y  o f  n u c l e a r  a n d  radiological m aterial h a s  b e e n  o f  p r o m i n e n t  c o n c e r n  since 1 1th 
S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 1  a t t a c k  o n  t h e  U n i t e d  States o f  A m e r i c a .  T h e  hijacking o f  f o u r  jet 
a e r o p l a n e s  b y  t h e  terrorist g r o u p  ‘A l - Q a e d i a ’ d e s t r o y e d  t h e  W o r l d  T r a d e  C e n t r e  a n d  
d a m a g e d  t h e  P e n t a g o n ,  highlighting t h e  vulnerability o f  n u c l e a r  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s  a n d  
t h e  n e e d  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  acquisition o f  n u c l e a r  o r  radiological material b y  m a l i c i o u s  
state o r  sub-state actors.
1.2: An a l y t i c a l  C o n c e p t s :
T h i s  thesis will u s e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  analytical c o n c e p t s  t o  p r o v i d e  a  f r a m e w o r k  u p o n  
w h i c h  t h e  a b o v e  issues will b e  d i s c u s s e d  a n d  e v a luated:
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•  C h a n g e
• R e s p o n s e
1.2.1: C h a n g e :
T h i s  c o n c e p t  p r o v i d e s  a  r a n g e  o f  spatial a n d  t e m p o r a l  b o u n d a r i e s  w i t h  w h i c h  c h a n g e  
c a n  b e  identified a n d  assessed. T i m e s c a l e s  will include: s h o r t - t e r m  (<5yrs), m e d i u m -  
t e r m  ( < 1 5 y r s )  a n d  l o n g - t e r m  ( > 1 5 y r s )  b o u n d a r i e s .  Spatial scales will include: 
national a n d  r e g i o n a l  b o u n d a r i e s .
1.2.2: R e s p o n s e :
T h i s  c o n c e p t  will b e  u s e d  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  anticipated c h a n g e  for n u c l e a r  p o w e r  a n d  th e  
implications for e n v i r o n m e n t a l  protection. T h e  a d e q u a c y  o f  curr e n t  policies t o  m e e t  
f u t u r e  c h a l l e n g e s  a n d  t h e  risks a n d  uncertainties o f  a c t i o n  o r  inaction in t h e  f a c e  o f  
t h o s e  c h a l l e n g e s  will b e  assessed.
1.3: A i m s :
• T o  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  issues that will influ e n c e  t h e  f u t u r e  role o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  u p  
t o  2 0 5 0 .
• T o  f i n d - o u t  t h e  positive a n d  n e g a t i v e  c o n d i t i o n s  f a c i n g  n u c l e a r  p o w e r .
•  T o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  fut u r e  role o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  in t h e  U K  for different t i m e  
horiz o n s .
• T o  ascertain t h e  futu r e  role o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  in g l o b a l  t e r m s  a n d  t h e  
implications for t h e  quality o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t .
1.4: Objective:
•  T o  h a v e  e n u m e r a t e d  a n d  investigated t h e  issues that will influence t h e  fixture 
role o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  u p  t o  2 0 5 0 .
•  T o  h a v e  e x a m i n e d  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  in t e r m s  o f  strengths, w e a k n e s s e s  a n d  
d i s c u s s e d  potential o p p o r t u n i t i e s  a n d  threats.
•  T o  h a v e  a s s e s s e d  t h e  fut u r e  role o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  in t h e  U K  for t h e  short, 
m e d i u m  a n d  l o n g - t e r m .
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•  T o  h a v e  e v a l u a t e d  t h e  g l o b a l  p r o s p e c t s  f or n u c l e a r  p o w e r  a n d  t h e  i m p l ications 
fo r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  protection.
■5
C h a p t e r  2:
G l o b a l  C l i m a t e  C h a n g e :
T h i s  c h a p t e r  will e v a l u a t e  t h e  s o u r c e s  o f  e v i d e n c e  a n d  m e t h o d s  u s e d  t o  d e t e r m i n e  th e  
effects a n d  m a g n i t u d e  o f  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e .  T h e  t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s  o f  forecasts a n d  
efficacy o f  international policy in r e s p o n s e  t o  t h o s e  forecasts will b e  r e v i e w e d ,  a s  will 
t h e  role o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  in that context.
T h e  p h y s i c a l  e n v i r o n m e n t  consists o f  5  interacting c o m p o n e n t s :
•  T h e  o c e a n s
•  T h e  a t m o s p h e r e
•  T h e  b i o s p h e r e
• T h e  c r y o s p h e r e
•  T h e  g e o s p h e r e
T h e  role o f  h u m a n  a g e n c y  s h o u l d  b e  i n c l u d e d  a s  a  6 th c o m p o n e n t  -  t h e  
‘a n t h r o p o s p h e r e 5 b e c a u s e  h u m a n  activity c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  c lim a t e  c h a n g e .  [3]
B y  t h e  1 9 8 0 s  e m e r g i n g  d a t a  c o m b i n e d  w i t h  a  r e - e v a l u a t i o n  o f  p r e v i o u s  d a t a  
c u l m i n a t e d  in t h e  c o n t e m p o r a r y  scientific v i e w  that t h e  a t m o s p h e r e  is b e i n g  h e a t e d  
a n d  that h u m a n  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  C O 2 is prim a r i l y  responsible. I n  r e s p o n s e  t o  this 
c o n c l u s i o n  g l o b a l  w a r m i n g  h a s  b e c o m e  a n  issue o f  m a j o r  international political 
c o n c e r n .
I n  a  p a p e r  p u b l i s h e d  in t h e  N u c l e a r  E n e r g y  A u t h o r i t y  N e w s  ( U S ) ,  J o h n s t o n  ( 2 0 0 1 )  
stated; “ T o d a y ,  t h e  a t m o s p h e r e  is b e i n g  c h o k e d  b y  g r e e n h o u s e  g a s  e m i s s i o n s ,  g l o b a l  
t e m p e r a t u r e s  a r e  rising dramatically, a n d  t h e  g l o b a l  p o p u l a t i o n  h a s  d o u b l e d  since 
1 9 5 5 ,  m o s t  living in p o v e r t y  in t h e  d e v e l o p i n g  w o r l d .  Y e t  w e  s e e m  t o  b e  d e n y i n g  
o u r s e l v e s  t h e  n u c l e a r  o p t i o n  w h i c h  w a s  s e e n  o v e r  f o u r  d e c a d e s  a g o  a s  t h e  w a y  
f o r w a r d ! ”  [4].
British E n e r g y  ( 2 0 0 5 )  a r g u e d  t h e  s a m e  p o i n t  b u t  w i t h  m o r e  caution; “ It c a n ’t b e  
p r o v e d  that g l o b a l  w a r m i n g  is t a k i n g  p l a c e  b u t  t h e r e  is a  c o n s e n s u s  o f  scientists that it 
is, U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  b y  t h e  t i m e  t h e  e v i d e n c e  is available t o  p r o v e  it is, it m a y  b e  t o o
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late. T h e r e  is s o m e  e v i d e n c e  that p a s t  e m i s s i o n s  h a v e  c o m m i t t e d  u s  t o  g l o b a l  w a r m i n g  
f o r  y e a r s  t o  c o m e . ”  [5].
M o r e o v e r ,  in t e r m s  o f  C O 2 r e d u c t i o n  British E n e r g y  ( 2 0 0 5 )  c o n t i n u e d ,  “ N u c l e a r  
e n e r g y  c a n ,  h o w e v e r ,  p l a y  a  m a j o r  p a r t  a n d  a l r e a d y  d o e s  so. F r a n c e ,  w h i c h  p r o d u c e s  
o v e r  t w o - t h i r d s  o f  its electricity f r o m  nuclear, h a s  r e d u c e d  its C O 2 e m i s s i o n s  b y  6 0 %  
in less t h a n  t e n  y e a r s  ”  [5].
T h e  U K  n u c l e a r  i n d u s t r y  h a s  m a d e  t h e  c a s e  that n u c l e a r  p o w e r  c a n  p r o v i d e  c l e a n  
‘c a r b o n  fre e ’ e n e r g y  t h u s  alleviating t h e  n e e d  for C O 2 p r o d u c i n g  fossil fuels. A s  will 
b e  s h o w n  b y  t h e  A u t h o r ,  n u c l e a r  is n o t  c a r b o n - f r e e  f r o m  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  life-cycle 
analysis. Fossil fuels a r e  u s e d  to  extract a n d  p r o d u c e  t h e  materials r e q u i r e d  t o  build 
n u c l e a r  p o w e r  plants.
T w o  k e y  q u e s t i o n s  n e e d  t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d :
•  Is t h e r e  a n  ‘e n h a n c e d  g r e e n h o u s e  g a s ’ p r o b l e m  t o  solv e ?
• Is t h e  c u r r e n t  International P a n e l  o n  C l i m a t e  C h a n g e ’s v i e w  o f  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  
valid a n d  t o  w h a t  e x t e n t  h a s  t h e  n u c l e a r  i n d u s t r y  b a s e d  its c l a i m s  a s  p a r t  o f  th e  
‘e n h a n c e d  g r e e n h o u s e  g a s ’ solu t i o n  o n  justified scientific a r g u m e n t s  a n d  n o t  a  
d i s c o u r s e  o f  o p p o r t u n i s m ?
2.1: T h e  D y n a m i c s  o f  C l i m a t e  C h a n g e :
W i t h o u t  a n  a t m o s p h e r e  t h e  m e a n  g l o b a l  t e m p e r a t u r e  o f  t h e  E a r t h  w o u l d  b e  - 1 9 ° C .  
[6], T h i s  m e a n  a v e r a g e  t e m p e r a t u r e  is n o t  e x p e r i e n c e d  d u e  to  ‘g r e e n h o u s e  g a s e s ’ 
p r e v e n t i n g  t h e  e s c a p e  o f  s u r f a c e  e m i t t e d  l o n g - w a v e  radiation into space.
2.1.1: E x t e r n a l  Factors:
2.1.1.1: S o l a r  Irradiance:
T h e  S u n  p o w e r s  t h e  E a r t h ’s c l i m a t e  a n d  is c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  m o s t  significant radiative 
force. S o l a r  o u t p u t  varies w i t h i n  a n  1 1  y e a r l y  s u n s p o t  cycle.
H a t h a w a y  ( 2 0 0 3 )  states; “ S u n s p o t s  a p p e a r  as  d a r k  s p o t s  o n  t h e  s u r f a c e  o f  t h e  S u n .  
T e m p e r a t u r e s  in t h e  d a r k  c e n t r e s  o f  s u n s p o t s  d r o p  t o  a b o u t  3 7 0 0  K  ( c o m p a r e d  t o
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5 7 0 0  K  f or t h e  s u r r o u n d i n g  p h o t o s p h e r e ) .  T h e y  typically last for several day s ,  
a l t h o u g h  v e r y  large o n e s  m a y  live f o r  s everal w e e k s . ”  [7],
O b s e r v a t i o n a l  d a t a  e x t e n d i n g  b a c k  t o  t h e  1 2 th C e n t u r y  indicates that s u n s p o t  n u m b e r s  
a n d  t h u s  solar intensity varies b e t w e e n  s u n s p o t  cycles. “ It s e e m s  unlikely that w e  
s h o u l d  e x p e c t  variations o f  m o r e  t h a n  1 p e r  c e n t  in solar o u t p u t  a s  a  result o f  th e  
s u n s p o t  o r  o t h e r  natural c h a n g e s ;  s i m p l e  calculations o f  t h e  E a r t h ’s radiative b a l a n c e  
s u g g e s t s  that a  1 p e r  c e n t  difference in o u t p u t  w o u l d  l e a d  to  a  c h a n g e  o f  o n l y  0 . 6  ° C  in 
m e a n  a n n u a l  t e m p e r a t u r e . ”  [8],
2.1.1.2: M i l a n k o v i c - C r o l l  E f f e c t  ( o p e r a t i n g  o v e r  t h o u s a n d s  o f  years):
T h i s  t h e o r y  h e l p s  e x p l a i n  p e r i o d i c  c h a n g e s  o f  c l i m a t e  b e t w e e n  glacial a n d  interglacial 
conditions. W a r r  &  S m i t h  ( 1 9 9 5 )  explain; “  C h a n g e s  in t h e  E a r t h ’s orbit p r o d u c e  
s e a s o n a l  a n d  latitudinal c h a n g e s  in solar radiation r e a c h i n g  t h e  Earth. T h e r e  a r e  thr e e  
c o m p o n e n t s  c a u s i n g  c h a n g e ;  eccentricity, tilt a n d  p r e c e s s i o n . ”  [9].
E ccentricity is t h e  s h a p e  o f  t h e  E a r t h ’s orbit a r o u n d  t h e  S u n .  O r b i t  varies f r o m  
circular (a  l o w  eccentricity) t o  elliptical ( a  h i g h  eccentricity). A t  l o w  eccentricity t h e  
E a r t h  r e c e i v e s  a  c o n s t a n t  radiative i n p u t  b u t  a  h i g h  eccentricity r eceives g r e a t e r  input 
w h e n  closer t o  t h e  S u n  a n d  vice versa. T h i s  results in s e a s o n a l  intensification o f  o n e  
h e m i s p h e r e  a n d  m o d e r a t e s  t h e  other. T h i s  p h e n o m e n o n  f o l l o w s  a  9 5  0 0 0  y e a r  cycle.
T h e  tilt o f  t h e  E a r t h ’s axis c a n  v a r y  f r o m  2 1 . 8 °  t o  24.4°. T h e  grea t e r  t h e  a n g l e  o f  tilt 
t h e  m o r e  e x t r e m e  t h e  s e a s o n  in e a c h  h e m i s p h e r e .  W h e r e  t h e  E a r t h  is at its near e s t  
p o i n t  t o  t h e  S u n  ( 1 4 . 7 1  x  1 0 7k m )  this is t e r m e d  t h e  perihelion. B y  contrast, t h e  
furthest p o i n t  o f  d i s t a n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  t w o  b o d i e s  is t e r m e d  t h e  aphelion ( 1 5 . 2  x  
1 0 7k m ) .
“ A t  p r e s e n t  t h e  perihelion o c c u r s  o n  3 rd J a n u a r y  w h i l e  t h e  a p h e l i o n  is o n  t h e  4 th July. 
T h e  difference in d i s t a n c e  o f  E a r t h  f r o m  t h e  S u n  at t h e s e  t i m e s  affects t h e  a m o u n t  o f  
solar radiation r e a c h i n g  t h e  a t m o s p h e r e .  A t  perihelion a  m a x i m u m  o f  1 4 0 0 W m ' 2 is 
received, w hi l s t  at a p h e l i o n  t h e  v a l u e  is 1 3 1  l W m 2, t h u s  v a r y i n g  b y  a b o u t  7  p e r  c e n t  
b e t w e e n  p e rihelion a n d  aphel i o n . ”  [9].
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T h i s  p h e n o m e n o n  h a s  a  c y c l e  o f  2 1  0 0 0  y e a r s  a n d  affects t h e  relative w a r m t h  o f  
w i n t e r s  a n d  s u m m e r s  in b o t h  h e m i s p h e r e s .
2.1.1.3: P r e c e s s i o n :
C o n c e r n s  t h e  c h a n g e  o f  d irection in s p a c e  o f  t h e  E a r t h ’s axis o f  rotation. T h i s  
p h e n o m e n o n  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  t i m e  o f  y e a r  w h e n  t h e  d i s t a n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  E a r t h  a n d  
S u n  is a  m i n i m u m  a n d  a  m a x i m u m ,  a n d  s o  affects seasonality in e a c h  h e m i s p h e r e .  [9]. 
T h i s  p h e n o m e n o n  h a s  a  c y c l e  o f  2 6  0 0 0  years.
2.1.2: Internal Factors:
Internal f e e d b a c k  m e c h a n i s m s  interact o v e r  v a r y i n g  spatial a n d  t e m p o r a l  scales. 
C h a n g e  in m o u n t a i n o u s  terrain o c c u r s  s l o w l y  o v e r  h u g e  t i m e s c a l e s  ( m i l l i o n s  o f  years) 
a n d  affects t h e  a t m o s p h e r e  significantly. O v e r  a  s i m i l a r  times c a l e ,  c h a n g e s  in th e  
s h a p e  o f  o c e a n i c  b a s i n s  affect c u r r e n t  patterns. T h i s  in turn affects t h e  t h e r m o h a l i n e  
c i r c u l a t i o n 1 ( T H C )  a b o u t  w h i c h  m o r e  is to b e  d e s c r i b e d .
Internal factors i n c l u d e  inter alia:
• V o l c a n i c  activity c h a n g e s  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  a t m o s p h e r e .  Particulate 
m a t t e r  (du s t  a n d  s u l p h a t e )  reflects solar r a diation a n d  h a s  a  c o o l i n g  effect. 
S t r a t o s p h e r i c  i n p u t  a n d  latitude ( e r u p t i o n s  at h i g h  latitudes d o  n o t  h a v e  g l o b a l  
effects) d e t e r m i n e  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  e r u p t i o n s  o n  the a t m o s p h e r e .  E v i d e n c e  
s u g g e s t s  that large e r u p t i o n s  (e.g. T a m b o r a  v o l c a n i c  eruption, I n d o n e s i a ,
1 8 1 5 )  h a v e  c a u s e d  a  d r o p  o f  0 . 2 ° C  in g l o b a l  t e m p e r a t u r e .
• D e f o r e s t a t i o n  a n d  o t h e r  l a n d  u s e  c h a n g e s  affect a l b e d o  a n d  r e d u c e  c a r b o n  
s t o r a g e  a n d  w a t e r  s t o r a g e  capacity.
• G l a c i a l  a d v a n c e m e n t  a n d  retreat affects a l b e d o  a n d  f r e s h w a t e r  storage. 
I n c r e a s e d  i n p u t  o f  f r e s h w a t e r  into t h e  o c e a n s  will affect, o r  m a y  s h u t  off, t h e  
t h e r m o h a l i n e  circulation c o m p l e t e l y .  O s b o u r n e  ( 2 0 0 2 )  e x p l a i n s ;  “ S o m e  fairly 
s i m p l e  m o d e l s  o f  t h e  w o r l d ' s  o c e a n s  d o  s i m u l a t e  a  r a p i d  b r e a k  d o w n  o f  t h e  
T H C ,  w h e n  t h e  d e n s i t y  o f  t h e  w a t e r  i n  t h e  N o r t h  Atlan t i c  O c e a n  is l o w e r e d  b y
1 The Thermohaline Circulation is a water transportation process driven by differences in density. 
Temperature and salinity differences produce movement that transports warm seawater from the 
equator to northern latitudes (e.g. Greenland Sea) where this water increases in density and sinks. This 
water then returns to equatorial regions (e.g. Indian and Pacific Oceans). This ‘conveyer’ system 
operates over tens to hundreds of years to complete one cycle.
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a d d i n g  fre s h  w a t e r  (rain) a n d / o r  b y  w a r m i n g .  I n c r e a s e d  rainfall a n d  w a n n i n g  
o v e r  t h e  N o r t h  A t l a n t i c  a r e  b o t h  e x p e c t e d  a s  a  result o f  i n c r e a s e d  g r e e n h o u s e  
g a s  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s ,  a n d  s o  it c a n  b e  a r g u e d  that g l o b a l  w a r m i n g  m a y  c a u s e  a  
r a p i d  c o l l a p s e  o f  t h e  T H C .”  [10]. If this w e r e  to h a p p e n  the U K  w o u l d  
e n c o u n t e r  a  c l i m a t e  simi l a r  to E a s t e r n  E u r o p e a n  c o u n t r i e s  at t h e  s a m e  latitude.
• C O 2 i n c r e a s e  is th e  result o f  t h e  g r o w t h  in fossil fuel u s e  a n d  deforestation. 
H o w e v e r ,  C H 4 i n c r e a s e  is d u e  to industrial a n d  agricultural p r actices (i.e. 
a n a e r o b i c  d e c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  o r g a n i c  m a t e r i a l  arising f r o m  rice cultivation a n d  
cattle w a s t e ) ,  n i t r o g e n  o x i d e s  ( N O x) a n d  w a t e r  v a p o u r  all participate in 
posit i v e  radiative f o r c i n g 2 . Particulate m a t t e r  a n d  s u l p h a t e  a e r o s o l s  m a y  offset 
positive radiative forcing.
2.2: F e e d b a c k :
T h e  5  interacting c o m p o n e n t s  o f  t h e  p h y s i c a l  e n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  h u m a n  m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  
t h o s e  c o m p o n e n t s  interact in a  c o m p l e x  f ashion. C h a n g e s  in o n e  c o m p o n e n t  will 
result in f e e d b a c k  (positive o r  n e g a t i v e )  w i t h i n  the entire c l i m a t e  s y s t e m .  It is t h e s e  
f e e d b a c k  m e c h a n i s m s  that r e g u l a t e  a n d  c a u s e  fluctuation w i t h i n  t h e  c l i m a t e  s y s t e m  a s  
identified in t h e  p a l a e o n t o l o g i c a l  record.
A b r u p t  c l i m a t i c  c h a n g e  o c c u r s  d u e  to r a p i d  f e e d b a c k  m e c h a n i s m s  w h e r e  t h e  m i n o r  
initial c h a n g e  is m a g n i f i e d  to a n  e x t e n t  w h e r e  t h e  w h o l e  s y s t e m  h a s  to u n d e r g o  
a d j u s t m e n t .  N o n - l i n e a r  s y s t e m s  a r e  c a p a b l e  o f  s e l f-organisation/regulation a n d  m a y  
h a v e  s e v e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  states. T h e  difficulty o f  a n a l y s i s  rests u p o n  t h e  t e m p o r a l  a n d  
spatial scale o f  t h e  c l i m a t o l o g i c a l  s y s t e m .  T h i s  pr e s e n t s  s e v e r e  limitations to c l i m a t e  
m o d e l l i n g  g i v e n  th e  p o v e r t y  o f  avai l a b l e  d a t a  a n d  t h e  c h a o t i c  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  
c o n s i d e r e d ,
2.3: T h e  H o l o c e n e :
T h i s  is t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t  E p o c h  o f  t h e  Q u a t e r n a r y  P e r i o d  that started 1 . 6 M a  a g o .
A l l a b y  &  A l l a b y  ( 1 9 9 1 )  d e f i n e  t h e  H o l o c e n e  a s  the; “ E p o c h  that c o v e r s  t h e  last 
1 0  0 0 0  years.”  [11]. It is p r o x y  e v i d e n c e  f r o m  this s e c t i o n  o f  g e o l o g i c a l  hist o r y  that 
offers greatest insight into f u t u r e  c l i m a t e  scenarios.
2 Positive Radiative Forcing is measured in W/m2 and describes a net increase in radiation to tlie 
Earth’s upper atmosphere with the effect of warming the Earth’s surface and the lower atmosphere.
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Indicators f r o m  w h i c h  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d a t a  a b o u t  this e p o c h  a r e  d e r i v e d  i n c l u d e  inter 
alia:
• R e l i c  L a n d f o r m s  - B r i g g s  &  S m i t h s o n  ( 1 9 9 2 )  assert; “ B y  c o m p a r i n g  certain 
l a n d f o r m s  a n d  s e d i m e n t s  w i t h  t h e  t y p e  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t  in  w h i c h  t h e y  ar e  
f o r m i n g  t o d a y ,  it m a y  b e  p o s s i b l e  to infer t h e  c l i m a t e  d u r i n g  their f o r m a t i o n . ’’ 
[12]. G o u d i e  ( 1 9 8 3 )  s h o w s  that l a n d f o r m  features i n d i c a t e  historical c l i m a t e  
conditions:
Landform Type of climatic information
Pingos, palsen, 
ice-wedge casts, 
giant polygons 
Cirques
Closed lake basins
Fossil dunes of 
continental interiors  
A n gu lar screes
Permafrost, and through  
that, mean annual 
tem peratures below - 5 CC
Tem perature through their 
relationship to snowlines  
Precipitation levels 
associated w ith  ancient 
shoreline formation
Form er w ind  directions and 
precipitation levels
Frost action w ith  the 
presence of some moisture
T a b l e  1: L a n d f o r m  features i ndic a t i n g  historical c l i m a t e  c o n ditions. [13].
• P o l l e n  a nalysis -  s p e c i m e n s  l o c a t e d  in a n a e r o b i c  c o n d i t i o n s  s u c h  a s  p e a t  a n d  
l a k e  m u d  indicate the v e g e t a t i o n  o f  a  l o c a t i o n  at a  certain p o i n t  in t i m e  f r o m  
w h i c h  c l i m a t e  c o n d i t i o n s  c a n  b e  inferred. S u c c e s s i o n  p r o c e s s e s  a r e  a s s u m e d
t
to b e  t h e  s a m e  as  p r e s e n t  b u t  s o m e  v e g e t a t i o n  p r o d u c e s  m o r e  p o l l e n  t h a n  
o t h e r s  a n d  this m a y  s k e w  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  results. P o l l e n  f r o m  o t h e r  
locations c o u l d  b e  b l o w n  o n t o  t h e  site o f  investigation a n d  m i s r e p r e s e n t  t h e  
v e g e t a t i o n  history o f  t h e  site
•  M a r i n e  fossils -  for e x a m p l e ,  f o r a m i n i f e r a  (Globigerina pachyderma) exist in 
t h e  N o r t h  A tlantic O c e a n  n e a r  G r e e n l a n d .  S p e c i m e n s  f o u n d  in s u c h  
c o n d i t i o n s  m e a n  that G. pachyderma s u r v i v e s  b u t  historically in p e r i o d s
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w h e r e  t h e  N o r t h  Atlantic O c e a n  w a s  m u c h  c o l d e r  ( 2 0  0 0 0  y e a r s  a g o )  t h e  p l a n k t o n  
s p e c i e s  e x t e n d e d  m u c h  further.
• D e n d r o c h r o n o l o g y  -  T r e e  rin g s  g r o w  a n n u a l l y  a n d  r e s p o n d  to climatic
conditions. T r e e s  f o u n d  in t e m p e r a t e  latitudes d e m o n s t r a t e  this p h e n o m e n o n  
w e l l  a n d  c a n  b e  c alibrated a g a i n s t  t h e  rings o f  trees o f  v a r y i n g  a g e  t o  
d e t e r m i n e  a n  o v e r l a p p i n g  s e q u e n c e  a n d  c a n  b e  further c o m p a r e d  w i t h  r e c e n t  
i n s t r u m e n t a l  data. F r o m  this calibration a n c i e n t  trees c a n  tell m u c h  a b o u t  
historical c l i m a t e  c o n d i t i o n s  (i.e. t e m p e r a t u r e ) .
•  I c e  c o r e s  -=• L a n d  b a s e d  ice d a t a  ( V o s t o k  ~  A n t a r c t i c a  a n d  G r e e n l a n d )  w e r e  
a c q u i r e d  t h r o u g h  c o r i n g  a n d  c o u n t i n g  t h e  layers c r e a t e d  d u e  t o  a n n u a l  
snowfall. S m a l l  quantities o f  air g e t  t r a p p e d  a n d  p r e s e r v e d  in t h e  layers a n d  
analysis o f  t h e s e  g a s e s  r e v e a l s  i n f o r m a t i o n  inferring t h e  state o f  t h e  
a t m o s p h e r e  at t h e  t i m e  t h e  ice w a s  laid d o w n .  C o n c e n t r a t i o n s  o f  a t m o s p h e r i c  
constituents (e.g. C O 2) c a n  b e  d e t e r m i n e d .
Antarctic tee com temperature record 
Antarctic ice core carbon dioxide record
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Fig. 1: T e m p e r a t u r e  r e s p o n s e  t o  a t m o s p h e r i c  C O 2 concent r a t i o n s .  [14].
T h e  g r a p h  s h o w s  a n  i m m e d i a t e  c l imatic t e m p e r a t u r e  r e s p o n s e  t o  i n c r e a s e s  in 
C 0 2 (r2 =  0.79). [15]. D a t a  a r e  t a k e n  f r o m  a  specific l o c a t i o n  ( V o s t o k  -  E a s t
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A n t a r c t i c a )  a n d  m a y  n o t  b e  r e p r esentative o f  g l o b a l  conditions.
• Isot o p i c  d a t i n g  - U s e d  to infer t e m p e r a t u r e  a n d  a g e  o f  s a m p l e s .  14C  d a t i n g  
c a n  b e  u s e d  to d e t e r m i n e  t h e  a g e  o f  o r g a n i c  material, w h e r e a s  180 : I60  ratios 
infer c l i m a t e  t e m p e r a t u r e .  L e s s  180  f o u n d  in ice c o r e s  indicate c o l d e r  g l o b a l
to *1m e a n  t e m p e r a t u r e  a n d  m o r e  O  infers w a r m e r  g l o b a l  m e a n  t e m p e r a t u r e  .
A  p r o x y  c l i m a t e  r e c o r d  c a n  b e  es t a b l i s h e d  f r o m  the a m o u n t  o f  l80  p r e s e n t  at 
different layers o f  t he ice core. 180 : l60  ratios are e x p r e s s e d  as d e p a r t u r e s  
f r o m  a  m e a n  v a l u e  t e r m  ( f r o m  the S t a n d a r d  M e a n  O c e a n  W a t e r  - S M O W )  
p r o v i d i n g  5 lsO  value.
(I80/I60) sample - (IS0/I60) SMOW X 103%o 
g180 =    --------
(l80/160) SMOW
F o r  “ . . . p a l a e o c l i m a t e  reco n s t r u c t i o n s ,  typical v a l u e s  for 5 180  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  
ice c o r e s  r a n g e  b e t w e e n  -10 a n d  -60%o” ( M o r g a n ,  1982) [15].
• O b s e r v a t i o n a l  d a t a  r e c o r d  -  P e r i o d s  o f  w a n n i n g  a n d  c o o l i n g  a r e  e v i d e n t  o v e r  
t h e  last l O O O y r s .  H i storical d o c u m e n t a t i o n  reve a l s  that b e t w e e n 1 0 0 0  -  1 2 0 0  
t h e  t e m p e r a t u r e  w a s  w a r m .  T h e  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e d  b e t w e e n l 2 0 0  -  1 4 0 0  
resulting in c o o l e r  t e m p e r a t u r e s .  W a n n e r  t e m p e r a t u r e s  r e t u r n e d  f r o m  1 4 0 0  -  
1 5 5 0  b u t  w e r e  f o l l o w e d  b y  m u c h  c o l d e r  t e m p e r a t u r e s  f r o m  1 5 5 0  -  1 8 5 0 .
T h i s  p e r i o d  is referred to a s  t h e  ‘Little I ce A g e ’ a n d  i n c l u d e d  glacial 
a d v a n c e m e n t  in p o l a r  a n d  m o u n t a i n o u s  r e g i o n s  as w e l l  as a b a n d o n m e n t  o f
3 There are 3 stable isotopes of oxygen: I60, l70 and i80. The ratio of 160:180 found in the remains of 
marine fossils (shells CaC03) preserved in ocean sediments provide a measure of the ratio of oxygen 
isotopes present in the ocean at the time the marine organism lived. During warm climates H 2160 is 
evaporated preferentially. Moreover, evaporated H2lsO  will condense and be precipitated back into the
ocean preferentially. These two processes result in an atmosphere rich in H2160. When the H 2160 
reaches polar regions it forms snow that is rich in H2I60  relative to seawater. The colder the global 
mean temperature the more l60 locked up in the ice relative to l80.
160: lsO ratios are measured using mass spectrometry with the results expressed as a 8 value that is
produced from a comparison with a standard sample of seawater having a S180 value of zero. 8 values
are measured in parts per thousand.
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u p l a n d  agriculture a n d  i n c r e a s e d  aridity in S o u t h e r n  E u r o p e .  W a n n i n g  w a s  
o b s e r v e d  b e t w e e n  1 8 5 0 - 1 9 4 0 s  f o l l o w e d  b y  c o o l i n g  until t h e  1 9 7 0 s .  T h e  
1 9 8 0 s  a n d  1 9 9 0 s  s h o w e d  i n c r e a s e d  w a n n i n g .
T h e r e  are inevitable p r o b l e m s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  th e  tr u s t w o r t h i n e s s  o f  data. P r o x y  d a t a  
will infer local c l i m a t e  c o n d i t i o n s  a n d  m a y  n o t  b e  w o r t h y  o f  g l o b a l  extrapolation. 
C o r r o b o r a t i o n  o f  different s o u r c e s  o f  d a t a  b y  c l i m a t e  r e s e a r c h e r s  s u c h  a s  t h e  I P C C  is 
essential to v a l i d a t e  claims. D i r e c t  o b s e r v a t i o n a l  d a t a  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  p o o r l y  collected 
w i t h  are a s  o f  t h e  g l o b e  h a v i n g  n o  records. T h e  o c e a n  c o v e r s  m o s t  o f  t h e  E a r t h  b u t  
little o b s e r v a t i o n a l  d a t a  exists o v e r  this space.
T h e r e  ar e  m a n y  ‘h o l e s ’, as  w e l l  as  uncertainties o v e r  t h e  p r e c i s i o n  a n d  a c c u r a c y  o f  
data. V a l i d a t i o n  o f  d a t a  is central to d e t e r m i n i n g  t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s  o f  c l i m a t e  m o d e l s .
2.4: G e n e r a l  C i r c u l a t i o n  M o d e l s  ( G C M ) :
T h e s e  t y p e s  o f  m o d e l  are ch a r a c t e r i s e d  b y  3 - d i m e n s i o n s  c o m b i n e d  w i t h  t i m e - e v o l v i n g  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  a t m o s p h e r e  o r  o c e a n .  C o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  a t m o s p h e r e ,  a  s u r f a c e  
g r i d  s y s t e m  is p l a c e d  o v e r  t h e  a r e a  to b e  m o d e l l e d  a n d  e a c h  s q u a r e  o n  t h e  grid 
c o n t a i n s  a  vertical c o l u m n  that is stratified.
B o u n d a r y  c o n d i t i o n s  ar e  se t - u p  a n d  e x c h a n g e s  b e t w e e n  cells (in t e r m s  o f  m a x i m u m  
a n d  m i n i m u m  t e m p e r a t u r e ,  press u r e ,  w i n d  s p e e d  a n d  direction, precipitation, inci d e n t  
solar radiation a n d  relative h u m i d i t y )  c a n  b e  r e p r e s e n t e d  t h r o u g h  time.
T h e  effects o f  s m a l l - s c a l e  p h e n o m e n a  that a r e  b e y o n d  m o d e l l i n g  ar e  s i m p l i f i e d  
t h r o u g h  a v e r a g i n g  a n d  applied. T h i s  p r o c e s s  is t e r m e d  ‘p a r a m e t e r i s a t i o n ’.
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Fig. 2: A  finite g r i d  s u p e r i m p o s e d  o n  t h e  E arth, w i t h  1 0° resolution. D a t a  o n  
s u c h  a  gri d  w o u l d  b e  s t o r e d  at t he intersections o f  gridlines. A  finite d i fference 
s c h e m e  will a l s o  e x t e n d  t h e  grid in t h e  vertical. ( U n i v e r s i t y  o f  L e e d s ,  2 0 0 3 )  
[16].
T h e  f o u n d a t i o n  o f  this t y p e  o f  m o d e l  is a  set o f  t i m e - d e p e n d e n t  e q u a t i o n s  that g o v e r n  
h o w  t h e  d y n a m i c s  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  a r e  d e s c r i b e d .  T h e s e  m o d e l s  a r e  c o m p l e x  a n d  
r e q u i r e  h u g e  c o m p u t a t i o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  to run.
C o u p l i n g  o f  A t m o s p h e r i c  G C M  w i t h  O c e a n i c / S e a  ice G C M  p r o v i d e s  a  m o r e  realistic 
b a s i s  o n  w h i c h  p r e d i c t i v e  m o d e l s  c a n  b e  d e s i g n e d .  A t m o s p h e r e - O c e a n  G e n e r a l  
C i r c u l a t o r y  M o d e l s  ( A O G C M )  a r e  m o r e  a c c u r a t e  a n d  c o m p l e x  c o n s t r u c t i o n s  b u t  are 
still i m p a i r e d  d u e  to l i miting factors s u c h  as  s p i n - u p  (see b e l o w ) ,  t he role that c l o u d s  
p l a y  i n  radiative f o r c i n g  a n d  t h e  e x t e n t  to w h i c h  f e e d b a c k  m e c h a n i s m s  (e.g. i n c r e a s e d  
w a t e r  v a p o u r )  will affect t h e  radiative b a l a n c e .
C i r c u l a t o r y  s y s t e m  m o d e l s  c o n t a i n  m i n o r  errors that g r o w  w i t h  t i m e  in a n  
u n p r e d i c t a b l e  w a y .  S p i n - u p  is t h e  t i m e  r e q u i r e d  for t h e  initial co n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  
m o d e l l e d  s y s t e m  t o  stabilise a n d  s u c h  p e r i o d s  v a r y  for different c o m p o n e n t s  o f  t h e  
s y s t e m  b e i n g  m o d e l l e d .  O c e a n s  r e q u i r e  a  s p i n - u p  t i m e  o f  s e a s o n s  for u p p e r  parts a n d  
c e nturies fo r  d e e p e r  parts. B y  contrast, t h e  s p i n - u p  t i m e  fo r  t h e  a t m o s p h e r e  is a  
m a t t e r  o f  w e e k s ,  therefore, fo r e c a s t i n g  t h e  f u t u r e  c l i m a t e  is limited since m o d e l s  are 
n o t  initialised w i t h  a n  a c c u r a t e  initial state. [16]
M o d e l s  a r e  further c o n s t r a i n e d  b y  t h e  quality o f  d a t a  available a n d  p r o c e s s i n g  p o w e r .  
I P C C  ( 2 0 0 1 )  p r o v i d e s  a n  e x t e n s i v e  ‘w i s h  list’ in their third r eport p o i n t i n g  o u t  that th e  
f o l l o w i n g  a c t i o n  is required:
•  F u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h  -  n e e d  t o  i m p r o v e  ability t o  detect, attribute a n d  u n d e r s t a n d  
c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  to  r e d u c e  uncertainties.
•  R e v e r s e  t h e  decline o f  o b s e r v a t i o n a l  n e t w o r k s  in m a n y  parts o f  t h e  w o r l d 4.
•  E n h a n c e  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s  o f  p a s t  climate periods.
•  I m p r o v e  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n s  o f  spatial distribution o f  g r e e n h o u s e  g a s e s  a n d  
aerosols.
•  S u s t a i n  a n d  e x p a n d  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n a l  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  clim a t e  studies b y  
p r o v i d i n g  accurate, l o n g - t e r m ,  consistent d a t a  i n c l u d i n g  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  a  
strategy f o r  integrated g l o b a l  observ a t i o n .
•  I m p r o v e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  m e c h a n i s m s  a n d  f o r c e s  lea d i n g  t o  c h a n g e s  in 
radiative forcing.
•  U n d e r s t a n d  a n d  characterise t h e  i m p o r t a n t  u n r e s o l v e d  p r o c e s s e s  a n d  
f e e d b a c k ,  b o t h  p hysical a n d  b i o g e o c h e m i c a l ,  in c l i m a t e  s ystems.
•  I m p r o v e  t h e  i n tegrated h i e r a r c h y  o f  g l o b a l  a n d  r e g i o n a l  cli m a t e  m o d e l s  w i t h  a  
f o c u s  o n  t h e  s i m u l a t i o n  o f  c l i m a t e  variability, r e g i o n a l  cli m a t e  c h a n g e s  a n d  
e x t r e m e  events.
•  I m p r o v e  m e t h o d s  t o  q u a n t i f y  uncertainties o f  c l i m a t e  projections a n d  
scenarios, i n c l u d i n g  l o n g - t e r m  e n s e m b l e  s i m u l a t i o n s  u s i n g  c o m p l e x  m o d e l s .
4 e.g. Disparities ip tidal-gauge data arise due to uneven spread o f monitoring stations in Western 
Europe, North America and Japan, being non-existent in Africa, South America and the Middle East.
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•  L i n k  m o r e  effectively m o d e l s  o f  t h e  p h y s i c a l  c l i m a t e  a n d  t h e  b i o g e o c h e m i c a l  
s y s t e m ,  a n d  in  t u r n  i m p r o v e  c o u p l i n g  w i t h  d e s criptions o f  h u m a n  activities. 
[18].
T h e  I P C C  ( 2 0 0 1 )  p r o p o s e d  a  r a n g e  o f  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  s c e n a r i o s  b a s e d  u p o n  curr e n t  
m o d e l s .  M o d e l s  are r e g a r d e d  as  r e s e a r c h  tools a n d  c a n  b e  u p d a t e d  as  required. 
E v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  m o d e l s  is b a s e d  o n  t h e  e x t e n t  to w h i c h  t h e  m o d e l  is p h y s i c a l l y  
b a s e d  c o u p l e d  w i t h  h o w  t h e  m o d e l l e d  d y n a m i c s  o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s y s t e m s  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  replicate o b s e r v e d  o u t c o m e s .
I P C C  ( 2 0 0 1 )  p r o d u c e d  a  b r o a d  r a n g e  o f  m o d e l s  that e m p h a s i s e  different radiative 
f o r c i n g  agents. T h e  results o f  t h e s e  m o d e l s  p r o j e c t  a  r a n g e  o f  potential s c e n a r i o s  for 
c l i m a t e  c h a n g e .  T h e s e  s c e n a r i o s  are u p d a t e d  o n  a  r e g u l a r  basis ( 1 9 9 2 , 1 9 9 6  a n d  
2 0 0 0 ) .  “ F o u r  different narrative storylines w e r e  d e v e l o p e d  to d e s c r i b e  consistently 
tlie relationship b e t w e e n  t h e  f o r c e s  d r i v i n g  e m i s s i o n s  a n d  their e v o l u t i o n  a n d  to a d d  
c o n t e x t  for t h e  s c e n a r i o  quantification.”  [18]. 4 0  potential s c e n a r i o s  e m e r g e  that 
c o n s i d e r  d e m o g r a p h i c ,  e c o n o m i c  a n d  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  c h a n g e  a n d  their i n f l u e n c e  u p o n  
radiative f o r c i n g  a g e n t s  (e.g. C O 2, S O 2, etc.).
2.5: T h e  F o u r  Storylines:
T h e  S p e c i a l  R e p o r t  o n  E m i s s i o n  S c e n a r i o s  ( S R E S )  w a s  p r o d u c e d  b y  t h e  I P C C  ( 2 0 0 1 )  
a n d  is u s e d  in t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  international c l i m a t e  p o l i c y  b u t  d o e s  n o t  i n c o r p o r a t e  
“ .. .additional c l i m a t e  initiatives, w h i c h  m e a n s  that n o  s c e n a r i o s  a r e  i n c l u d e d  that 
explicitly a s s u m e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  F r a m e w o r k  C o n v e n t i o n  o n  
C l i m a t e  C h a n g e  01* t h e  e m i s s i o n s  targets o f  t h e  K y o t o  P r o t o c o l . ”  [19].
E a c h  o f  t h e  f o u r  storylines A l ,  A 2 ,  B 1  a n d  B 2  ar e  further s u b - d i v i d e d  into a  ‘f a m i l y ’ 
o f  s c e n a r i o s  (e.g. A 1 F I ,  A 1 B ,  etc).
A l : A s s u m e s  r a p i d  g l o b a l  e c o n o m i c  a n d  p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h  that p e a k s  at 2 0 5 0 .  
D e c l i n e  f o l l o w s  a n d  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n  e n a b l e s  greater efficiency. T h e r e  is 
c o n t i n u e d  c o n v e r g e n c e  b e t w e e n  e c o n o m i c  regions, c a p a c i t y  b u i l d i n g  a n d  greater 
s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  e quality b e t w e e n  regions.
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3  s u b - s c e n a r i o s  e m e r g e  f r o m  this storyline b a s e d  o n  t h e  direction o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
c h a n g e  in t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  distribution o f  e n e r g y .  T h e s e  are; fossil intensive 
( A 1 F I ) ,  non-fossil e n e r g y  s o u r c e s  ( A I T )  a n d  b a l a n c e d  u s e  o f  all e n e r g y  s o u r c e s  
( A 1 B ) .
A 2 :  T h i s  storyline c o n s i d e r s  g l o b a l  diversity. Self-reliance a n d  t h e  s urvival o f  
r e g i o n a l  identity prevail o v e r  g l o b alisation a n d  fertility rates c o n v e r g e  l e a d i n g  t o  a  
c o n t i n u o u s  p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h .  R e g i o n a l  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  a n d  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
i n n o v a t i o n  is u n e v e n  a n d  t h e  p a c e  o f  c h a n g e  is s l o w .
B 1 : S i m i l a r  t o  A l  in its a s s u m p t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h  a n d  r e g i o n a l  
c o n v e r g e n c e  b u t  c o n t e n d s  that e c o n o m i c  structures shift t o w a r d s  s e r v i c e  industries 
a n d  th e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  industrialisation a s  w e l l  as  c l e a n e r  t e c h n o l o g i e s  in operation. 
G l o b a l  e q u i t y  a n d  su s t a i n a b l e  d e v e l o p m e n t  will l e a d  to glob a l  solu t i o n s  to g l o b a l  
p r o b l e m s .
B 2 :  L o c a l  solutions to  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  p r o b l e m s  ar e  central to this 
scenario. P o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h  is e x p e c t e d  b u t  at a  s l o w e r  rate t h a n  p o r t r a y e d  in t h e  
storyline o f  A 2 .  E c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  is n o t  r a p i d  o r  s l o w  a n d  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n  
is less ra p i d  t h a n  in A l  o r  B 1 scenarios. R e g i o n a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  is pivo t a l  t o  this 
storyline.
2.6: L i m i t s  to  S c e n a r i o  D e v e l o p m e n t :
S c e n a r i o s  a r e  b r o a d  a n d  a t t e m p t  to r e p r e s e n t  potential o u t c o m e s  at a  specific p o i n t  in 
time. T h e  v a l u e  o f  h a v i n g  a  r a n g e  o f  s c e n a r i o s  is that r e f i n e m e n t  c a n  b e  o n g o i n g  in 
r eceipt o f  n e w  data. T h e  validity o f  s c e n a r i o s  c a n  b e  m e a s u r e d  t h r o u g h  t i m e  a n d  o l d e r  
s c e n a r i o s  b a s e d  o n  s i m p l i f i e d  m o d e l s  c a n  b e  u s e d  a s  b e n c h m a r k s .  T h e  I S 9 2  sc e n a r i o  
f a m i l y  p r o v i d e s  this a d v a n t a g e .
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IS92a-f: T h i s  f a m i l y  o f ‘s t a n d a r d ’ s c e n a r i o s  w e r e  d e v e l o p e d  a n d  p u b l i s h e d  b y  t he 
I P C C  in 1 9 9 2 .  ( H o u g h t o n  et al, 1 9 9 2 )  [20], T h e s e  s c e n a r i o s  w e r e  b a s e d  o n  simplified 
m o d e l s  b y  c urr e n t  s t a n d a r d s  b u t  a r e  still u s e d  for t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  c o m p a r i s o n .
I S 9 2 a  is r eferred to as t h e  ‘B u s i n e s s  a s  U s u a l ’ ( B a U )  s c e n a r i o  a n d  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  m o s t  
likely c o u r s e  o f  e v e n t s  a n d  c o n s e q u e n c e s  if c h a n g e s  in p o l i c y  d u e  to e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
c o n c e r n s  w e r e  n o t  realised.
T h e  r a n g e  o f  s c e n a r i o s  forecast for a n t h r o p o g e n i c  radiative f o r c i n g  a n d  resulting 
t e m p e r a t u r e  incr e a s e s  a r e  s h o w n  b e l o w .
Y«ar
Fig. 3: P r e d i c t e d  radiative f o r c i n g  for a  r a n g e  o f  scenarios. I P C C  ( 2 0 0 1 )  [18].
19
20CO 2030 *M0 20» mo ?iOO
Fig. 4  &  5: P r e d i c t e d  t e m p e r a t u r e  c h a n g e  f or a  r a n g e  o f  scenarios. I P C C  ( 2 0 0 1 )  [18].
E a c h  s c e n a r i o  forecasts a n  i n c r e a s e  in a n t h r o p o g e n i c  radiative f o r c i n g  a n d  
t e m p e r a t u r e  b u t  t h e r e  r e m a i n s  a  large r a n g e  o f  potential o u t c o m e s .  T h e  I P C C  ( 2 0 0 1 )  
h a v e  m a d e  critical o b s e r v a t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  g e n e r i c  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e s e  pr e d i c t e d  
o u t c o m e s .
2.7: Critical O b s e r v a t i o n s :
T h e  I P C C  ( 2 0 0 1 )  r e p o r t e d  a  r a n g e  o f  e m p i r i c a l  e v i d e n c e  that establishes that t h e  
E n h a n c e d  G r e e n h o u s e  E f f e c t  is b e y o n d  d o u b t  a n d  i n c l u d e s  inter alia.
• T h e  g l o b a l  a v e r a g e  t e m p e r a t u r e  h a s  i n c r e a s e d  b y  0 . 6 ° C  b e t w e e n  1 9 0 0 - 2 0 0 0 .  
P r o x y  d a t a  f r o m  t h e  N o r t h e r n  H e m i s p h e r e  indicates that 0 . 6 ° C  w a s  th e  h i g h e s t  
c e n t e n n i a l  t e m p e r a t u r e  rise for th e  last l O O O y r s .
•  S n o w  c o v e r  h a s  d e c r e a s e d  b y  1 0 %  s i n c e  t h e  1 9 6 0 s  a n d  w i d e s p r e a d  m o u n t a i n  
glacier retreat h a s  b e e n  o b s e r v e d  b e t w e e n  1 9 0 0 - 2 0 0 0 .
•  O c e a n  h e a t  c o n t e n t  h a s  i n c r e a s e d  a n d  g l o b a l  a v e r a g e  sea-level h a s  risen b y  
0 . 1 - 0 . 2 m  b e t w e e n  1 9 0 0 - 2 0 0 0 .
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• A t m o s p h e r i c  C O 2 h a s  i n c r e a s e d  b y  3 1 %  sin c e  t h e  Industrial R e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  
1 7 5 0 s  a n d  that 7 5 %  o f  t h e  a n t h r o p o g e n i c  c o n t r i b u t i o n  b e t w e e n  1 9 8 0 - 2 0 0 0  
d e r i v e d  f r o m  fossil fuel c o m b u s t i o n .
• A n t h r o p o g e n i c  g r e e n h o u s e  g a s  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  ( 1 7 5 0  -  2 0 0 0 )  h a v e  b e e n  
e s t i m a t e d  to i n c r e a s e  radiative f o r c i n g  b y  2 . 4 3  W m " 2 w i t h  C O 2 r e s p o n s i b l e  for
1 . 4 6 W m ' 2, C H 4 r e s p o n s i b l e  for 0 . 4 8  W m ' 2, N 2O  r e s p o n s i b l e  for 0 . 1 5 W m ' 2 a n d  
H a l o c a r b o n s  r e s p o n s i b l e  for 0 . 3 4  W m " 2 [18].
I n  t e r m s  o f  f u t u r e  c o n c e r n s  t h e  I P C C  ( 2 0 0 1 )  forecast o n  t h e  basis o f  m o d e l s :
•  T h e  g l o b a l  a v e r a g e  t e m p e r a t u r e  is p r o j e c t e d  to i n c r e a s e  b y  1.4 -  5 . 8 ° C  o v e r  
the p e r i o d  1 9 9 0 - 2 1 0 0 .  B a s e d  o n  t h e  full r a n g e  o f  m o d e l s .
• A n t h r o p o g e n i c  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  will persist for m a n y  centuries. If C O 2 
e m i s s i o n s  stabilise t h e  rate o f  t e m p e r a t u r e  rise w o u l d  b e  < 1 ° C  p e r  century.
• T h e r m a l  e x p a n s i o n  o f  t h e  o c e a n  a n d  c o n c o m i t a n t  sea-level rise is p r o j e c t e d  
o v e r  t h e  c o m i n g  c e n t u r i e s  d e s p i t e  a n y  potential stabilisation o f  C O 2 e m i s s i o n s  
b e c a u s e  t h e  d e e p  o c e a n  adjusts to c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  o v e r  l o n g  t i m e s c a l e s  (i.e. 
centuries).
•  Ice s h e e t s  will c o n t i n u e  to m e l t  o v e r  t h o u s a n d s  o f  y e a r s  e v e n  a s s u m i n g  
stability o f  C O 2 e m i s s i o n s .  L o c a l i s e d  w a r m i n g  o v e r  G r e e n l a n d  is a nticipated 
to b e  t h r e e f o l d  that o f  t h e  g l o b a l  a v e r a g e  rate o f  i n c r e a s e d  t e m p e r a t u r e .
M o d e l s  forecast that o v e r  1 0 0 0 y r s  a > 3 ° C  i n c r e a s e  s u s t a i n e d  o v e r  G r e e n l a n d  
w o u l d  result in t h e  c o m p l e t e  m e l t i n g  o f  t h e  ice s h e e t  resulting in a  sea-level 
rise o f  7 m  globally.
• M e l t i n g  o f  th e  W e s t  A n t a r c t i c  ice s h e e t  is e s t i m a t e d  to c o n t r i b u t e  3 m  to 
sea-level rise o v e r  t h e  n e x t  l O O O y e a r s  a c c o r d i n g  to ice d y n a m i c  m o d e l s .
T h e s e  m o d e l s  are b a s e d  o n  m a n y  a s s u m p t i o n s  a n d  results d e r i v i n g  f r o m  t h e m  
m u s t  b e  treated w i t h  caution.
•  I n c r e a s e d  rates o f  d r o u g h t  a n d  f l o o d s  as t h e  a t m o s p h e r e  w a r m s  a n d  h o l d s  m o r e  
w a t e r  c a n  b e  e x p e c t e d .  I n c r e a s e d  r e s i d e n c e  o f  w a t e r  in th e  a t m o s p h e r e  m a y  
result in  m o r e  f r e q u e n t  p e r i o d s  o f  h e a v y  rain a n d  l o n g e r  p e r i o d s  o f  n o  rain. 
L a n d s l i d e s  m a y  o c c u r  w i t h  greater f r e q u e n c y  a s  a  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  i n c r e a s e d  
p e r i o d s  o f  h e a v y  rainfall. I n c r e a s e d  f r e q u e n c y  o f  s e v e r e  w e a t h e r  e v e n t s  a n d  
d a m a g e  to d w e l l i n g s  a s  w e l l  a s  o t h e r  e c o n o m i c  r e s o u r c e s  a re anticipated. [18].
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C o n c e r n s  h a v e  b e e n  v o i c e d  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  latest I P C C  m o d e l s  b e c a u s e  l a n d  u s e  
c h a n g e  h a s  n o t  b e e n  t a k e n  into a c c o u n t .  P e n m a n  ( 2 0 0 2 )  reports t h e  f i n d i n g s  o f  
r e s e a r c h  c o m p l e t e d  at C o l o r a d o  State U n i v e r s i t y  that d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h e  p l a n t i n g  o f  
forests as a d v o c a t e d  in t h e  K y o t o  P r o t o c o l  c o u l d  h a v e  a  deleterious effect if d o n e  so  
in  s n o w - l a d e n  r e g i o n s  b e c a u s e  t h e  benefits o f  s e q u e s t e r i n g  C O 2 will b e  o u t w e i g h e d  b y  
a  d e c r e a s e  in a l b e d o  t h u s  raising t h e  t e m p e r a t u r e .  [2 1 ].
I n  addition, t h e  potential risks o f  m e t h y l  h y d r a t e  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  u n d e r e s t i m a t e d .  
M e t h y l  h y d r a t e  c o n t a i n e d  u n d e r  t h e  s e a b e d  a n d  p e r m a f r o s t  c o u l d  start to t h a w  u n d e r  
g e n e r a l  w a n n i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  c a u s i n g  r a p i d  positive f e e d b a c k .  M e t h y l  h y d r a t e  
d e c o m p o s e s  to C H 4. T h i s  h a s  a  6 2 - f o l d  greater p ositive radiative f o r c i n g  effect 
c o m p a r e d  to C O 2. ( I P C C ,  2 0 0 1 )  [18].
H e c h t  ( 2 0 0 2 )  e s t i m a t e s  that 1 0  0 0 0  G T  o f  m e t h y l  h y d r a t e  are s t o r e d  in  g l o b a l  
deposits. G e o l o g i s t s  c l a i m  that this p o s i t e d  c h a i n  o f  e v e n t s  o c c u r r e d  5 5  M a  
( P a l a e o c e n e  e p o c h )  a n d  a c c o u n t s  for o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  r a p i d  i n c r e a s e s  in t e m p e r a t u r e  
r e c o r d e d  in t h e  fossil record. [22].
M e t h y l  h y d r a t e  is stable at l o w  t e m p e r a t u r e  a n d  h i g h  p r e s s u r e  b u t  if t h e  t h r e s h o l d  at 
w h i c h  it d e c o m p o s e s  w e r e  r e a c h e d  a  r a p i d  t e m p e r a t u r e  i n c r e a s e  w o u l d  e n s u e .  J o n e s  
( 2 0 0 2 )  reports that r e s e a r c h  carried o u t  b y  t h e  U S  N a v a l  R e s e a r c h  L a b o r a t o r y  h a s  
c r e a t e d  c a u s e  for c o n c e r n  a s  t h e  p h y s i c a l  state o f  t h e  h y d r  ate layer i n  t h e  Pacific (off 
t h e  c o a s t  o f  t h e  V a n c o u v e r  Island) h a s  s h o w n  1 0 0 m  d i a m e t e r  holes. T h i s  attests to t h e  
a r g u m e n t  that t h e  t h r e s h o l d  is closer to b e i n g  r e a c h e d  t h a n  p r e v i o u s l y  t h o u g h t .  [23].
2.8: T h e  Scientific B a s i s  for E n e r g y  Policy:
T h e  n e e d  for g l o b a l  a c t i o n  to a m e l i o r a t e  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  e n h a n c e d  g l o b a l  w a r m i n g  h a s  
b e e n  es t a b l i s h e d  b u t  a g r e e m e n t  a n d  ratification o f  targets for r e d u c e d  e m i s s i o n s  h a s  
b e e n  a c r i m o n i o u s .  T h e  U N  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  K o f i  A n n a n  asserted; “ S o  far, o u r  
scientific u n d e r s t a n d i n g  c o n t i n u e s  to r u n  a h e a d  o f  o u r  social a n d  political r e s p o n s e . ”  
[24].
G l o b a l  p o l i c y  o n  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  h a s  b e e n  b e s e t  w i t h  political d i s a g r e e m e n t .  P o l l u t i n g  
n a t i o n s  m a y  n o t  suffer t h e  costs o f  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  a n d  r e g a r d  t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  n o n -
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p o l l u t i n g  t e c h n o l o g y  to b e  d e t r i m e n t a l  to their e c o n o m i c  p e r f o r m a n c e .  T h i s  is 
typified b y  t h e  U S  position.
S m a l l  islands s u c h  as  th e  M a l d i v e s  ( c h a i n  o f  1 1 9 0  s m a l l  islands) that a r e  o n l y  2 m  
a b o v e  sea-level will b e c o m e  s u b m e r g e d .  D r o u g h t s  in S u b - S a h a r a n  A f r i c a  a n d  the 
M i d d l e  E a s t  a n d  g reater rates o f  a v a l a n c h e s  in  m o u n t a i n o u s  r e g i o n s  m a y  result in 
h u g e  m i g r a t i o n  to t h o s e  a r e a s  relatively u n h a r m e d  b y  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  (e.g. N o r t h e r n  
E u r o p e ) .  W a t e r  w a r s  in t h e  M i d d l e  E a s t  h a v e  b e e n  p r e d i c t e d  as  t h e  c o r o l l a r y  o f  w a t e r  
s h o r t a g e s  in that region. ( A m e r y ,  2 0 0 2 )  [25].
It h a s  b e e n  t h e  c o n t e n t i o n  o f  e n v i r o m n e n t a l i s t s  that t h e  s o u t h e r n  r e g i o n s  o f  th e  g l o b e  
suf f e r  t h e  costs o f  n o r t h e r n  industrialisation. T h o s e  m o s t  likely to b e  a f f e c t e d  b y  
c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  in t h e  s o u t h e r n  r e g i o n s  exist o n  th e  p e r i p h e r y  o f  international political 
a n d  e c o n o m i c  i n f l u e n c e  a n d  h a v e  the m o s t  to lose.
T h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  th e  I P C C  ( 1 9 8 8 ) 5 [26], U N  F r a m e w o r k  C o n v e n t i o n  o n  C l i m a t e  
C h a n g e  ( 1 9 9 2 )  [27] a n d  K y o t o  P r o t o c o l  ( 1 9 9 7 )  [28] highl i g h t  th e  g l o b a l  significance 
o f  e n h a n c e d  g l o b a l  w a r m i n g  o n  th e  international political a g e n d a .  T h e  K y o t o  T r e a t y  
(ratified in 2 0 0 4 )  is a  first ste p  b u t  as th e  t w o  m a i n  C O 2 p r o d u c e r s  ( U S  a n d  C h i n a )  a r e  
u n d e r  n o  o b l i g a t i o n  to c u t  g l o b a l  g r e e n h o u s e  e m i s s i o n s  ( U S  d i d  n o t  ratify a n d  C h i n a  
is classified as  a  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r y  a n d  e x e m p t  f r o m  r e d u c t i o n s ’) t h e  effects o f  t h e  
T r e a t y  m a y  b e  insufficient.
D e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  m u s t  a g r e e  to t a r g e t e d  r e d u c t i o n s  o f  6  g r e e n h o u s e  g a s e s  ( C O 2, 
C H 4 , N 20 ,  S F g ,  H F C s  a n d  P F C s )  b y  5 . 2 %  b e l o w  1 9 9 0 s  levels for t h e  p e r i o d  b e t w e e n  
2 0 0 8 - 2 0 1 2 .  T h e  U S  ( r e s p o n s i b l e  for 2 5 %  o f  g l o b a l  C 0 2 e m i s s i o n s )  h a s  r e f u s e d  to 
ratify th e  K y o t o  P r o t o c o l  a n d  h a s  o p t e d  f or a n  internal v o l u n t a r y  initiative ( C l e a r  
S k i e s  a n d  C l i m a t e  C h a n g e  Initiative) [29]. S a f e g u a r d i n g  t h e  U S ’s n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m y  
is t h e  justification for w i t h d r a w a l  f r o m  t h e  protocol.
5 Jointly established by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP) in 1988.
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2.9: A c t i o n  o n  G l o b a l  W a r m i n g  as  Justification for N u c l e a r  P o w e r :
A t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  this c h a p t e r  t h e  e v a l u a t i v e  q u e s t i o n  p o s i t e d  w a s  ‘to w h a t  e x t e n t  
h a s  t h e  n u c l e a r  i n d u s t r y  b a s e d  its c l a i m s  a s  part o f  t h e  e n h a n c e d  g r e e n h o u s e  g a s  
s o l u t i o n  o n  justified scientific a r g u m e n t s  a n d  n o t  a  d i s c o u r s e  o f  o p p o r t u n i s m ? ’
T h e  scientific e v i d e n c e  r e v i e w e d  s t r o n g l y  a r g u e s  that there is a n  e n h a n c e d  g r e e n h o u s e  
g a s  p r o b l e m  to s o l v e  a n d  that a  p r e c a u t i o n a r y  a p p r o a c h 6 is appropriate. T h e r e  are 
uncertainties w i t h  f o r e c a s t i n g  future c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  b u t  t h e  scientific a s s e s s m e n t s  u s e  
t h e  b e s t  a v ailable d a t a  a n d  m e t h o d s .  T o  that e x t e n t  t h e  s c i e n c e  is v a l i d  b u t  n e e d s  to b e  
built u p o n  to a s s u r e  t h e  a c c u r a c y  o f  forecasts a re i m p r o v e d .
T h e  e v i d e n c e  r e v i e w e d  s u g g e s t s  that t h e r e  is a  justification for utilising n u c l e a r  p o w e r  
to r e d u c e  C O 2 a n d  t h e r e b y  t a c k l e  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e .  A r g u m e n t s  s u p p o r t i n g  n u c l e a r  
p o w e r  o n  that basis h a v e  merit.
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  c h a p t e r  will c o m p a r e  r e g i o n a l  e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n  a n d  e v a l u a t e  th e  
potential role o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  in  a c h i e v i n g  s u s t a i n a b l e  d e v e l o p m e n t .
6 This supposes that actions are needed to adapt to future climatic conditions (e.g. no future build on 
flood plains) and despite the risks and uncertainties inherent in forecasting that it is better to take 
excessive preventive measures (e.g. reduction in greenhouse gas emissions despite economic impact) 
now than suffer in the future due to inaction today.
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C h a p t e r  3
N u c l e a r  P o w e r  a n d  S u s t a i n a b l e  D e v e l o p m e n t :
3.1: I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  S u s t a i n a b l e  D e v e l o p m e n t :
T h e  W o r l d  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  E n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t  ( W C E D ) 7 in r e s p o n s e  t o  
c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  potential g l o b a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o b l e m s  s t u d i e d  t h e  i d e a  o f  e c o n o m i c  
g r o w t h  w i t h o u t  o v e r - u s i n g  t h e  future s t o c k  o f  n o n - r e n e w a b l e  resources.
S u s t a i n a b l e  d e v e l o p m e n t  e m e r g e d  a s  a  result o f  t h o s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a n d  h a s  b e e n  
d e f i n e d  in v a r i e d  w a y s .  F o w k e  a n d  P r a s a d  ( 1 9 9 6 )  f o u n d  8 0  different definitions o f  t h e  
c o n c e p t .  [30]. It is d efined; “ D e v e l o p m e n t  that m e e t s  t h e  n e e d s  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  w i t h o u t  
c o m p r o m i s i n g  t h e  ability o f  f u t u r e  g e n e r a t i o n s  to  m e e t  their o w n  n e e d s . ”  ( W C E D ,  
1 9 8 7 )  [31].
Inter-generational e g a l i t a r i a n i s m 8, ‘qual i t y ’ r e p l a c i n g  ‘q u a n t i t y ’ a n d  ‘n e e d s ’ r e p l a c i n g  
‘w a n t s ’ w e r e  central to t h e  architecture o f  t h e  treatise. T h e s e  aspirations w e r e  n o t  
n e w .  T h e  p r o b l e m  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h  c o u p l e d  w i t h  i n c r e a s i n g  e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n  
t o  a c h i e v e  g r e a t e r  m a t e r i a l  satisfaction h a s  b e e n  d e b a t e d  f or centuries.
M a l t h u s  ( 1 9 7 0 )  c o n t e n d e d  that i n c r e a s e s  in p o p u l a t i o n  w o u l d  c a u s e  g r e a t e r  d e m a n d  
fo r  s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e s  resulting in c o n s t a n t  struggle. [32], I n c r e a s e s  in p o p u l a t i o n  
g r o w t h  a n d  p e r  capita c o n s u m p t i o n  l e a d i n g  t o  social a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c a t a s t r o p h e  
w e r e  further a s s e r t e d  b y  M e a d o w s  et al ( 1 9 7 2 )  in: ‘ The Limits to Growth’, a  s e m i n a l  
c ollection o f  w o r k  that e x p o u n d e d  t h e  perils o f  u n f e t t e r e d  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h ,  [33].
T h i s  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d i s c o u r s e  asserts that d e m a n d  s h o u l d  b e  b a s e d  u p o n  n e e d  a n d  
s u p p l y  m e t  t h r o u g h  p r o d u c t i o n  that d o e s  n o t  w a s t e  n o n - r e n e w a b l e  natu r a l  r e s o u r c e s  
a n d  c a u s e s  m i n i m a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p a c t  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  lifecycle o f  p r o d u c t s .
T h e r e f o r e ,  s u s tainable d e v e l o p m e n t  a t t e m p t s  t o  r e c o n c i l e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  q uality w i t h  
t h e  d e m a n d s  o f  social d e v e l o p m e n t  fo r  n o w  a n d  t h e  fixture. It h o l d s  that e c o n o m i c
1 The WCED was responsible to the United Nations to outline a global agenda for change in the 
context of environmental strategy beyond the year 2000. The Commission was chaired by Gro Harlem 
Brundtland and is commonly referred to as the Brundtland Committee.
8 Equality of opportunity for future generations to meet their needs. I f  non-renewable resources are 
consumed excessively by the present population this may impose limitations on future generations to 
meet their basic needs.
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d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  ar e  n o t  antithetical b u t  a r e  b o t h  central to  a 
c o n t e n t  society. M o r e o v e r ,  o v e r - e m p h a s i s  o f  o n e  to t h e  n e g l e c t  o f  t h e  o t h e r  will h a v e  
l o n g - t e r m  de l eterious c o n s e q u e n c e s 9 .
3.2: T h e  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  P e r f o r m a n c e  o f  N u c l e a r  P o w e r  C o m p a r e d  to O t h e r  M e t h o d s  
o f  Electricity G e n e r a t i o n :
T h e  chart b e l o w  c o m p a r e s  t h e  total C O 2 e m i s s i o n s  p r o d u c e d  b a s e d  o n  t h e  life-cycle 
a n alysis ( L C A )  o f  g e n e r i c  plants:
1200 1 1041
F i g u r e  6: C o m p a r i s o n  o f  C O 2 e m i s s i o n s  f r o m  different m e t h o d s  o f  electricity 
p r o d u c t i o n .  M e i e r  ( 2 0 0 2 )  [34],
O i l  is n o t  c o n s i d e r e d  in t h e  a b o v e  c ha r t  b u t  r e s e a r c h  f r o m  E x t e m E  ( 1 9 9 8 )  c o m p a r e d  
t he C O 2 e m i s s i o n s  f r o m  g e n e r i c  oil p lants in G e r m a n y  to o t h e r  m e t h o d s  o f  electricity 
p r o d u c t i o n .
9 Examples of excessive development without the natural resources to sustain that development can be 
found in Mediterranean regions where a rapid push towards tourism without the water resources to 
sustain that level of tourism produces restrictions on watering crops that in turn can result in soil 
erosion. Malta imports soil. Equally, excessive protection of species and natural habitats may prevent a 
community from the economic development it needs to exist.
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N O x P a r t i c u l a t e s C 0 2
G e n e r a t i o n  t y p e S 0 2  ( g / M W h )  ( g / M W H ) ( g / M W H ) ( g / M W H )
N u c l e a r 3 2 7 0 7 1 9 , 7 0 0
C o a l 3 2 6 5 6 0 1 8 2 8 1 5 , 0 0 0
G a s 3 2 7 7 1 8 3 6 2 , 0 0 0
O i l 1 , 6 1 1 9 8 5 6 7 9 3 5 , 0 0 0
W i n d 1 5 2 0 4 . 6 6 , 4 6 0
P V  ( H o m e  A p p l i c a t i o n ) 1 0 4 9 9 6.1 5 3 , 3 0 0
T a b l e  2: C o m p a r i s o n  o f  life-cycle e m i s s i o n s  f r o m  different t y p e s  o f  electricity 
p r o d u c t i o n  in G e r m a n y .  E x t e r n E  ( 1 9 9 8 )  [35]
T h e  a b o v e  chart a n d  table d e m o n s t r a t e  that t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  n u c l e a r  
p o w e r  in t e r m s  o f  C O 2 e m i s s i o n s  is s u p e r i o r  t o  all fossil fuel electricity p r o d u c t i o n .  
T h e  s t o r a g e  a n d  disposal o f  radio a c t i v e  w a s t e  is p r o b l e m a t i c  b u t  unlike fossil fuels 
d o e s  n o t  rely o n  b i o - p r o d u c t i v e  l a n d  t o  a m e l i o r a t e  its effects.
3.3: T o o l s  o f  Susta i n a b l e  D e v e l o p m e n t :
N o t  o n l y  h a v e  t h e  objectives o f  sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t  b e e n  e n s h r i n e d  w i t h i n  
n ational a n d  international policy, tools h a v e  b e e n  d e v i s e d  t o  aid d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  
w h e r e  conflict arises b e t w e e n  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  quality.
C o s t - b e n e f k  analysis h a s  b e e n  u s e d  a s  t h e  u n d e r p i n n i n g  rationale b e h i n d  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p a c t  a s s e s s m e n t  ( E I A ) .  It h a s  b e e n  u s e d  successfully t o  d e t e r m i n e  
t h e  e c o n o m i c  benefits o f  a  pro j e c t  against e n v i r o n m e n t a l  costs.
T h e  A u t h o r  c o n t e n d s  that t h e  limitations o f  this t e c h n i q u e  a r e  3 -fold:
•  M o n e y  is t h e  basic unit o f  m e a s u r e  u s e d  in cost-benefit analysis. H o w  c a n  t h e  
v a l u e  o f  flora, f a u n a  o r  e x i s t e n c e  v a l u e  o f  a  p l a c e  b e  successfully i m p u t e d  a n d  
u s e d  t o  f o r m u l a t e  a n  e c o n o m i c  c a lculus? M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  role o f  flora in 
s e q u e s t e r i n g  C O 2 e m i s s i o n s  is igno r e d .
•  “ W e i g h t i n g  F a c t o r s ”  g i v e n  t o  c o s t s  a n d  benefits m a y  b e  ad hoc a n d  n o t  
a d e q u a t e l y  reflective o f  t h e  m a g n i t u d e  o f  i m p a c t  o r  benefit.
•  O n l y  local cos t s  a n d  benefits ar e  c o n s i d e r e d  (e.g. t r a n s - b o u n d a i y  i m p a c t s  are 
n o t  included).
T h e r e  w a s  a  n e e d  t o  m e a s u r e  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t  o n  larger spatial scales t o  
d e t e r m i n e  inter alia t h e  e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n  habits o f  different p o p u l a t i o n s  a n d  t h e  
e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  c o u l d  sustain t h o s e  rates o f  c o n s u m p t i o n .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  tools w e r e  n e e d e d  that d i d  n o t  u s e  m o n e y  b u t  instead u s e d  a  m o r e  
‘rational unit o f  m e a s u r e  -  b i o - p r o d u c t i v e  l a n d ’. ( R e e s  &  W a c k e m a g a l ,  1 9 9 6 )  [36]. 
B i o - p r o d u c t i v e  l a n d  is l a n d  that is sufficiently fertile t o  a c c o m m o d a t e  forests o r  
agriculture. ( R e e s  &  W a c k e m a g a l ,  1 9 9 6 )  [36],
3.4: E n e r g y  F o o t printing:
R e e s  a n d  W a c k e m a g e l  ( 1 9 9 6 )  p r o v i d e d  a  n e w  analytical tool that c o u l d  b e  u s e d  to 
m a n i f e s t  t h e  principles o f  sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t  in d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  a n d  o b v i a t e  t h e  
n e e d  to  u s e  m o n e y  as  t h e  bas i c  unit o f  m e a s u r e m e n t  fo r  analysis. T h i s  analysis is 
called: ‘E c o l o g i c a l  F o o t p r i n t i n g  ( E F ) \  [36].
“E c o l o g i c a l  F o o t p r i n t i n g  analysis is a n  a c c o u n t i n g  t o o l  that e n a b l e s  u s  to  e s t i m a t e  t h e  
r e s o u r c e  c o n s u m p t i o n  a n d  w a s t e  assimilation r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  a  d e f i n e d  h u m a n  
p o p u l a t i o n  o r  e c o n o m y  in t e r m s  o f  a  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  p r o d u c t i v e  l a n d  area.”  ( R e e s  &  
W a c k e m a g a l ,  1 9 9 6 )  [36].
E F  quantifies r e s o u r c e  c o n s u m p t i o n  u s i n g  b i o - p r o d u c t i v e  l a n d  a s  t h e  basic unit o f  
m e a s u r e m e n t  for analysis. It c a n  b e  a p p l i e d  o v e r  a  r a n g e  o f  spatial b o u n d a r i e s .  F o r  
2 0 0 2 ,  t h e  W o r l d  Wildlife F u n d  ( W W F )  c a l culated that the r e  are 11. 3  billion g l o b a l  h a  
o f  b i o - p r o d u c t i v e  l a n d  o n  E a r t h  a n d  that t h e  glob a l  e cological footprint is 2 . 2  g l o b a l  
h a / c a p i t a 10. T h e  b i o - p r o d u c t i v e  l a n d  available o n  E a r t h  is 1.8 h a /capita ( W W F ,  2 0 0 4 )  
[37]. T h i s  results in a  deficit o f  0.4ha/capita.
F o u r  factors f o r m  t h e  E F  analysis; o c c u p i e d  l a n d  ( h o u s e ,  roads, industries, etc), 
agricultural l a n d  to  f e e d  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n ,  w a t e r - c a t c h m e n t  l a n d  fo r  d r i n k i n g  a n d  c r o p s  
a n d  t h e  f o u r t h  a n d  m o s t  c ontroversial is e n e r g y  land. It is t h e  f o u r t h  c o m p o n e n t  
‘E n e r g y  L a n d ’ that is t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d .
10 Global hectares refer to the amount of land on the globe that is sufficiently fertile to accommodate 
forests or agriculture.
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‘E n e r g y  L a n d ’ c o n s u m e d  p e r  capita is called th e  E n e r g y  F o o t p r i n t  ( E n F ) .  T h e  E n F  
a s s e s s e s  th e  a m o u n t  o f  b i o - p r o d u c t i v e  l a n d  n e e d e d  to s u p p o r t  e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n .  
D i f f e r e n t  r e g i o n s  c a n  b e  c o m p a r e d  in t e r m s  o f  e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n  a n d  th e  e n e r g y  
l a n d  p e r  capita n e e d e d  to s e q u e s t e r  th e  C O 2 f r o m  that c o n s u m p t i o n .
T h e  A u t h o r ,  u s i n g  d a t a  f r o m  t h e  W W F  ( 2 0 0 4 ) ,  Living Planet Report, e x t r a p o l a t e d  the 
g l o b a l  E n F  to 2 0 5 0  to p r o d u c e  a  forecast o f  h o w  th e  g l o b a l  E n F  m a y  i n c r e a s e  o v e r  
t i m e  w i t h o u t  r e m e d i a l  action. T h i s  w a s  a c h i e v e d  u s i n g  M i c r o s o f t  E x c e l ’s Teast- 
s q u a r e  fit’ routine.
T h e  c h a n g e  in rate o f  E n F  i n c r e a s e  f r o m  1 9 7 3  c o u l d  b e  attributable to th e  oil crisis o f  
t h e  early 1 9 7 0 s .
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F i g u r e  7: E x t r a p o l a t i o n  o f  g l o b a l  E n F  ( 1 9 6 1  -  2 0 5 0 )
H o w  c o u l d  th e  d e m a n d s  o n  b i o - p r o d u c t i v e  l a n d  b e  r e d u c e d ?
It c o u l d  b e  r e d u c e d  by:
• R e d u c t i o n  in e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n .
• I n c r e a s e d  u s e  o f  e n e r g y  r e s o u r c e s  that n e e d  less b i o - p r o d u c t i v e  l a n d  to 
s e q u e s t e r  e m i s s i o n s .
•  I n c r e a s e  in g l o b a l  b i o - p r o d u c t i v e  land.
• D e c l i n e  in p o p u l a t i o n
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G i v e n  p r e d i c t e d  g l o b a l  p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h  a n d  i n c r e a s e d  e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n  trends, 
futu r e  r e d u c t i o n s  in g l o b a l  e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n  a r e  i m p r o b a b l e .  I n c r e a s e d  u s e  o f  
e n e r g y  r e s o u r c e s  that n e e d  less b i o - p r o d u c t i v e  l a n d  t o  s e q u e s t e r  e m i s s i o n s  is m o r e  
a c h i e v a b l e  f r o m  t h e  v i e w p o i n t  o f  international policy. S w i t c h i n g  to  non-fossil fuel 
b a s e d  e n e r g y  s u p p l i e s  w o u l d  r e d u c e  C O 2 e m i s s i o n s  a n d  t h e  d e m a n d s  p l a c e d  o n  g l o b a l  
b i o - p r o d u c t i v e  l a n d  n e e d e d  t o  s e q u e s t e r  t h o s e  e m i s s i o n s .
B i o - p r o d u c t i v e  l a n d  is in decline. I n c r e a s e d  u r b a n i s a t i o n  a n d  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  
rainforests all s e r v e  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  b i o - p r o d u c t i v e  l a n d  available t o  s e q u e s t e r  C O 2. 
T h e r e f o r e ,  i n c r e a s e d  g l o b a l  b i o - p r o d u c t i v e  c a p a c i t y  a p p e a r s  i m p r o b a b l e .
3.4.1: R e e s  a n d  W a c k e r n a g a l ’ s E n F  M o d e l :
T o t a l  o f  all a n n u a l  n o n - r e n e w a b l e  e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n  =  a  (J/year).
R e g i o n a l  p o p u l a t i o n  =  b
R e g i o n a l  e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n  =  c  (capita / y e a r )
I h a  o f  b i o - p r o d u c t i v e  l a n d  s e q u e s t e r s  C 0 2 p r o d u c e d  f r o m  1.0 x  1 0 11 J 
E n e r g y  F o o t p r i n t  =  d  (ha/capita)
So ,  a  / b  =  c
T h e r e f o r e ,  c  / 1 . 0 x l 0 n J =  d  (ha/capita)
W a c k e r n a g e l  &  R e e s  ( 1 9 9 6 )  assert; “ .. . o n e  h e c t a r e  o f  a v e r a g e  forest c a n  
s e q u e s t e r  a n n u a l l y  t he C O 2 e m i s s i o n s  g e n e r a t e d  b y  t h e  c o n s u m p t i o n  o f  1 0 0  
g i g a j o u l e s  o f  fossil fuels” . [36], ( T h e  a v e r a g e  U K  citizen c o n s u m e s  1 5 0  
g i g a j o u l e s  o f  e n e r g y  in a typical year).
3.4.2: C a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  E n F :
U s i n g  t h e  m o d e l  d e s i g n e d  b y  R e e s  a n d  W a c k e r n a g e l  ( 1 9 9 6 ) ,  r e g i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  w a s  
p e r f o r m e d  b y  t h e  A u t h o r  u s i n g  2 0 0 1  d a t a  p r o v i d e d  b y  t h e  International E n e r g y  
A g e n c y  for e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n .  [38], P o p u l a t i o n  d a t a  for 2 0 0 1  w e r e  u s e d  in t h e  E n F  
calculations. T h i s  d a t a  w a s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s .  [39].
30
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  calculations d i d  n o t  i n c l u d e  r e n e w a b l e  e n e r g y  sources. T h e  c o m b i n e d  
E n F  for fossil fuels (liquid, g a s  a n d  solids a g g r e g a t e d )  a n d  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  w e r e  
calcu l a t e d  for e a c h  region:
R e g i o n  ( I E A  classification) E n e r g y  F o o t p r i n t  ( h a / c a p i t a )
O c e a n i a 1.63
C e n t r a l  A m e r i c a  a n d  C a r i b b e a n 0.3
S o u t h  A m e r i c a 0 . 3 3
N o r t h  A m e r i c a 3 . 1 1
S u b - S a h a r a n  A f r i c a 0 . 0 3
M i d d l e  E a s t  a n d  N o r t h  A f r i c a 0 . 5 3
E u r o p e 1.41
A s i a  ( e x c l u d i n g  M i d d l e  E a s t ) 0.3
T a b l e  3: R e s u l t s  o f  r e g i o n a l  E n F ;
3.4.3: M o d e l  A s s u m p t i o n s  for N u c l e a r  P o w e r :
O n e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  that carries o u t  e c o l o g i c a l  f o o t printing is B e s t  F o o t  F o r w a r d .  B e s t
F o o t  F o r w a r d  ( 2 0 0 5 )  a r g u e  that “ N u c l e a r  p o w e r  h a s  at least a s  large a n  e c o l o g i c a l
i m p a c t  as fossil fuel if w e  c o n s i d e r  t h e  risk o f  l o n g - t e r m  d a m a g e .  A s s e s s m e n t s  o f  
fut u r e  risk a r e  not, h o w e v e r ,  part o f  t h e  cu r r e n t  footprint m e t h o d o l o g y ” . [40],
T h e  W o r l d  W i l d l i f e  F u n d  e c h o e d  that v i e w  in t h e  Living Planet Report 2004. 
“N u c l e a r  p o w e r . .. [is]... . c o u n t e d  as b e i n g  e q u i v a l e n t  to fossil fuels p e r  unit o f  
e n e r g y ” . [37], T h i s  v i e w  is a n  o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  as s h o w n  in fig. 6  a n d  table 2, 
respectively.
T h e  results o f  t h e  E n F  a nalysis a r e  i m p o v e r i s h e d  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  e q u i v a l e n c e  o f  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p a c t  a s s u m e d  b e t w e e n  fossil fuel a n d  n u c l e a r  e n e r g y  p r o d u c t i o n .
If t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  that n u c l e a r  p o w e r  h a s  t h e  s a m e  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  as  fossil 
fuels is d i s c a r d e d  a n d  ins t e a d  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  is classified w i t h  r e n e w a b l e s ,  t h u s  
r e m o v e d  l f o m  t h e  footprint calculation, t h e n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  E n F  results c a n  b e  
calculated:
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R e g i o n  ( I E A  classification) E n e r g y  F o o t p r i n t  ( h a / c a p i t a )
O c e a n i a 1.63
C e n t r a l  A m e r i c a  a n d  C a r i b b e a n 0.3
S o u t h  A m e r i c a 0 . 3 2
N o r t h  A m e r i c a 2 . 8 1
S u b - S a h a r a n  A f r i c a 0 . 0 3
M i d d l e  E a s t  a n d  N o r t h  A f r i c a 0 . 5 3
E u r o p e 1.23
A s i a  ( e x c l u d i n g  M i d d l e  E a s t ) 0 . 2 9
T a b l e  4: R e s u l t s  o f  r egional E n F  e x c l u d i n g  n u c l e a r  p o w e r .
C o m p a r i n g  t h e  results o f  t h e  calcu l a t e d  E n F  w i t h  o r  w i t h o u t  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  s h o w  
negligible differences. Asia, E u r o p e ,  N o r t h  A m e r i c a  a n d  S o u t h  A m e r i c a  a r e  t h e  o n l y  
r e g i o n s  that s h o w  a n y  r e d u c t i o n  in E n F  w h e n  e n e r g y  c o n s u m e d  f r o m  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  is 
r e m o v e d  f r o m  analysis.
T h i s  s u g g e s t s  that despite t h e  m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  p r o b l e m  o f  including n u c l e a r  p o w e r  
w i t h i n  t h e  E n F  calculation that it is c o n s u m p t i o n  o f  fossil fuels a n d  n o t  e n e r g y  f r o m  
n u c l e a r  p o w e r  that p r o d u c e s  inequalities b e t w e e n  r e g i o n a l  E n F  v a l u e s  a n d  that 
sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t  rests o n  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  this condition.
3.5: T h e  Validity o f  E n F  Calculations:
T h e  E n F  m o d e l  is b a s e d  o n  persistent historical ide a s  o f  * G l o b a l  C a r r y i n g  C a p a c i t y ’11. 
T h i s  c o n c e p t  is d e e p l y  r o o t e d  in e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t  thinking. G l o b a l  c a t a s t r o p h e  
resulting f r o m  o v e r p o p u l a t i o n  o r  u n f e t t e r e d  r e s o u r c e  use, t herefore o v e r - r e a c h i n g  t h e  
E a r t h ’s c a r r y i n g  c a p a c i t y  attracts criticism f r o m  t h o s e  w h o  c o n t e n d  that t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
a d v a n c e m e n t  d u e  to  in creases in intellectual capital arising f r o m  i n c r e a s e d  p o p u l a t i o n  
g r o w t h  will result in m o r e  r e s o u r c e s  b e c o m i n g  available t o  satisfy d e m a n d .
O ’R i o r d a n  ( 1 9 7 6 )  defines t h e s e  attitudes a s  t h e  ‘t e c h n o c e n t r i c ’ position. [42],
1 Global Carrying Capacity is explained in Hardin’s (1968) model showing that environmental change 
can be caused due to underlying principles of population growth. Simply put, there are limits to 
consumption of environmental goods and services. The demands placed on those goods and services 
are related to the number of consumers. I f  consumption rates exceed natural production rates then tlie 
global carrying capacity has been exceeded. Environmental degradation should follow. Note, that 
economic and environmental inequalities prevail across tlie globe and those are due in most part to tlie 
shortcomings of political and social-economic systems rather than as a consequence of population 
growth. [41].
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T h e r e f o r e ,  E F  a n d  E n F  c o u l d  b e  criticised fo r  b e i n g  p r e d i c a t e d  o n  v a l u e - l a d e n  ideas 
a n d  b e i n g  t o o  a m b i t i o u s  in application. T o  p e r f o r m  ‘e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a c c o u n t a n c y ’ o n  
s u c h  large spatial scales relies h e a v i l y  o n  t h e  quality o f  d a t a  collected b y  international 
agencies.
H o w e v e r ,  d e s p i t e  ideological a n d  m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  criticism E F  h a s  s uccessfully 
shifted t h e  p a r a m e t e r s  o f  a s s e s s i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p a c t  f r o m  financial c a l c u l u s  to  
b i o - p r o d u c t i v e  c a p a c i t y 12. T h e s e  m o d e l s  will u n d o u b t e d l y  u n d e r g o  m o d i f i c a t i o n  b u t  
a r e  s e m i n a l  t o  fu t u r e  a d v a n c e m e n t s  in t h e  practical a pplication o f  sustainable 
d e v e l o p m e n t .
3.7: I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  E x p a n s i o n  o f  N u c l e a r  P o w e r :
T h i s  c h a p t e r  c o n f i r m s  that n u c l e a r  p o w e r  is c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  t h e  objectives o f  
sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t .  C a l c u l a t i o n s  p r o d u c e d  b y  t h e  A u t h o r  h a v e  s h o w n  that fossil 
fuel c o n s u m p t i o n  is in t h e  m a i n  r e s p o n s i b l e  fo r  regi o n a l  E n F  values. Clearly, n u c l e a r  
e x p a n s i o n  w o u l d  assist in t h e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  c a r b o n - b a s e d  e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n  resulting 
in l o w e r  glo b a l  a n d  regi o n a l  E n F  values.
C O 2 p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  h a s  b e e n  d i s c u s s e d  in t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r  a n d  
t h e  n e e d  fo r  e n e r g y  that is n o n - c a r b o n  b a s e d  h a s  b e e n  s u p p o r t e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  E n F  
analysis p r o v i d e d  in this c hapter.
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  c h a p t e r  will e v a l u a t e  cur r e n t  r e g i o n a l  e x p a n s i o n  a n d  c o n t r a c t i o n  o f  
n u c l e a r  p o w e r .  F u t u r e  s c e n a r i o s  fo r  t h e  i n d u s t r y  will b e  p r o d u c e d  a n d  its potential 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  a  m o r e  sustainable f u t u r e  c o n s i d e r e d .
12 Economic assessments are predicated on the false view that all environmental goods and services are 
‘substitutable’ with social and commercial goods and services. These transactions are facilitated 
through money. However, social and commercial goods and services are dependent on environmental 
goods and services (natural capital) that have ecological limits. It is the demand placed on natural 
goods and services that is measured through EF and EnF. Therefore, EF and EnF are more rational 
forms of environmental assessment
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C h a p t e r  4:
G l o b a l  a n d  R e g i o n a l  N u c l e a r  P o w e r  D e v e l o p m e n t :
T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  this c h a p t e r  is t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  g l o b a l  status o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  a s  a  
m e t h o d  o f  e n e r g y  p r o d u c t i o n .  T w o  r e g i o n a l  e x a m p l e s  ( O E C D  P a c i f i c / C h i n a  a n d  
W e s t e r n  E u r o p e )  will b e  e x p l o r e d  that will s e r v e  t o  contr a s t  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  a s  a  
t e c h n o l o g y  in e x p a n s i o n  a n d  d e c l i n e 13.
4.1: W o r l d  O u t l o o k  f o r  N u c l e a r  P o w e r :
T h e  cha r t  b e l o w  s h o w s  that in 2 0 0 6  t h e r e  a r e  large differences in t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  
electricity p r o d u c e d  f r o m  n u c l e a r  e n e r g y  b e t w e e n  t h e  3 0  c o u n t r i e s  that o p e r a t e  
n u c l e a r  p o w e r  facilities. T o t a l  o u t p u t  o f  n u c l e a r  e n e r g y  a c c o u n t s  f o r  1 6  %  o f  g l o b a l  
electricity generation.
13 Other regions could have been included to contrast the development of nuclear power with equal 
legitimacy. The Author contends that the two regions selected best represent the complex web of 
issues that determine nuclear expansion/decline as well as potentialities for reversal of current trends.
-34
Lithuania 
Frame 
Slovakia 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Ukraine 
South Korea 
Slovenia 
Svdtsertand 
Bulgaria 
Armenia 
Czech Republic 
v^onnany 
Japan 
Spain 
UK 
Finland
USA
Russia 
Canada 
Hungary
Romania 
Argentina 
South Africa 
Mexico
wr.Ai a . .. a.nvmcvMiiiii
India 
Braril 
Pakistan 
China
% 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 00
Nuclear Electricity Generation %
Fig. 8: P e r c e n t a g e  o f  electricity g e n e r a t e d  f r o m  n u c l e a r  p o w e r .  S o u r c e :  W o r l d  
N u c l e a r  A s s o c i a t i o n  ( 2 0 0 6 )  [43],
(World 1€%)
T h e  table b e l o w  s h o w s  t h e  state o f  g l o b a l  n u c l e a r  d e v e l o p m e n t  in 2 0 0 6  w i t h  r e a c t o r s  
u n d e r  c o n s t r u c t i o n  a n d  p l a n n e d  fixture build:
NUCLEAR ! 
ELECTRICITY [
generation!
2004 |
REACTORS I 
OPERABLE ‘j 
Mar 2006 }j
REACTORS 
under 
CONSTRUCTION 
Mar 2006
REACTORS 
PLANNED 
Mar 2006
REACTORS 
PROPOSED 
Mar 2006
1
URANIUM ] 
REQUIRED j
2006 j
billion
kWh
% e!
i
No.!!t
MWe|
___|
No.! MWe No. |
____ !
MWe No. j
j
MWe tonnes U!
Argentina 7.3 8.2 i _ 2j 935] l l___ ! 692 oj 0 Oj 0 134]
Armenia 2.2 L 9 ! 1 376!__ __-  j ° ! 0 oj 0 0
"I
0 51 j
Belgium 44.91 55 j 7 57281 oi
________________ °J
....1
0! 0 0 ____ oj 10751
Brazil 11.5j 1 :°J 2 1901! ......o] ______ oj L i ! 1245 0 _...  o: 336|___ _ ____i
Bulgaria 15.6| 42 4 2722| oj _ ...............°J 2 i 19001 oi oi____ i 253]
Canada14 j 85.3! 15 18 12595! oj ______ oj 2| 154o] ol 0! 163 5 j
China 47.8 2.2 9 6587 i 5! 4480
1
_ 6J 5050]5 19] 15000! 1294]
Czech 1 
Republic j
26.3 31 j
___j
6 34721
\
oii 0 oi1
____ 1 ° l .... J
1900] 540
Egypt 0 ° ! 0 oi 0 o i __________ oj l j 600 0
Finland j 21.8 27 4
___ ____ j 26761
r 1 i
l j 1600 oi 0|
---------
ol
_____ ! 0 473" . ........ .."1
France 426.8| 78 59; 63473] o! _ ......J \ o i 0|
......!
l \ 1600 1014?
Germany 158.4] 32
. ... . 17 i 20303j o| ___________ oj L ° j L _ o j oj olj 3458
Hungary 11.2! 34 L t i 1755] ........0] 0! . £ l 0]■ra...____j oj _ ...oj 251 j
India 15.0 2.8 15] 2993] 8 i 3638
■to
01 oj 24] 13160j 1334|
Indonesia 0 0 oj _________ Oj o| 0 ° l ° ! 4! 4000 j
Iran 0 0 oi
_____ j o| i !\ 915 L l ! 1900 3 1 2850 j oj
Israel
_______ __t 0 0 °! 0| ........oj ° l o lJ 0 1 1200j oi
Japan 273.8 29 551 4^ © © _ l j 866]
m 14782 0 ____ oj 8169!____ _ _ _______ J
Korea DPR 
(North)
0 0 oj
| ° !
i tj 9501i i [ 950] Ol1
______!
o!
. _  J
° |
Korea RO 
(South) 124.0
38 20 j
______!
16840!
}
o|
______ jLJ 81I_____j 9200 oii Oji 3037
Lithuania 13.9 72 *! 1185| o| oi ol____ 1 oi
......
i \
j
1000 134
Mexico 10.6 5.2 L 2J 13101 o| 0 oS— ----- i
""J
° j Oj 0 256
Netherlands 3.6 3,8 l l
____J L i 52! o! _ o | L ° ] _ £ l ° l 0 112
Pakistan 1.9 2.4
_ i !
425] i !____<__r 300 ° ! ° l
—... i
21
. .......... .i
1200] 64
36
Romania 1
i
5.11 io i
i
l j 655 [
1 i
M
1
655)
......%w4..vw(,..j
{
0 |
I
oi
j
—; 
3j 1995 j
1
176 j
1
Russia it
133.0!
1
3 l|
j
21743}
, .......i
4)t_,1
3600!ii *1.._ j
925]
_j *1' ij
93751
_____I
3439 j
1
Slovakia ? 15.6} 55 j
. ! 6 !
2472 ( o!Ii ° l......_........f 01I
oj
----- ]
2 ] 840 iI
3561i
Slovenia 1i.
5.21 38 i!| 676] ol1 ° l\ oj °| o|| oii1 1441|
South
Africa
\
14,3!
i
6 .6 |
11
...... i
2 ]
_ I
1842}
11
ol
1
!
\
1_ _______________ri-> \
l !
1
165|
j
24)
1
40001]i
]
329!
5
Spain
i
60.9!
______
23!
...._ -A
9 \j
7584 j
i ol1
0 !
1
oij oi______j
° |I
oj
1
1505!
j
! Sweden
i i[........... j
75.01 52 10!i
8938 j
j ° !i oj> ° !i
0
3 ° it
ol 14351
1r---  — (
| Switzerland! 25.4| 401
|
sj 3220!I ° i
01 o|
’
° oi!
0
’
575!!{
| Turkey
° iJ;
0 !
1
oit ° ii
o l
___1
oi
“‘1
oii
ol! 3j1___i
4500 ° i
1 Ukraine 1
j____,__ | 81.1!( 511! 15) 13168}| j o li 2 !__1
1900!
\ °1___ 1
0 19881
j United 
* Kingdom ]
73.7!
I
______]
19 2311
!
118521t| 0)I1
oi
1—- --——
0 !I
1I
0 i
!
0 !
1j
0 2158|
1
j
| USA
| ] 788.6j 20] 103 j 98034) l j_ __ I
1065]
i
0!
}_ 13 j
17000 19715j
i Vietnam ] oj
_ . 0|
ol___] oj___ __j
° i oj
|
Oj Oj 2 !I 2000 ° |1
j WORLD** ] 2618*6 j 16 j
|
441!s368,496 j1
25 j
]
21,361 j
s
38 j
I
39,557 j 1131
1
82,220 65,478 |i.....  ..$
i
|______j
billion |
kWh I
______ j
i
%e!i
L.J
j
No. j
1
MWej
1t_ s
No.!
J
>
MWej
1
I
No.!
~.,J
1
MWej
i_ „ 1
.....1
No. i!
j
MWet.1[
tonnes U j
j
\[ 1 
i
J
NUCLEAR | 
ELECTRICITY j 
GENERATION 1 2004 1
7i
REACTORS 1
OPERATING |«J
REACTORS 
BUILDING [
1
ON ORDER 1 
or | 
PLANNED 1
..... ....... i
jj
PROPOSED |i1j..—.. _ _ __i
-—t
i
URANIUM]
REQUIRED!]
T a b l e  5: O v e r v i e w  o f  glo b a l  n u c l e a r  g e n e r a t i o n  a n d  p l a n n e d  d e v e l o p m e n t .  S o u r c e :  
W o r l d  N u c l e a r  A s s o c i a t i o n  ( 2 0 0 6 )  [44],
I n d i a  (8), R u s s i a  (4), C h i n a  (5), J a p a n  (1), N o r t h  K o r e a  (1), U S A  (1), A r g e n t i n a  (1), 
P a k i s t a n  (1), R o m a n i a  (1), Ir a n  (1) a n d  F i n l a n d  (1) h a v e  civil n u c l e a r  facilities u n d e r
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construction. Iranian a n d  t h e  N o r t h  K o r e a n  n u c l e a r  projects a re c a u s i n g  international 
anxiety.
T a b l e  5 s h o w s  that 3 8  n e w  reactors a r e  to b e  built w o r l d w i d e  i n c l u d i n g  2 7  in Asia; 
J a p a n  (12), S o u t h  K o r e a  (8), N o r t h  K o r e a  (1) a n d  C h i n a  (6), 5 in E u r o p e ;  B u l g a r i a  
(2), R u s s i a  (1) a n d  U k r a i n e  (2), 2  in t h e  M i d d l e  E a s t  a n d  N o r t h  A f r i c a  region; Iran 
(2), 1 in t h e  S u b - S a h a r a n  A f r i c a n  r egion; S o u t h  A f r i c a  (1), 1 in S o u t h  A m e r i c a ;  Brazil 
(1) a n d  2  in t h e  N o r t h  A m e r i c a  r egion; C a n a d a  (2).
4.2: T h e  W o r l d  E n e r g y  M o d e l  ( F o r e c a s t  f r o m  1 9 9 5  - 2 0 2 0 ) :
T h e  W o r l d  E n e r g y  M o d e l  ( I E A ,  1 9 9 8 )  [45] p r o v i d e s  t h e  p r o jections p u b l i s h e d  in t h e  
W o r l d  E n e r g y  O u t l o o k .  T h e  m o d e l  forecasts that 9 2 %  o f  total p r i m a r y  e n e r g y  
d e m a n d  in 2 0 2 0  will b e  fossil fuel b a s e d .  G r o w t h  in t h e  u s e  o f  coa l  b a s e d  e n e r g y  
p r o d u c t i o n  is e x p e c t e d  in C h i n a  a n d  Asi a .  G r o w t h  in t ransportation will r e q u i r e  
i n c r e a s e d  oil p r o d u c t i o n .  G a s  p r o d u c t i o n  will g r o w  in t h e  O E C D  for p o w e r  
g e n e r a t i o n  (e.g. R u s s i a  a n d  N o r w a y ) .
F i g u r e  9: F o r e c a s t  p r o d u c e d  f r o m  t h e  W o r l d  E n e r g y  M o d e l .
S o u r c e :  Bir o l  ( 1 9 9 9 )  [46]
G a s  c o n s u m p t i o n  is p r o j e c t e d  to d o u b l e  b e t w e e n  1 9 9 5  - 2 0 2 0 .  H y d r o p o w e r  is 
e x p e c t e d  to s h o w  m i n i m a l  g r o w t h  a n d  o t h e r  r e n e w a b l e s  are e x p e c t e d  to  a c c o u n t  for
38
1 %  o f  t h e  g l o b a l  fuel m i x  b y  2 0 2 0 .  G l o b a l  d e m a n d  for e n e r g y  p r o d u c t i o n  will g r o w  
b y  6 5 %  b e t w e e n  1 9 9 5  - 2 0 2 0  w i t h  2 /3 o f  this g r o w t h  o c c u r r i n g  in C h i n a .
4.3: C o m p a r i s o n  o f  F o u r  E x t r a p o l a t e d  F u t u r e  P r o j e c t i o n s  ( 1 9 9 5  -  2 0 5 0 ) :
F o u r  proje c t i o n s  o f  future g l o b a l  n u c l e a r  e n e r g y  c a p a c i t y  w e r e  c o m p a r e d  b y  the 
A u t h o r  to  establish c o m m o n a l i t y  a n d  differences. A  t r e n d  line w a s  fitted u s i n g  linear 
T e a s t - s q u a r e  fit’ r o u t i n e  to e a c h  p r o j e c t i o n  a n d  e x t e n d e d  to  2 0 5 0 .
T h e  p r o j e c t i o n s  u s e d  w e r e :
• British N u c l e a r  F u e l s  ( B N F L )  s u b m i s s i o n  to t h e  R o y a l  S o c i e t y  in N u c l e a r  
E n e r g y  - T h e  F u t u r e  C l i m a t e .  [47],
•  International E n e r g y  A g e n c y ’s forecast i n c l u d e d  in t h e  W o r l d  E n e r g y  
O u t l o o k .  [45],
• International A t o m i c  E n e r g y  A g e n c y  ( I A E A )  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  e s t i m a t e s  
( l o w  a n d  high). [48],
♦ IEA■ BNFUNACIAEA (low)X IAEA (high)“Linear (IEA)“Lhear (BNFUNAC)“Inear (IAEA (low)“Ltoear (IAEA <hi*i»
Fig. 10: E x t r a p o l a t i o n  o f  f o u r  forecasts o f  g l o b a l  n u c l e a r  g e n e r a t i n g  
c a p a c i t y  ( 1 9 9 5  -  2 0 5 0 ) .
T h e  I A E A  ( h i g h  a n d  l o w )  p r o j e c t i o n  s u g g e s t s  n u c l e a r  e x p a n s i o n  w h e r e a s  t h e  I E A  a n d  
B N F L / N A C  p r o j e c t i o n  indicates decline.
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T h i s  is a  simplified analysis that c a n n o t  reflect t h e  c o m p l e x i t i e s  that g o v e r n  e a c h  
m o d e l  b u t  is effective at s h o w i n g  t h e  r a n g e  o f  o u t c o m e s  b e t w e e n  predictive m o d e l s .  
T h e  t r e n d  lines a s s u m e  linearity that c a n  b e  e x t e n d e d  t h r o u g h  time.
F o r e c a s t  a s s u m p t i o n s  will v a r y  b e t w e e n  m o d e l s  a n d  foreca s t i n g  f u t u r e  e n e r g y  
s c e n a r i o s  h a v e  historically b e e n  s h o w n  t o  b e  p r o b l e m a t i c .
T h e  I A E A  in 1 9 7 4  e s t i m a t e d  that in 2 0 0 0  the r e  w o u l d  b e  4 4 5 0  n u c l e a r  r e a c t o r s  in 
o p e r a t i o n  w o r l d w i d e .  [49]. 4 3 8  n u c l e a r  reactors w e r e  in o p e r a t i o n  w o r l d w i d e  in 
2 0 0 0 .  T h i s  illustrates t h e  m a g n i t u d e  o f  err o r  o f  p r e v i o u s  forecasting. T h e r e f o r e ,  
c u r r e n t  forecasts s h o u l d  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  w i t h  caution.
4,4: R e g i o n a l  O u t l o o k  f or N u c l e a r  P o w e r :
4.4.1: E x p a n s i o n  o f  N u c l e a r  P o w e r  in O E C D  Pacific a n d  C h i n a :
4.4.1.1: J a p a n e s e  O u t l o o k :
T h e  1 9 7 0 s  oil crisis d a m a g e d  t h e  J a p a n e s e  e c o n o m y  a n d  J a p a n  h a s  r e s p o n d e d  b y  
i ncre a s i n g  e n e r g y  efficiency a n d  diversification o f  e n e r g y  s u p p l y  w i t h  3 0 %  o f  
electricity g e n e r a t i o n  f r o m  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  in 2 0 0 5 .  [50]. J a p a n  is still reliant o n  
i m p o r t e d  oil f r o m  t h e  M i d d l e  East.
H a v i n g  5 5  reac t o r s  ( 4 7 G W e )  h a s  e n c o u r a g e d  J a p a n  t o  d e v e l o p  r e p r o c e s s i n g  facilities 
that a r e  p l a n n e d  t o  b e  o p e r a t i o n a l  in 2 0 0 7  ( R o k k a s h o - m u r a )  w i t h  t h e  c o n c o m i t a n t  
c e s s a t i o n  o f  r e p r o c e s s i n g  b u s i n e s s  w i t h  B N F L  a n d  C o g e m a  in 2 0 0 5 .  T h e  
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  fast b r e e d e r  reac t o r s  t o  i m p r o v e  u r a n i u m  utilisation a n d  p r o m o t i o n  o f  
n u c l e a r  p o w e r  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  ar e  k e y  p o l i c y  o b jectives14. T h e  latter objec t i v e  is in 
r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  e r o s i o n  o f  pub l i c  c o n f i d e n c e  d u e  t o  a n  a r r a y  o f  r e c e n t  a c c i d e n t s  s u c h  
a s  t h e  ‘criticality incident’ at T o k a i  ( 1 9 9 9 )  that resulted in t w o  d e a t h s 15.
A n t i c i p a t e d  build consists o f  1 A d v a n c e d  B o i l i n g  W a t e r  R e a c t o r  ( A W B R  - S h i m a n e  
3 )  that is u n d e r  c o n s t r u c t i o n  a n d  1 2  p l a n n e d  for t h e  f u t u r e  ( 8  A B W R ,  1 B o i l i n g  W a t e r
14 The first fast breeder reactor was connected to the Japanese electricity grid in 1996.
15 After the accident at Tokai the Nuclear Safety Network was set-up to enhance the safety culture 
within the Japanese nuclear industry.
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Reactor (BWR), 2 Advanced Pressurised Water Reactor (APWR), 1 Prototype Fast- 
Breeder Reactor (FBR)).
Reactor Type MWe(each) Utility
Start * 
construction Start * operation
Fukushima I - 7 & 
8 ABWR 1380 Tepco 2007 2011-12
Ohma ABWR 1383 EPDC 2006 2012
Tsuruga 3 & 4 APWR 1538 JAPC 2007 2014-15
Higashidori 1 & 2 ABWR 1385 Tepco 2007 & 09 2013 & 15
Higashidori 2 ABWR 1385 Tohoku 2011 2016
Namie-odaka BWR 825 Tohoku 2011 2016
Kaminoseki 1 & 2 ABWR 1373 Chugoku 2009 & 12 2014 & 171xciw459
Total (11) 13,407MWe
Monju PrototypeFBR 246 JAEA operated 1994-95, awaiting restart
Table 6: Japanese reactors planned or on order. Source W NA (2006) [50].
Japan is dependant on nuclear power and it is envisaged that the Japanese 
Government w ill continue to promote, utilise and expand its nuclear capacity. The 
long-term objective is for nuclear power to double in capacity (90GWe) by 2050.
4.4.1.2: South Korean Outlook:
Due to lack o f indigenous energy resources nuclear power is a major policy objective 
to secure energy provision. Nuclear power provided 38% o f the country’s electricity 
in  2004 and there are plans for this to increase to 60% by 2035. (W NA, 2006) [51]. 
Annual increases in energy demand in response to population and productivity growth 
requires new additions to the current fleet o f 20 nuclear reactors.
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R e a c t o r T y p e N e t  c a p a c i t y S t a r t - u p *
Shin Kori 1 PWR (KSNP+) 950 MWe 2010
Shin Kori 2 PWR (KSNP+) 950 MWe 2012
Shin Wolsong 1 PWR (KSNP+) 950 MWe 2011
Shin Wolsong 2 PWR (KSNP+) 950 MWe 2012
Shin Kori 3 PWR (APR 1400) 1350 MWe 2013
Shin Kori 4 PWR (APR 1400) 1350 MWe 2014
Shin Ulchin PWR (APR 1400) 1350 MWe 2015
Shin Ulchin PWR (APR1400) 1350 MWe 2016
total 8 9,200 MWe
Table 7: South Korean reactors under construction or order.
Source: WNA (2006) [52].
Two reactors w ill be decommissioned in 2008 but 8 further nuclear reactors are to be 
completed by 2016. This w ill be complemented w ith a centralised storage facility to 
be completed by 2016 at Kyongju and deep geological storage is envisaged in the 
long-term.
4.4.1.3: Chinese Outlook:
Rapid economic growth in China has reaffirmed a commitment to nuclear power 
expansion. China’s nuclear fleet consists o f 9 reactors (7 Pressurised Water Reactors 
(PWR) and 2 Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR)) and 2 (PWRs) under 
construction anticipated to start operating by the end o f 2006. An additional 9 are 
planned and 19 proposed for the future.
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Figure 11: Geographical distribution o f nuclear reactors in China.
Source: W NA (2006) [53].
China’s vast coal reserves are located in the north whereas rapid economic growth is 
occurring in the south. The Economics Intelligence Unit (2006) predicts economic 
growth rates for China o f 8.6% (2006) and 8.2% (2007) [54]. The main sources o f 
electricity production to deliver this rate o f economic growth derive from fossil fuels 
(80%) and hydroelectric power (18%) whereas nuclear power provides (2%). [53].
However, international pressure over excessive use o f fossil fuels and the encountered 
pressure from environmental groups w ith the construction o f the Three Gorges Dam 
(the largest in the world to be completed in 2009) may further encourage China to 
expand its long-term plans to further develop nuclear power provision.
The WNA (2006) declared that China has indigenous supplies o f uranium (70 000 tU) 
and is aiming for self-sufficiency through the development o f nuclear skills and 
expertise. Uranium deposits are located in the Xinjiang region from which 750t/yr are 
extracted. This supplies 50% o f demand and the balance is imported from Russia,
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N a m i b i a  a n d  K a z a k h s t a n .  C e n t r a l i s e d  s t o r a g e  facilities for s p e n t  fuel w e r e  c o n s t r u c t e d  
in 1 9 9 4  a n d  a  pilot r e p r o c e s s i n g  pla n t  is b e i n g  built (project c o m m e n c e d  in 2 0 0 2 ) .
T h e  s t o r a g e  facility a n d  r e p r o c e s s i n g  pla n t  ar e  l o c a t e d  at t h e  L a n z h o u  N u c l e a r  F u e l  
C o m p l e x .  [53],
4.4.1.4: C o n t r a c t i o n  o f  N u c l e a r  P o w e r  in W e s t e r n  E u r o p e :
T h e  role o n  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  in W e s t e r n  E u r o p e  is in d e c l i n e  w i t h  o n l y  2  reactors 
p l a n n e d  in F i n l a n d  (1) a n d  F r a n c e  (1). T h e  detail o f  t h e  r eactors will b e  c o n s i d e r e d  
further in c h a p t e r  6. F r a n c e  s t a n d s - o u t  as t h e  o n l y  n a t i o n  in E u r o p e  w i t h  a  firm, large- 
scale c o m m i t m e n t  to n u c l e a r  p o w e r  in E u r o p e .
G e r m a n y  a n d  S w e d e n  i n t e n d  n o  further n u c l e a r  b u i l d  a n d  typify t h e  inevitable 
c o n t r a c t i o n  o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  in E u r o p e  w i t h o u t  p o l i c y  c h a n g e .
G e r m a n y ’s coalition g o v e r n m e n t  b e t w e e n  t h e  S o c i a l  D e m o c r a t i c  P a r t y  a n d  t h e  G r e e n  
P a r t y  in 1 9 9 8  c r e a t e d  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  n u c l e a r  ‘p h a s e - o u t ’ o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ’s 1 7  reactors. 
T h i s  p o l i c y  r e m o v e s  a n y  p r o s p e c t  for n u c l e a r  b u i l d  a n d  f r o m  2 0 0 1  t h e  m e a n  a v e r a g e  
o p e r a t i o n a l  life o f  all r eactors s h o u l d  b e  a  m a x i m u m  o f  3 2  years. [55],
S w e d e n ’s e n e r g y  m i x  h a s  shifted in f a v o u r  o f  h y d r o p o w e r  b u t  n u c l e a r  h a s  r e m a i n e d  at 
4 5 %  b e t w e e n  2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 5 .
Sources of Electricity 2003
net importsNuclear 45%
mostly fossil Hydro 36%
9%
Sources of Electricity 2005 Hy0r0 
Nuclear
'ossil fuel
m 7006 4%  o f  production 
w a s  e x p o rted
F i g u r e  12: S w e d e n ’s e n e r g y  m i x  2 0 0 3 .  F i g u r e  13: S w e d e n ’s e n e r g y  m i x  2 0 0 5 .
S o u r c e :  W N A  ( 2 0 0 6 )  [56] S o u r c e :  W N A  ( 2 0 0 6 )  [56]
T h e r e  a r e  n o  p l a n n e d  a d d i t i o n s  t o  S w e d e n ’s 1 0  reactors. S w e d e n  is c o m m i t t e d  to 
r e d u c i n g  g r e e n h o u s e  g a s e s  a n d  it is n o t  clear h o w  w i t h o u t  future n u c l e a r  b u i l d  e n e r g y  
d e m a n d s  c a n  b e  m e t .  M o r e o v e r ,  S w e d e n ’s w a s t e  m a n a g e m e n t  is a d v a n c e d  w i t h
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research for a final deep repository being carried out by the Aspo Hard Rock 
Laboratory. [56].
In contrast to Germany and Sweden, France’ s commitment to nuclear energy is firm  
and typifies the positive benefits from a large-scale commitment to nuclear power. In 
2005, France produced 75% o f its electricity from nuclear power and exported more 
electricity than any other country despite having minimal indigenous energy 
resources. [57].
Uranium imports derive from Canada, Nigeria, Australia, Kazakhstan and Russia. 
Future commitment to nuclear power is demonstrated through co-operation in a 
project involving Framatome, Siemens and Electricite de France and German 
u tilities16 to develop a new reactor design - the European Pressurised Water Reactor 
(EPR). One EPR w ill be bu ilt in Flamanville. [57]. Also, France is involved in the 
research and development o f Generation IV  reactors that w ill be explored further in 
chapter 6.
4.5: U K Outlook:
In 2004, nuclear power supplied the U K w ith 19% o f its electricity. [58]. There is no 
future nuclear build planned. The BNFL submission to the Royal Society (1999) 
shows the future outcome o f this policy:
16 Despite the German policy of nuclear ‘phase-out’ the German utilities want to keep the nuclear 
power option open in anticipation of a future change in national policy. Therefore, it is necessary for 
those utilities to remain active in research and development.
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Year
F i g u r e  14: U K  n u c l e a r  g e n e r a t i n g  c a p a c i t y  -  in t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  n e w  construction. 
S o u r c e :  R o y a l  S o c i e t y  ( 1 9 9 9 )  [47],
T h e  a b o v e  g r a p h  s h o w s  t h e  U K  n u c l e a r  i n d u s t r y  in a  state o f  d e c l i n e  e n d i n g  in 2 0 3 5 .  
T h i s  i m p l i e s  that alternative e n e r g y  s o u r c e s  m u s t  b e  f o u n d  to re p l a c e  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  
that d o e s  n o t  p r o d u c e  g r e e n h o u s e  g a s e s  (i.e. r e n e w a b l e s ) .
If p o l i c y  c h a n g e s  t h e r e  will n e e d  to b e  p e r s o n n e l  w h o  c a n  b u i l d  a n d  o p e r a t e  n e w  
plants. T h e r e  ar e  c o n c e r n s  r aised a b o u t  t h e  state o f  n u c l e a r  skills in t h e  U K  a n d  this 
will b e  e x p l o r e d  further in c h a p t e r  5.
B N F L  ( 2 0 0 3 )  further c l a i m e d  to m a i n t a i n  2 5 %  o f  U K  electricity s u p p l y  f r o m  n u c l e a r  
p o w e r  ( 1 9 9 9  p e r c e n t a g e  c ontribution) b y  2 0 2 5  will r equire t h e  c o m m i s s i o n i n g  o f t e n  
A P I 0 0 0  r eactors (5 t w i n  sites)17. N o  lo cations w e r e  s u g g e s t e d .  [59].
1 API000 is an advanced reactor designed by Westinghouse.
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Total Nuclear Power Production 
API 000 ■ Nuclear Has 25% Shore by 2025
F  F  F  F  F  p F  /  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  F  -F ^  hP £  F  F  F  F  F
F i g u r e  15: P r o g r a m m e  o f  A P I 0 0 0  b u i l d  t o  restore n u c l e a r  g e n e r a t i o n  to  2 5 %  
o f  total electricity p r o d u c t i o n  b y  2 0 2 5 .
S o u r c e :  B N F L  ( 2 0 0 3 )  [59],
B N F L  ( 2 0 0 3 )  s u b m i t t e d  to t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  c o n s u l t a t i o n  o n  U K  e n e r g y  p o l i c y  t he 
d o c u m e n t  ‘N u c l e a r  n o w . ..for t o m o r r o w ’s g e n e r a t i o n ’. [59], T h i s  d o c u m e n t  a r g u e d  
that t h e  U K  faces a  future o f  i n c r e a s i n g  e n e r g y  d e m a n d  w h e r e :
•  B y  2 0 2 0 ,  7 0 - 8 0 %  o f  t h e  n a t i o n ’s electricity is d e r i v e d  f r o m  gas, a l m o s t  all o f  
w h i c h  is i m p o r t e d ,  p r i m a r i l y  f r o m  Russ i a .
• Electricity prices rise s h a r p l y  t o  m i r r o r  g l o b a l  oil a n d  g a s  prices.
• C O 2 e m i s s i o n s  are rising, in t h e  f a c e  o f  a  n e e d  for substantial cuts.
•  Electricity s u p p l i e s  will b e  d i s r u p t e d  at t i m e s  o f  p e a k  d e m a n d .
T h e  n e e d  for a  l o n g - t e r m  e n e r g y  strategy that f o c u s e s  u p o n  n u c l e a r  a n d  r e n e w a b l e  
e n e r g y  w a s  a d v o c a t e d .  Barriers to t h e s e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  n e e d e d  to b e  r e m o v e d .
T h e  E n e r g y  W h i t e  P a p e r  ( C m 5 7 6 1 )  -  Our Energy Future: Creating A Low Carbon 
Economy ( 2 0 0 3 )  [60] rejected B N F L ’s a r g u m e n t s .  T h e  W h i t e  P a p e r  stated;
“N u c l e a r  p o w e r  is currently a n  i m p o r t a n t  s o u r c e  o f  c a r b o n - f r e e  electricity. H o w e v e r  
its c u r r e n t  e c o n o m i c s  m a k e  it a n  unattractive o p t i o n  for n e w ,  c a r b o n - f r e e  g e n e r a t i n g
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capacity. There are also important issues o f nuclear waste to be resolved, including 
legacy waste and continued waste arising from other sources. We do not make 
specific proposals for building new nuclear power stations. However we do not rule 
out the possibility that at some point in the future new nuclear build might be 
necessary i f  we are to meet our carbon targets. Before any decision to proceed w ith 
new build there w ill need to be the fullest public consultation and the publication o f a 
further white paper setting out our proposals.”  [60].
The White Paper claims that by 2010, 10% o f energy production w ill derive from 
renewable sources. [60].
Planned closure o f nuclear power plants include:
B N F L  M a g n o x C a p a c i t y  M W P u b l i s h e d  L i f e t i m e
Sizewell A 420 2006
Dungeness A 450 2006
Oldbury 434 2008
W ylfa 980 2010
Table 8: Planned closure dates for UK Magnox plants.
Source: DTI (2003) [61].
B r i t i s h  E n e r g y C a p a c i t y  M W P u b l i s h e d  l i fetime
Dungeness B 1110 2008
Hinkley Point B 1220 2011
Hunterston B 1190 2011
Hartlepool 1210 2014
Heysham 1 1150 2014
Heysham 2 1250 2023
Torness 1250 2023
Sizewell B 1188 2035
Table 9: Planned closure dates on UK non-magnox plants. 
Source: DTI (2003) [61].
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Berkeley, Hunterston A and Trawsfynydd Magnox plants are being decommissioned. 
Bradwell, Calder Hall and Hinkley Point A  are being de-fuelled w ith Chapelcross 
entering the defueling stage in 2006. The prototype Fast Reactor at Dounreay is being 
decommissioned. [62].
British Energy’s financial hardships are due to a range o f factors. Competition from 
gas-fired plants in a deregulated market renders nuclear power uncompetitive 
economically. Given this situation it is important to consider the economic 
constraints that apply to the prospects o f nuclear build in detail as increased reliance 
on gas-fired plants have serious implications for the U K ’s energy security and 
commitments to the Kyoto Treaty.
4.6: The Economic Constraints o f New Nuclear Build:
Electricity generated from nuclear plants is a commodity that competes against other 
methods o f production w ithin a global liberalised market. Nuclear power is 
unattractive to investors for the follow ing reasons:
• Construction o f nuclear power plants is capital intensive.
• Construction time is a minimum o f 6 years and the potential for legislative, 
market and technological change coupled w ith the prospect o f delay presents a 
set o f financial risks.
•  Capital-intensive projects need to be accompanied by rapid returns on 
investment and low economic risks. Nuclear power cannot satisfy either o f 
those requirements.
• Nuclear fuel maintains a constant price whereas o il and gas are vulnerable to 
fluctuations but the disadvantage is that nuclear technology has not undergone 
any significant innovative change since the 1960s/70s18. This is in  contrast to 
the development o f the Combined Cycle Gas Turbine that has reduced the cost 
o f energy production from gas.
• Research and development is focused upon extending the operational life  o f 
existing facilities and has neglected innovative new design.
18 There are new nuclear technologies in emergence in 2006 that relate to research and development 
started in the 1990s. The 1980s was a dormant period. Moreover, the Combined Cycle Gas Turbine 
has proven itself economically attractive whereas new reactors such as the EPR have not done so as 
none are in operation as yet.
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• The nuclear industry is burdened w ith the costs o f strict safety standards 
compared to other methods o f energy production. Waste production is fu lly  
internalised. This is in contrast to other energy production methods. This is a 
deterrent to investors. It is anticipated that emissions trading as provided for 
in  the Kyoto Treaty may resolve this inequality in the near* future.
• Change in government -  from a sympathetic to an unsympathetic view o f 
nuclear technology such as experienced in Germany presents a risk to 
investors.
• Unclear long-term government policy o f support and commitment to nuclear 
power confers minimum confidence to investors.
• Competition from cheaper and less risk laden energy production that benefits 
from government policy diminishes the attractiveness o f investment in nuclear 
power.
• Innovative designs such as the AP600 and A P I000 that are smaller production 
units and present smaller investment costs compared to traditional designs 
may encounter technical problems that are unanticipated.
• World gas reserves in 1980 had doubled by 2000 (75 x 1018m3 -  150 x 1018m3) 
[63]. This induces confidence that energy prices w ill remain low under current 
deregulated conditions and the necessity o f energy security such as nuclear 
power provides is not o f concern.
New build is capital intensive and would have to be viable in terms o f safety and 
economics from the viewpoint o f the market to attract investment. The increasing 
deregulation o f electricity markets w ill place emphasis on extending the life  and 
increasing capacity o f current facilities rather than investment in new build that is risk 
laden in strict economic terms.
4.7: Nuclear Development Prospects:
This chapter has shown different global future scenarios for nuclear power presented 
by four predictive models. The application o f fiend lines to the outcomes o f these 
models revealed potential long-term prospects. The range o f outcomes for the four 
models highlights the uncertainties inherent in producing such models.
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These results illustrate that the future o f global nuclear power could fo llow  a range o f 
pathways and that its future success or failure is not fixed. Therefore, qualitative 
understanding must be obtained to ascertain future prospects. These considerations 
w ill be investigated in the chapters that follow.
The follow ing chapter w ill investigate the state o f skills w ithin the global nuclear 
industry. Focus w ill be placed on the U K because this country typifies a nation where 
nuclear power is in decline and contrasted w ith France where nuclear power is in the 
ascendant.
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C h a p t e r  5
N u c l e a r  Skills, E d u c a t i o n  a n d  T r a i n i n g :
5.1: OECD Nuclear Skills Perspective:
The OECD/NEA (2000) report titled; “Nuclear Education and Training -  A  Cause for 
Concern?”  [64] examined the view expressed by member states that there was a 
decline in provision o f nuclear education and training. It was anticipated that this 
trend would result in future recruitment problems throughout the nuclear industry.
“ To quantify the trends in nuclear education and training from 1990 to 1998, the 
OECD/NEA sent a questionnaire in 1998 to Member countries.”  [65]. 119 
universities as well as regulatory bodies, power companies, etc, from 16 Member 
countries (Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United 
States) responded.
The report presented 5 concerns that are listed below:
• The decreasing number and the dilution o f nuclear programmes.
• The decreasing number o f students taking nuclear subjects.
• The lack o f young faculty members to replace ageing and retiring faculty 
members.
• Ageing research facilities, which are being closed and not replaced.
• The significant fraction o f nuclear graduates not entering the nuclear industry.
5.2: The Decreasing Number and the D ilution o f Nuclear Programmes w ithin the 
OECD:
The report noted that the nuclear content o f the curricula o f many universities was 
declining. Universities have combined expertise to offer nuclear courses across 
institutions. This reduces costs and meets the demands o f low enrolment.
D ilution o f nuclear content is considered to be the result o f attempts to give nuclear 
science greater appeal. This is achieved through the provision o f nuclear modules 
w ithin mainstream undergraduate science courses.
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“ In some universities, nuclear programmes have been merged w ith mechanical, other 
energy related, or environmental programmes. While this approach keeps nuclear 
education alive in  the short-term, there is a danger that the nuclear content w ill 
diminish w ith time and may eventually disappear altogether.”  [64].
Only Mexico, Japan and France have increased their numbers o f nuclear courses 
(1990-1998).
5.3: The Decreasing Number o f Students taking Nuclear Subjects w ithin the OECD: 
“ While there was a 10% decrease in the number o f [nuclear based] degrees awarded at 
the undergraduate level between 1990 and 1998, the number awarded at the Masters 
level remained fa irly constant, and the number at the Doctoral level increased by 
26% ”  [64].
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Figure 16: Number o f degrees awarded in 1990, 1995, 1998. 
Source: OECD/NEA (2000) [64].
The above provides a broad overview across the region but masks the differences 
between countries. The emerging problem that the OECD/NEA (2000) report 
engenders is that i f  undergraduates are decreasing in number and the nuclear content 
o f those courses are diluted then the commonwealth o f nuclear knowledge and skills 
w ill diminish. This w ill inevitably impact upon graduate studies at Masters and 
Doctoral levels.
1*
53
C u r r e n t  industrial n e e d s  ar e  b e i n g  m e t  b u t  if t h e  n u c l e a r  i n d u s t r y  w e r e  t o  m o v e  into a n  
e r a  o f  rapid e x p a n s i o n  t h e n  th e  quantity a n d  quality o f  g r a d u a t e  talent w o u l d  b e  
insufficient to  r e s p o n d ,
5.4: T h e  L a c k  o f  Y o u n g  F a c u l t y  M e m b e r s  t o  R e p l a c e  A g e i n g  a n d  R e t i r i n g  F a c u l t y  
M e m b e r s :
F r a n c e  h a s  s h o w n  a n  increase in th e  n u m b e r  o f  fiill-time faculty m e m b e r s  r e s ponsible 
for n u c l e a r  e d u c a t i o n .  T h i s  reflects th e  i n c r e a s e  in n u c l e a r  e d u c a t i o n  c o u r s e s  in 
F r a n c e  a n d  contrasts w i t h  t h e  situation e x p e r i e n c e d  b y  t h e  U K  a n d  t h e  U S .
E l s e w h e r e ,  n u m b e r s  r e m a i n  constant. P a r t - t i m e  faculty m e m b e r s  a r e  o n  t h e  increase 
in countries w h e r e  full-time positions a r e  r e d u c i n g .
T h e  table b e l o w  s h o w s  t h e  a g e  distribution o f  faculty m e m b e r s  a c r o s s  t h e  O E C D  
n a t i o n s  a n d  c o n f i r m s  t h e  v i e w  that there a r e  limited n u m b e r s  o f  y o u n g  a c a d e m i c s  
b e l o n g i n g  t o  faculties. F r a n c e  h a s  4 9 %  o f  its faculty m e m b e r s  b e t w e e h  2 1 - 3 0 y r s .  T h i s  
p e r c e n t a g e  c o ntrasts w i t h  t h e  O E C D  n a t i o n s  m e a n  a v e r a g e  o f  7 %  fo r  that a g e - r a n g e .
8 2 %  o f  F r a n c e ’s n u c l e a r  faculty m e m b e r s  a r e  a g e d  b e t w e e n  2 L 4 0 y r s .  T h e  U K  h a s  
o n l y  3 0 % .  T h e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  n u c l e a r  c o u r s e s  in F r a n c e  a n d  a  clear g o v e r n m e n t a l  a n d  
industrial c o m m i t m e n t  t o  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  a r e  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  attracting recruits w i t h i n  
this a g e  r a n g e  a n d  contrasts w i t h  t h e  situation in t h e  U K .
It w a s  f o u n d  a c r o s s  t h e  O E C D  r e g i o n  that c u r r e n t  trainer a n d  staffing levels w e r e  
a d e q u a t e  b u t  f u t u r e  p r o v i s i o n  a p p e a r e d  t o  b e  o f  c o n c e r n .
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Country Agedistribution (% of total) Averageage21-3031-4041-5051-6061-70 714-Belgium 6 1 31 47 14 0 | 52Canada 13 19 31 34 3 0 45Finland 13 25 25 25 13 0 1 46France 49 3 5 8 5 0 34Hungary 7 16 3 30 14 0 48Italy 0 10 31 29 28 2 54Japan 3 18 23 43 13 0 50Korea 0 5 57 36 2 0 49Mexico 0 20 52 IS 9 0 47Netherlands 0 60 0 40 0 0 4Spain 4 32 46 4 14 0 45Sweden 19 19 2 15 2 4 47Switzerland 0 0 27 73 0 0 53Turkey 15 37 30 15 3 0 41United Kiugdom 9 21 24 34 9 2 47United States 1 15 35 35 13 1 50TOTAL 7 18 29 3 13 1 48
Table 10: Age distribution and average age o f faculty members in 1998.
Source: OECD/NEA (2000) [64].
5.5: Ageing Research Facilities which are being Closed and Not Replaced:
The OECD/NEA (2000) discovered that most o f the nuclear equipment used by 
universities was over 25 years old. Hot cells and research reactors have been 
decommissioned w ith no prospect o f replacements. Under these declining 
circumstances universities are incapable o f performing quality research for industry. 
This state o f affairs is not hugely important given the current emphasis on power plant 
efficiency but future research and development capabilities w ill be damaged. This 
heralds an immediate constraint on any future expansion o f the nuclear industry.
5.6: The Significant Fraction o f Nuclear Graduates N ot Entering the Nuclear 
Industry:
“ It is also evident that a significant fraction (20-40%) o f graduates in  nuclear fields at 
a ll levels do not enter the nuclear industry.”  [64]. I f  there is a smaller pool o f 
graduates w ith reduced nuclear knowledge and skills and 20-40% are deciding not to 
enter the nuclear professions any future expansion o f the nuclear industry would be 
unworkable. Therefore, it  is vita l that the reasons for this are identified and 
addressed.
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5.7: In-House Training:
“ Belgium, Hungary, Turkey and Spain have shown a decrease in the number o f 
trainees between 1990 and 1998.”  [64]. Elsewhere within the OECD region there has 
been an increase in in-house provision. It could be anticipated given the present 
contraction o f the nuclear industry across the OECD region that training provision 
would decrease.
5.8: Attractiveness o f Nuclear Education and Careers:
As student enrolments are declining and teaching equipment and facilities are ageing 
it is imperative that strategic long-term action is administered to reverse this trend.
“ In an era o f deregulation, privatisation and downsizing, there are increased pressures 
for decisions to be made based upon economic short-term considerations.”  [64].
The contraction o f the nuclear industry across the OECD necessitates government 
assistance in securing the future o f nuclear education and training. Market forces 
alone w ill not envision the long-term scenarios o f increased nuclear development.
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The situation as advanced by the O E C D / N E A  (2000) is demonstrated below:
INDUSTRY
Few new power 
plants 
FYivatisation
GOVERNMENT
Eroded support for 
programmes
Unclear future 
Negative public perception
STUDENTS’ PERCEPTION
Negative image 
Little interesting research 
Poor job prospects 
Limited curricula opportunities
UNIVERSITIES
Low enrolment, especially top students 
Decreased financial resources 
Merging/dosing programmes 
Ageing and retiring faculty members 
Ageing and closing facilities
GRADUATES
Fewer graduates and insufficient nuclear courses, which affect:
Nuclear Rower I ndustry Other Areas
•  Fuel cycle/existing installations • Life sciences
•  New plants •  Medicine
•  Safety •  Materials
•  Industrial processes
Inadequate manpower and infrastructure leading to:
•  Breach of responsibility for the existing nuclear enterprise
•  Loss of long-term options
•  Reduced international influence
•  Delayed development of new technologies
Figurel7: Schematic overview showing the causes o f decline in nuclear skills. 
Source: OECD/NEA (2000) [64].
Under the current circumstances that present an uncertain nuclear future as a result o f 
the contraction o f power plant construction across the OECD region combined with 
poor remuneration for levels o f skills and knowledge and poor public perception, it is 
clear that enrolments w ill continue to diminish for nuclear courses.
Collaboration between industry and academia has proven to be a mutually beneficial 
relationship that serves both partners and supports as well as enriches the learning
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experience for students. There are many current successful applications o f this 
approach:
• Swedish Nuclear' Technology Centre: Mission to improve collaboration 
between industry and academia to improve teaching and research provision foj* 
nuclear technology.
• BNFL Research Alliances w ith Manchester, Sheffield and Leeds University: 
These are strategic research and development alliances w ith universities in 
subjects o f core importance to BNFL.
• Glenn T. Seaborg Institute for Transactinium Sciences: Situated w ithin the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the US, its objective is to 
progress in the knowledge and technological application o f transactinide 
elements.
5.9: Communication and Co-ordination:
OECD/NEA (2000) raised concerns over the lack o f communication between 
universities w ithin national and international boundaries. It contends that this lack o f 
communication and co-ordination must be addressed. [64]. Though methods to 
address these identified concerns are not provided.
There exist examples o f valuable communication and co-ordination such as Frederic 
Joliot-Otto Halm Summer School in Reactor Physics at Cadarache and Karlsruhe, the 
International Youth Forum in Obninsk (Russia) and the European 7th Framework 
(EURATOM) that is concerned with co-funding and co-ordinating research and 
training w ith the co-operation and support o f both private and public nuclear sectors 
across the 25 Member States o f the EU.
5.10: OECD Outlook:
The challenges facing the nuclear industry across the OECD region demonstrate the 
need for greater communication and co-operation. Yet, too often, international 
forums become embroiled w ith the discourse o f good intentions but slow to deliver 
corrective action. This is a consequence o f ‘top-down’ problem-solving over large 
spatial scales and is best reconfigured by addressing the needs o f small geographical 
units (e.g. nations) and formulating bespoke solutions at that level. Once that has
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been achieved co-ordination across broader geographical units can be promulgated 
and regional strategies expanded.
Timescales are crucial to the modelling o f future scenarios. Again this is best 
achieved from the basic geographical unit o f the nation. Quantifying the 
circumstances and trends that have produced current conditions provide a basis upon 
which future scenarios can be constructed and inform the direction o f corrective 
policy. In the UK the Department o f Trade and Industry recognised this and charged 
the Nuclear Skills Group to evaluate the situation in the UK.
5.11: UK Nuclear Skills Perspective:
In response to OECD, Coverdale (2002) [65] reported on behalf o f the Nuclear Skills 
Group (NSG) that the current U K nuclear workforce and future workforce provisions 
were a cause for concern. Projections were carried forward to 5 year, 10 year and 15 
year reference points.
The key areas o f concern that Coverdale (2002) asserted corroborate the views 
expressed in the OECD report and are as follows:
1. P r o m o t i o n  o f  t h e  Skills S e c t o r :  Engineering and physical sciences are 
unpopular fields o f study and unpopular career choices for young people; and 
nuclear and radiological technologies are unpopular choices in this unpopular 
field. Action to encourage more young people into these sectors is urgently 
needed.
2. U n d e r p i n n i n g  o f  E s s e n t i a l  L e a r n i n g  P a t h w a y s :  The learning pathways 
required to develop the skills needed by the sector must be defined and a 
means devised o f underpinning those pathways.
3. U n d e r p i n n i n g  E d u c a t i o n a l  Institutions: The education and training 
institutions, colleges and establishments needed to service the above learning 
pathways must be identified and a means o f ensuring their v iab ility 
established, otherwise the infrastructure to deliver essential training w ill be 
iost. [65].
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5.12: P r o m o t i o n  o f  t h e  Skills Sector:
T h e r e  is e v i d e n c e  o f  a n  a g e  s k e w  that will h a v e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  a c r o s s  all n u c l e a r  skills 
sectors o v e r  time. T h i s  e c h o e s  t h e  O E C D  findings. C o v e r d a l e  ( 2 0 0 2 )  reports; “ W i t h  
t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  hea l t h  sector, H u m a n  R e s o u r c e  M a n a g e r s  repo r t  that t h e y  h a v e  
b e e n  a b l e  t o  satisfy r e c r u i t m e n t  d e m a n d  t o  date, b u t  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  f i n d i n g  suitable 
c a n d i d a t e s  is b e c o m i n g  i n c r e a s i n g l y  difficult.” [65], T h e  health s u b - s e c t o r  is 
e x p e r i e n c i n g  a  current skills s h o r t a g e  a n d  all o t h e r  n u c l e a r  sectors will d e v e l o p  
s h o r t a g e s  in t h e  short to m e d i u m - t e r m  that will g r o w  w i t h o u t  corrective action.
T h e  n u c l e a r  s ector consists o f  six p r i m a r y  client sub-sectors; health, d e f e n c e ,  p o w e r  
gener a t i o n ,  fuel cycle, n u c l e a r  c l e a n - u p  a n d  s e c o n d a r y  u se r s  (e.g. dentists). T h e  
tables b e l o w  s u m m a r i s e  t h e  p r o j e c t i o n s  for h u m a n  r e s o u r c e  n e e d s  w i t h i n  t h e  n u c l e a r  
sector.
PRIMARY USER DEMAND
Now Over 5 years  
2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 7
Over 10 years 
2 0 0 2 -2 0 1 2
O ver 15 years 
2 0 0 2 -2 0 1 7
R etirements 10.100 21.100 32.200
Shortage 3.000 3.000 3,000 3,000
Growth 4.900 8.900 14.800
TOTAL DEMAND 3.000 18.000 33.000 50.000
T a b l e  11: D e m a n d  for n u c l e a r  skills ( 2 0 0 2  -  2 0 1 7 ) .  
S o u r c e :  C o v e r d a l e  ( 2 0 0 2 )  [65]
SUB-SECTOR DEMAND Over 5 years  2002 -  2007
Over 10 years 
2 0 0 2 -2 0 1 2
O ver 15 years 
2 0 0 2 -2 0 1 7
Health
Radiologists and Radiographers 8.000 13,000 18.000
Clinical Scientists 1,600 2.600 3.600
Defence. P o w er . Rjel, & Clean  Up
Professional and 
Associa te Prof essio na I42
4.450 10,000 15.500
Skilled Trade. Process Plant and 
Machine Operator13
2.250 4.900 7.850
Others 44 1,700 2.500 5.050
TOTAL DEMANDS 18,000 33.000 50.000
T a b l e  12: D e m a n d  for n u c l e a r  skills in e a c h  s u b - s e c t o r  ( 2 0 0 2  -  2 0 1 7 ) .
S o u r c e :  C o v e r d a l e  ( 2 0 0 2 )  [65],
C o v e r d a l e  ( 2 0 0 2 )  states; “ It is c o n s e r v a t i v e l y  e s t i m a t e d  t h e  overall sec t o r  will req u i r e  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  5 0  0 0 0  n e w  entrants o v e r  t h e  n e x t  1 5  y e a r s  to satisfy anticipated
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demand.”  [65]. As was highlighted in the OECD/NEA (2000) report, there are a 
diminishing number o f students enrolling on undergraduate engineering or physical 
science courses w ith nuclear* content.
This phenomenon is not unique to the nuclear industry but spans most fields o f 
engineering and physical sciences. Therefore, the need to promote engineering and 
physical sciences and nuclear skills w ithin it is pressing. Coverdale (2002) points to 
employer short-termism (planning between 3-5 years ahead) as a serious barrier to 
recruitment because skills development takes between 5-10years.
Communication, professional profile, pay and indecision are further mentioned as 
barriers to development. The momentum o f the green movement since the 1960s 
compared to the secretive menacing portrayal o f nuclear power w ithin the media may 
have, in the Author’s view, coloured perceptions and therefore career choices.
Roberts (2002) asserts; “ Compared to competitors, the UK has a relatively high 
proportion o f graduates in scientific and technical disciplines. However, the trends 
seen in  students’ subject choices at A-level (w ith fewer choosing to study engineering 
and physical sciences) are repeated in their choice o f undergraduate course. Between 
1995 and 2000, although overall graduate numbers rose by 12%, the number o f 
entrants to chemistry degrees fe ll by 16% and the number o f entrants to physics and 
engineering degrees by 7%.”  [66].
Figures 18 illustrates that physics enrols the least number o f undergraduates w ithin 
science, engineering and technology courses. Despite comparatively healthy 
enrolment figures for engineering and technology this masks a declining trend that is 
shown in figure 19.
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|  First class H  Upper second | | | |  Other grades
Figure 18: UK students graduating w ith first degrees in science, engineering and 
technology subjects in 2000.
Source: Higher Education Statistics Agency (2002) [67].
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Figure 19: UK Students graduating w ith first degrees in science, engineering and 
technology subjects, percentage change 1994/95 to 1999/00.
Source: Higher Education Statistics Agency (2002) [67].
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Engineering and technology graduates are diminishing in number. In contrast, 
computer sciences and biological sciences are enjoying rapid expansion. This 
confirms the current unpopularity o f physical sciences and engineering to the benefit 
o f computer and biological sciences but does not explain the migration o f physical 
sciences and engineering graduates into other industries.
S e c t o r  G r a d u a t e s
Manufacturing 197
Education 132
Public administration &  defence/social security 115
Financial activities 113
Transport, storage &  communication 73
Wholesale &  retail trade/repair o f motor vehicles,
motorcycles &  personal &  household goods 70
Research &  experimental development on natural sciences &  engineering 61 
Health &  social work 49
Other community, social &  personal service activities 36
Electricity, gas &  water supply 23
Hotels &  Restaurants 23
Architectural &  engineering activities &  related technical consultancy 23
Business &  management consultancy activities 21
Not known 18
Engineering design consultancy 16
Legal activities 11
Meteorological activities 8
Table 13: Major employment categories o f UIC domiciled students obtaining an 
undergraduate or postgraduate physics/astronomy qualification at university in 
1998/99.
Source: Higher Education Statistics Agency (2001) [68]
Table 13 shows that greater numbers o f graduate physicists enter manufacturing, 
education, public administration/defence, financial services, transport and 
wholesale/retail sectors rather than R&D/engineering. These sectors recruit physics 
graduates because o f their numerical skills that are in short supply. It is not clear 
from the reviewed research why graduate physicists are opting for alternative career 
paths. Clearly, financial services careers are w ell paid and offer global career 
opportunities but this provides only a partial explanation.
The results in table 13 are a ‘snapshot’ o f 1 year and this research needs to be 
repeated to ascertain whether these findings depict a trend or are anomalous.
The literature surveyed does have an underlying theme that must be addressed and 
that is the diminished status o f physics as a career and curriculum imperative in U K 
schools and universities.
I f  graduate physicists are not pursuing careers in engineering or physical sciences then 
that has implications for recruitment in the event o f a nuclear renaissance.
The future o f the UK nuclear industry remains unclear and as such would not inspire 
graduates to choose the nuclear industry as a safe career option. Given the alternative 
career options available the migration o f physical sciences, mathematics and 
engineering graduates into other sectors may continue unabated unless the nuclear 
industry can provide more imaginative way s o f communicating w ith the public and 
build up trust, provide a coherent picture o f the industry and its future and provide 
clear career structures and competitive remuneration in comparison to other 
industries.
5.13: Underpinning o f Essential Learning Pathways:
I t  has been established that projected sub-sector demand for skilled workers requires 
both qualified graduate and trades personnel. The educational system that must 
supply these workers consists o f a multitude o f learning pathways that have 
undergone rapid change.
The UK education sy stem consists o f compulsory and post-compulsory education. 
Compulsory education must conform to the requirements o f a centrally prescribed 
curriculum fo r four key stages.
• Key stage 1 (5 -  7 yrs olds).
• Key stage 2 (7 -  11 yrs olds).
• Key stage 3 (11 to 14 yr olds).
•  Key stage 4 (14 -  16 yr olds).
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It is critical that compulsory education provides opportunities for learners to explore a 
range o f scientific concepts that include nuclear sciences. Early learning experiences 
influence future learning pathways and career choice but the compulsory sector is 
encumbered by shortages o f science teaching staff and laboratory7 facilities are in need 
o f refurbishment.
The lack o f science teachers is a cause for concern. Low pay, disruptive pupil 
behaviour, excessive paperwork, erosion o f social status o f teaching, increased 
vulnerability to litigation and lack o f parental support in matters o f discipline all act as 
disincentives to those in the profession and attracting new recruits.
Science teaching requires strict student discipline to enable experiments to be 
performed safely and for effective learning to take place. I f  standards o f behaviour 
are poor and the teachers corrective action lim ited then the whole learning experience 
is impoverished for all learners. Science and mathematics are ‘building block’ 
subjects that require cognitive stepping-stones from one concept to another. I f  there is 
a break in this chain then the learners w ill struggle to grasp more complex concepts. 
This results in exclusion and disengagement w ith science.
Syllabi change could be successful in highlighting nuclear sciences but there are 
systemic problems (e.g. teacher recruitment and retention) that need addressing before 
the benefits o f syllabi change can be realised.
In addition, few schools offer GCSE Biology, Chemistry and Physics but instead offer 
GCSE Science (double award) that meets the specifications o f the curriculum. As the 
title  “ GCSE Science (double award)”  suggests, the 3 core sciences are studied in 
reduced depth that perhaps provides learners w ith a broader knowledge o f how the 
sciences interconnect. This has an advantage over teaching physics, chemistry and 
biology as stand-alone topics but at the expense o f the depth o f understanding that 
studying each subject alone can provide.
Curriculum changes introduced in September 2000 a range o f new and revised 
qualifications at advanced level. The contest between depth and breadth is at the
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heart o f post-compulsory education and therefore central to understanding the choices 
that learners’ make and the courses offered.
Sixth form colleges, adult education, colleges o f further education and higher 
education institutions all fa ll w ithin the definition o f post-compulsory education. 
Unlike compulsory education, teachers/lecturers until recently did not require a 
teaching qualification but this has changed. Those teaching in further and community 
education w ill require a Further Education National Training Organisation (FENTO) 
recognised teaching qualification. This w ill be a PGCE or Certificate o f Education.
Those teaching in higher education may have to gain membership o f the Higher 
Education Academy (HE A) [formerly the Institute o f Learning and Teaching in 
Higher Education (ILTHE)]. This is achieved through submission o f a portfolio o f 
evidence that demonstrates competence against given criteria, or have completed an 
accredited teacher training course such as an M A or PGCE.
These measures are designed to safeguard teaching quality. Coverdale (2002) [65] 
points out that continuous professional development (CPD) is important to improve 
nuclear knowledge w ithin the science teaching profession. This would be useful 
given that often non-physicists teach physics w ithin schools and further education. 
Also, those undertaking teacher teaching in further education are not assessed against 
their subject knowledge but only against their educational skills and knowledge (i.e. 
their ability to plan, deliver, assess, etc.).
How are teachers and lecturers going to find the time to undertake CPD given the 
current staff shortage in the classroom? Teacher CPD is essential to embed nuclear 
science w ithin the science curriculum but training must accommodate the demands on 
teachers’ time. Coverdale (2002) [65] makes no reference to the difficulties o f 
implementation and this must be central to the proposed strategy.
The Author is aware o f no evidence o f available CPD for teachers/lecturers to 
enhance the teaching o f nuclear education w ithin the science curriculum since the 
publication o f Coverdale (2002) [65]. This attests to the gap between what is needed 
and what is happening.
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Courses relevant to nuclear sciences w ithin the 1 6 -1 9  yrs old bracket include:
• The Vocational and General Certificate o f Education (VCE/GCE)
• Advanced Subsidiary (AS) levels
• The GCE A2 leading to a fu ll GCE A  level
• The VCE A  levels and A  level (Double Awards)
• Modern Apprenticeships
These qualifications were developed follow ing the Government's Report ‘ Qualifying 
for Success’ (1997) [69]. These proposed greater breadth and flex ib ility  in  the post- 
16 curriculum.
These new qualifications sit alongside other established national qualifications, 
General Certificates o f Secondary Education (GCSEs), General National Vocational 
Qualifications (GNVQs), National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs) and other 
qualifications such as BTEC Certificates and Diplomas.
A-levles have traditionally provided the main route into undergraduate physical 
science courses. Curriculum changes in 2000 seperated an A-level into A/S and A2. 
A-levels became modular enabling teachers and lecturers to have greater choice over 
which topics w ithin the subject syllabus are taught. Roberts (2002) warns,
“ .. .increasing modularization o f A-levei courses has led to students entering higher 
education w ith wider variation in subject knowledge (differences in the mathematical 
knowledge o f students are seen to cause particular problems in mathematics, physical 
science and engineering degrees).”  [66].
There are 8 A-level Physics courses that schools and colleges can choose from in the 
UK. The Author compared each course to determine the nuclear/radiation physics 
content.
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A - l c v e l  C o u r s e N u c l e a r / R a d i a t i o n  P h y s i c s  T a u g h t  
C o n t e n t
AQA AS/A2 GCE Physics A  [70] 40%
AQA AS/A2 GCE Physics B [71] 20%
CCEA AS/A2 GCE Physics [72] 20%
Edexcel AS/A2 GCE Physics [73] 4 -  20% depending on options taken
Edexcel AS/A2 GCE Physics 
(Salters Homers) [74]
9%
OCR AS/A2 GCE Physics A  [75] 10 -  27% depending on options taken
OCR AS/A2 GCE Physics B [76] 18%
WJEC AS/A2 GCE Physics [77] 19%
Table 14: Nuclear/radiation physics content in  A-level physics courses.
The above results quantify the nuclear/radiation physics content between A-level 
physics courses and may explain why there are disparities between nuclear and 
radiological knowledge and skills between students w ith the same grade and 
qualification enroling on undergraduate nuclear/radiation physics courses.
Moreover, the minimal nuclear/radiation physics content on most o f the above A-level 
courses may fa il to highlight the educational and career opportunities available in the 
fields o f nuclear/radiological physics.
Vocational qualifications that attempt to m ix vocationalism w ith academic rigour do 
contain optional modules that f it  w ith some o f the nuclear skills needed. The AVCE 
in  Science offers a module in  Medical Physics. This demonstrates that there are other 
training pathways into university or skilled trades that have some nuclear content but 
one module is not enough.
Modem Apprenticeships are intended to provide a strongly vocational route.
Learners’ between the ages 1 6 -2 4  are salaried while they learn a skilled trade. 
Apprentices have to gain a national vocational qualification (NVQ), a technical
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certificate in their chosen field and pass "key skills" tests in information and 
communications technology and application o f number.
Rubin (2003) comments; “ C ity &  Guilds Level 2 NVQ no. Q 1027091 in Nuclear 
Decommissioning is not something you are like ly to find on the menu at your local 
general further education college.”  [78], Only “ 60 candidates have managed to pass 
a ll the units o f the programme”  [78] since its launch in 1997. 60 successful 
candidates since 1997 demonstrates the failure o f industry and further education 
providers to take this qualification seriously and that is a recurrent theme w ith modem 
apprenticeships and NVQs. Links between the nuclear industry and further education 
colleges need to be developed to provide the manual skills the future w ill demand.
Modern Apprenticeships in engineering take between 3.5 -  5 yrs to complete. Not 
only has the apprentice got to maintain motivation throughout this period but escape 
redundancy, career re-direction and to live on low  wages throughout.
There is scope to provide a Modem Apprenticeship based upon the C ity &  Guilds 
Level 2 NVQ no.Q1027091 in Nuclear Decommissioning. This would help diminish 
die future shortage o f ‘skilled trades’ personnel w ith in  the nuclear industry. 
Communication and co-operation between nuclear industry representitives, Regional 
Development Agencies (RDA) and the Learning and Skills Council (LSC) is required 
to fu lfill such an ambition.
Undergraduate pathways into the nuclear industry are through engineering and 
physical science degrees. Traditionally, A-levels presented the only tangible route 
onto such courses. However, universities are increasingly opening places to students 
w ith non-traditional qualifications (i.e. BTEC, AVCE) and to mature students who 
can utilise their life  experience to succeed academically.
The opening-up o f learning opportunities is a direct response to the expansion o f 
higher education in the 1990s. Market conditions have been created in which 
universities have to compete w ith each other to attract students. The corollary o f 
these conditions is an increased and broader range o f students w ith  differing aptitude 
and abilities.
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The flipside o f in c lu s io n 19 is that employers have legitimate concerns over the quality 
o f graduates to choose from based on the view that undergraduate study has been 
‘watered down’ behind the fanfare o f vocationalism.
Moreover, the decline in the numbers taking A-levels or degrees in physical sciences 
could be due to greater variety o f courses available to students that are less 
intellectually demanding and therefore a safer investment from the student point o f 
view.
5.14: Underpinning Educational Institutions:
In contrast to higher education expansion the Institute o f Physics (2003) assert; “ The 
economics o f university physics departments, including under-funding o f laboratory 
infrastructure, has led to the loss o f more than 10 departments in the past ten years.”  
[79].
Physics departments are having to cope w ith the disparities o f the ‘ skills set’ o f 
undergraduates coming-up through modularised A-levels, remaining economically 
viable and delivering graduates that are capable o f meeting the rigours o f the 
workplace or postgraduate study.
The context o f international universities competing for undergraduate students present 
extra constraints on course design and assessment strategies. Greater emphasis on 
nuclear content would be welcomed but the emphasis on specialised nuclear skills 
should be at postgraduate level because undergraduate courses cannot afford to be too 
specialised. Therefore, it would be the role o f undergraduate courses to equip 
undergraduates w ith the necessary skills and knowledge to manage the demands o f 
nuclear based postgraduate study.
The HSE-NII (2002) published their second report on the state o f “ Nuclear Education 
in  British Universities” . [80]. The report found that 22 universities teach nuclear 
topics. Out o f those universities (including; HMS Sultan) 13 taught postgraduate
19 Inclusion in the context of education means that students must have equal opportunities. That is 
admirable but employers may have concerns over the rigorousness of assessment methods that could be 
perceived as skewed to enable more students to gain qualifications. There are then disparities between 
the skills and knowledge acquired between students with the same qualifications. This presents 
selection difficulties when employers recruit staff.
nuclear courses. This is an increase o f 1 compared to the previous study performed in 
2000.
Postgraduate taught courses w ith nuclear content are shown:
UNIVERSITY COURSE TITLE NUMBER OF 
STUDENTS PER 
YEAR
NUCLEAR 
CONTENT OF 
COURSE
Birmingham MSc Physics and 
Technology of Nuclear 
Reactors
5-10 100%
MSc Medical and 
Radiation physics
10 55%
PGCeit in Radioactive 
Waste Management 
and Decommissioning
5 100%
City MSc Energy and 
Environmental 
Technology and 
Economics
12 5%
MSc Information 
Engineering
35 5%
Radiation Protection* 6-10 17%
Hull MBA Engineering 
Innovation
10 <5% typically (33% 
with project)
MSc Advanced 
Materials, Processes 
and Manufacturing
10 <5% typically (33% 
with project)
Imperial MSc Environmental 
Diagnosis
15 15%
Lancaster MSc Safety 
Engineering (nuclear 
option)
15 65%
Liverpool MSc/PGDip/PGCert
Radiometrics
15** 100%
Loughborough MSc/PGDip/PGCert 
Analytical and 
Pharmaceutical 
Chemistry
12 5%
Middlesex MSc Occupational 
Health and Safety
30 T i%
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Plymouth Various MSc 45 5%
HMS Sultan (affiliated 
to Surrey)
MSc Nuclear Reactor 
Technology and Safety 
Management
3-8 100%
4 PGCert/PGDip 
Courses
24-34 100%
Surrey MSc Radiation and
Environmental
Protection
20 100%
MSc Medical Physics 25 50 -  75%
Swansea MRes 15 5%
University College 
London
MSc Radiation Physics 20-25 50%
* Radiation protection is an optional module in the MSc programme for medical 
radiographers.
**60 -  70 students take MSc modules
Table 15: UIC postgraduate courses that contain nuclear content.
Source: HSE-NII (2002). [80].
The report further estimated that 320 students/year are involved in postgraduate 
nuclear courses. The report makes a quantitative judgement as to the level o f nuclear 
content w ithin each o f the 13 taught courses and from this have calculated that 165 
students/year are studying on postgraduate courses w ith more than a 5% nuclear 
content.
In addition, the report calculated that since 2000 there has been a decrease from 82 -  
72 students/year follow ing postgraduate courses w ith 100% nuclear content and only 
43 students/year follow ing masters courses w ith 100% nuclear content which is a 
decrease o f 13 students from the 2000 report.
The HSE-NII recommend; “ The focus o f nuclear education should be on the 
postgraduate courses as it  is at this level that the main specialisation into disciplines o f 
relevance to the nuclear industry occurs. Furthermore, because o f the way university 
funding operates it is far easier for industry to support or initiate postgraduate courses
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than undergraduate ones. The move towards modular postgraduate courses and the 
introduction o f postgraduate certificates and diplomas should broaden the appeal o f 
nuclear subjects and attract more students, but in  the move away from masters 
courses, care needs to be taken that quality is not compromised.”  [80].
Modularisation provides a range o f subject options w ithin the umbrella o f an 
academic qualification. Students would then have more choice over what was studied 
and be able to select according to their personal interest and/or employment needs. 
This approach is very common across many other academic disciplines and is referred 
to as c u s to m iz a t io n .
It is important to maintain comparative intellectual standards across a ll modules.
‘Soft options’, such as ‘management’ or ‘professional studies’ w ithin the context o f 
nuclear skills would be far less demanding than a purely physics based option. 
Although, it could equally be argued that the ‘soft skills’ are necessary to complement 
the mathematical and scientific skills that should have been acquired at undergraduate 
level.
Institutions such as the Open University insist that a ‘ foundation’ module is 
completed before students can elect to do other postgraduate modular options. This 
enables the delivering institution to ‘upgrade’ students knowledge and skills 
(e.g.mathematics) which are essential to studying the rest o f the course.
Tlie cost o f postgraduate nuclear education provision is severe compared to arts based 
subjects due to the expense o f specialist laboratory equipment. As has been identified 
by Coverdale (2002) laboratory equipment is old and there is a need for industry to 
donate equipment for educational purposes. [65].
The prospect o f universities collaborating to develop courses that meet the needs o f 
industry at a commercially competitive price is dawning. In  the UK, the BNFL 
Research Alliances w ith Manchester, Sheffield and Leeds University has provided a 
model o f industrial and academic co-operation. There remains further options for 
collaborating institutions and industry to develop new course designs that produce the 
needed skills for the nuclear industry.
Not only the design o f courses but the mode o f delivery, learning outcomes and 
assessment strategy o f nuclear education should be reviewed in response to the needs 
o f employers. Modularisation and customization needs to encompass accreditation o f 
experiential learning and re-evaluate course outcomes in terms o f cognitive, 
psychomotor20 and affective learning. [81].
Cognitive learning is concerned w ith knowledge acquisition and application through 
problem-solving. This can be delivered through lectures, or at a distance through the 
medium o f carefully produced written and electronic materials supported by tutorial 
support through media such as computer mediated conferencing (CMC).
This approach has been pioneered by the Open University and is being increasingly 
adopted by other universities who are providing courses for working professionals. 
Moreover, geography is not a lim itation to participation, therefore the potential 
recruitment base is global.
Affective learning is concerned w ith attitudinal change and in  the context o f the 
nuclear industry is best delivered through a mixed mode approach. Health and safety 
practices are integral to nuclear education. Legislation could be taught at a distance 
but implementation o f a ‘safety attitude’ can only be measured in terms o f 
professional practice.
The role o f ‘workplace’ experiential learning (reflective development) is integral to 
postgraduate courses w ithin the sphere o f education and social care and is assessed 
through presentation o f a portfolio o f evidence that is measured against a set o f 
generic learning outcomes. The evidence supplied is generated from the student’s 
professional practice thus enabling course customization. Nuclear education could 
utilise this approach by incorporating work experience.
Psychomotor learning is about ‘doing’ and is skills orientated. The student learns 
how to use equipment through tutor directed explanation and demonstration upon 
which the action is imitated and practised. This is purely behavioural but it is these 
skills that are in demand.
20 Learning by doing. Experimentation in laboratories exemplify this domain of learning.
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The delivery o f this aspect o f teaching must be face-to-face and could be done over a 
b rie f residential period. This approach is used by the Open University w ith science 
courses successfully. The University o f Central Lancashire uses this approach to 
teach astronomy.
An overhaul o f course structure and delivery as w ell as using recent educational 
technology has minor disadvantages in as much as it is ‘ front loaded’ in  terms o f 
resources and w ill encounter ‘ teething’ troubles. However, these considerations are 
small compared to the long-term advantages.
However, i f  a number o f universities developed a range o f modules that contributed tp 
an over-arching qualification (e.g. MSc) and utilising the technological nuclear 
resources produced by the co-operating institutions then the m ix o f facilities and 
expertise would amount to a world class course that had the flex ib ility  to adapt to 
meet the needs o f the global nuclear industry.
5.15: Prospects for Nuclear Skills, Education and Training:
The survival o f nuclear skills are imperative to any future renaissance o f nuclear 
power in  Europe. This is particularly the case for the UK,
This chapter has shown that nuclear skills are in decline. The causes o f decline have 
been reviewed and developed through a nuclear/radiation physics content analysis o f 
A-level physics specifications. I f  nuclear/radiation physics contributes 20% or less tq 
the content o f % o f the A-level physics courses then how can school/college leavers 
be expected to pursue nuclear/radiation physics undergraduate courses. This may 
have implications for postgraduate enrolments in  subsequent years.
As well as needing to elevate the status o f nuclear/radiation education at A-level and 
above, further innovation in  postgraduate course delivery should be utilised. 
Investment in new educational facilities and rethinking course design is needed.
Engaging the public in the positive application o f nuclear/radiation physics combined 
w ith supportive goverance is crucial to growth in learner numbers and a skilled 
workforce.
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There is a need to cultivate research and development through further academic- 
industrial collaboration that can provide technological imiovation and invigorate the 
imagination o f future faculty members as well as new postgraduate learners.
The EngD in  nuclear engineering to be delivered in 2006 by a consortium that 
includes; Manchester University, Imperial College, London, Bristol, Leeds, Sheffield 
and Strathclyde Universities could be a major step in this process. The Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council are investing £5 m illion in this project. [82].
It is the Author’s view that this can only be achieved w ith government support for 
nuclear power. Without it nuclear power w ill be perceived as a rejected technology in 
the UK and why should graduates risk a career in a discipline that has been rejected?
The follow ing chapter w ill consider research and development (R&D) and evaluate 
future prospects.
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C h a p t e r  6:
N u c l e a r  R e s e a r c h  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t :
The purpose o f research and development (R&D) is the advancement o f scientific 
knowledge and its practical application. In a commercial context this is done in the 
main for economic gain. However, the profit motive is not always the only driver o f 
R&D. The potential benefits for citizens may encourage financial support from 
governments or larger economic communities (e.g. European Union).
The Human Genome Project (HGP) exemplifies how large-scale research undertaken 
across continents can be managed successfully. The core aims were:
1. Identify the 20,000-25,000 genes in human DNA
2. Determine the sequences o f the 3 b illion chemical base pairs that make up human 
DNA
3. Store this information on a computer database
4. Improve tools for data analysis
5. Address the ethical, legal and social issues that may arise from the project
6. Transfer related technologies to the private sector.
Bjoursen (2006) [83]
The HGP commenced in 1990 and was completed in 2003. US National Institute o f 
Health and the US Department o f Energy collaborated with international partners 
from the UK, France, Germany, Japan and China. The success o f this project 
supports the view that expensive pioneering research can be done collaboratively 
across international boundaries and w ithin specific timescales. Also, the HPG shows 
that ethical and social considerations should not be ignored but seen as integral to the 
project.
R&D provides solutions to technological challenges and could facilitate an 
improvement in the economic and environmental performance o f nuclear power and 
thereby extend its longevity as a method o f energy production.
The success o f R&D depends upon financial support and skilled researchers that have 
the innovative expertise to develop solutions to design problems. Commercial R&D 
is dependant upon economic conditions that dictate the amount o f time and resources
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that can be invested. The skills, knowledge and technical imagination o f the 
researchers involved combined w ith the foresight o f investors determine the triumph 
or failure o f R&D. Moreover, there must be a commercial/governmental need for 
what is being developed. This is exemplified in the HGP.
Typically, industry supports short-term R&D because results are realised over short 
timescales and the economic risks are low. Short-term R&D w ill place emphasis on 
improving current technology. This process o f ‘evolution’ has been applied to the 
extension o f reactor longevity (e.g. Dungeness B has been granted a 10 year extension 
and is now to close in 2018), improved safety systems and increased capacity factors. 
[84].
Long-term R&D support is ‘risk laden’ and unattractive to private investment. It is a 
standard quip amongst physicists that ‘ fusion reactors have always been 20-30 years 
away’ and this underlines the problem for commercial investors. This type o f research 
is often novel and success d ifficu lt to estimate. It is argued that government should 
support this kind o f research, as it is in their national interest that future electricity 
capacity meets demand.21
Furthermore, long-term nuclear research is based upon a small number o f capital- 
intensive projects. To safeguard investor interests R&D investment should be spread 
across a large portfolio o f smaller projects because that reduces the risk o f 
unproductive investment.
In the UK, ‘ free market* thinking prevails that prohibits direct intervention by 
government that would favour one electricity generating technology over another 
through direct subsidy. It is the role o f industry to invest in its own future. That is 
the burden o f private ownership and profit the reward.
21 In 2004-05 there was much debate over the energy security of the UK. The prospect of the UK 
becoming a net importer of gas in 2006 and 80% dependent on imported gas by 2020 highlighted the 
risks of not having sufficient secure energy capacity to meet future demand and the potential disastrous 
consequences of that condition. (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2004) [85].
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R&D w ill be examined in the U K  and global context Emphasis w ill be placed upon 
long-term R&D. Therefore, the provision o f public financing w ill be an integral 
component.
The follow ing areas o f R&D w ill be considered:
• Nuclear Fission.
• Nuclear Fusion.
• Radioactive Waste Management.
6.1: Nuclear Fission R&D in the UK:
Since privatisation o f the U K energy sector in 1990/91 there has been a marked 
decrease in R&D funding. The U K Dept, o f Energy (now DTI) in 1989/90 provided 
funding o f £184 m illion compared to £17 m illion  in  2000/01. A ll current research 
funding from the D TI goes to fusion R&D w ith no contribution to fission reactor 
R&D whatsoever. [86].
Funding related to R&D for safety/risk management (radiation and environmental 
protection) derives from public and private arrangements. Public bodies include: 
Health and Safety Commission (HSC), Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 
Department for Enviromnent and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), Department o f Health 
(DoH), Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and Natural 
Environment Research Council (NERC). In contrast, reactor efficiency 
improvements R&D derives solely from the private sector.
The EPSRC (2006) through the programme ‘Towards a Sustainable Energy 
Economy’ are investing £6.1 m illion  in research grants over 4 years to enable the UK 
to keep the nuclear option open. [87]. This programme is in  response to the 2003 
Energy White Paper [60] that argued that the nuclear option should be kept open.
The objectives o f the programme are:
• The sustainable and efficient generation o f electrical power from nuclear 
generation systems based on life  cycle analysis (including waste disposal).
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♦ The distribution, control, monitoring, stability, supply and connection and 
electrical power o f energy carriers.
•  The evolution o f alternative energy vectors, carriers, conversion technologies 
or generation systems. [87].
The consortium o f researchers awarded the grant includes the following members: 
Imperial College London, University o f Manchester, University o f Cardiff, University 
o f Sheffield, University o f Bristol, University o f Leeds and the Open University.
These universities are working with BNFL (contribution o f £0.5 million) and other 
organisations that include: Atomic Weapons Establishment, British Energy, DEFRA, 
HSE, M itsui Babcock, M inistry o f Defence (MoD), Nirex, AMEC NNC, Rolls-Royce 
PLC and the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA). [87]. Surrey University has 
formed links and is receiving sponsorship from AWE Aldermaston.
6.2: Global Nuclear Fission R&D:
“ The OECD International Energy Agency (IEA) annual R&D statistical reports show 
a steady decline in public nuclear R&D expenditure by IEA  member countries since 
1980” . [86]. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US are the main 
contributors to nuclear R&D accounting for >95%.
Japan and France have continuously increased their spending on nuclear R&D. This 
contrasts w ith all other countries. “ Expenditure by these two countries now accounts 
for 90% o f OECD public22 fission (non-breeder) R&D. Total OECD public 
expenditure on OECD fission (non-breeder) R&D in 1998 was $2 939million” . [86].
As the HGP showed, collaboration between countries can achieve technical success. 
This principle is behind the follow ing international projects that have emerged to 
further nuclear R&D. These are:
•  Generation IV  International Forum (GIF) that commenced in 2001.
♦ European Union Research Framework Programme 6 (FP6) that commenced in 
2002 and ends in 2006.
22 Governemnt
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6.3: Generation IV  International Forum:
GIF is a research forum that consists o f 10 countries (USA, Argentina, Brazil, 
Canada, France, Japan, South Korea, South Africa, Switzerland and UK) that have 
consented to develop 6 nuclear fission reactor designs for deployment (2010-2030). 
The 6 successful designs were selected by the Forum against the follow ing criteria:
• To provide sustainable energy generation that meets clean air objectives and 
promotes the long-term availability o f systems as well as effective fuel 
utilisation for worldwide energy capacity.
• To minimize and manage nuclear waste, and particularly to reduce the burden 
o f long-term stewardship o f waste.
• To increase the assurance that the waste streams are very unattractive for 
diversion into weapons.
• To excel in safety and reliability.
• To ensure a very low likelihood and degree o f reactor core damage.
• To eliminate the need for off-site emergency response.
• To have a clear lifecycle cost advantage over other energy sources.
• To ensure that financial risks are comparable to those associated w ith other 
energy projects.
Gimston &  Beck (2002) [88].
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The 6 reactor designs are outlined in the table below:
neutron
spectrum
(fast/
thermal)
C o o l
ant
t e m p e r a t u r e
(°C) p r e s s u r e * fu e l
fue l
cycle
size(s)
(MW e) u s e s
Gas-cooled 
fast reactors fast helium
850 high U-238+
closed, 
on site 288
electricity
&
hydrogen
Lead-cooled 
fast reactors fast
Pb-Bi 550-800 low U-238+
closed,
regional
50-
150**
300-
400
1200
electricity
&
hydrogen
Molten salt 
reactors epithermal
fluoride
salts 700-800 low
UF in 
salt closed 1000
electricity
&
hydrogen
Sodium- 
cooled fast 
reactors
fast sodium 550 low
U-238
&
MOX
closed
150-
500
500-
1500
electricity
Supercritical
water-
cooled
reactors
thermal or 
fast water 510-550 very high U 02
open
(thermal)
closed
(fast)
1500 electricity
Very high 
temperature 
gas reactors
thermal helium 1000 high
U 0 2
prism
or
pebbles
open 250
hydrogen
&
electricity
*high = 7-15 Mpa 
+ = w ith some U-235 or Pu-239
** 'battery' model w ith long cassette core life  (15-20 years) or replaceable reactor 
module.
Table 16: The 6 Generation IV  reactors.
Source: W NA (2003) [89].
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6.3.1: Gas-cooled fast reactors:
K e y  features of this design includes:
• T h e  potential use of depleted uranium as a feel extending long-term feel 
resources. This positively links to issues of the sustainability of nuclear 
power.
• Offers a closed-reprocessing based feel cycle that will reduce High Level 
Waste ( H L W )  quantities.
• Will use Triso granular feel concept. Triso feel presents challenges for 
reprocessing due to silicon carbide layers in the feel granules. Ceramic-clad 
feels m a d e  from actinide compounds are under consideration. [90].
• Th e viability of project to be established by 2012 and conceptual design to be 
complete by 2019 with international prototype operating in 2025. [91],
6.3.2: Lead-cooled fast reactors:
K e y  features of this design includes:
• A n  outlet temperature of 550 -  880°C. This temperature allows for thermo­
chemical hydrogen production that theoretically could be used for motor 
vehicle feel without the production of C O 2.
• Small (50 -  1 5 0 M W e ) ,  m e d i u m  (300 -  4 0 0 M W e )  and large ( 1 2 0 0 M W e )  
reactors types.
• Modular design would enable small reactors to utilise replaceable reactor 
cores (batteries) that would need changing every 20yrs. This design would 
benefit developing countries without nuclear feel-cycle capabilities.
• Nitride feels would be required at these temperatures.
• In 2014 a decision on whether to proceed with a prototype will be taken. [91].
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6.3,3: Molten salt reactors:
K e y  features of this design includes:
• Liquid fuel p u m p e d  through the core of the reactor.
• Uranium and plutonium fluorides dissolved in sodium and zirconium 
fluorides.
• Large scale ( l O O O M W e )  base-load facility operating at 850°C enabling 
thermochemical hydrogen production.
• U S  research on Molten Salt Reactors in the 1950/60s have presented 
formidable decommissioning challenges due to build-up of uranium 
hexafluoride gas and fluorine.
• The viability of this will be decided in 2014. [91 ]
6.3.4: Sodium-cooled fast reactors:
K e y  features of this design includes:
• The most mature in terms of prior R & D  of all the six G I F  designs.
• Could be used to b u m - u p  demilitarised plutonium stocks.
• Could b u m - u p  spent fuel from countries operating a ‘once through cycle’.
• M e d i u m  scale (150 - 5 Q 0 M W e )  or large scale (500 -  1 5 0 0 M W e )  reactor types.
• T h e  viability of this will be decided in 2010. [91]
6.3.5: Supercritical water-cooled reactors:
K e y  features of this design includes:
• Water is used to cool the reactor that is raised above its thermodynamic 
critical point (374°C and 22. IMPa). Under these conditions wafer does not 
exist as liquid or steam but as a single fluid of smoothly varying density in 
response to changes in pressure or temperature. [92],
• This desigh promises low capital costs (estimated by G I F  to be U S  $900 per 
kWe), This is half of the estimate for Generation III Light Water Reactors. 
[92].
• Challenges are faced in producing materials to build components that will 
withstand the demands of supercritical water conditions.
• Large scale reactor type (15 0 0 M W e ) .
• Conceptual design to be decided by 2015. [91 ].
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6.3.6: Very high temperature gas reactors:
K e y  features of this design includes:
• Graphite-moderated, helium-cooled concept using a ‘once-through uranium 
cycle’.
• Will use Triso granular feel concept.
• M e d i u m  sized reactor ( 2 5 0 M W e )  that will produce temperatures of 1000°C 
enabling the thermochemical hydrogen production.
• The preliminary design is to be completed by 2006 with construction and 
operational status by 2017. [92]
6.3.7: Contemporary Reactor Development
The G I F  is further concerned with more imminent deployment of ‘Generation H I ’ 
advanced reactors before 2020. These include: Westinghouse Advanced Passive 
series (A P6 00 and AP1000)23, Advanced Boiling Water Reactors ( A B W R ) ,  European 
Pressurised Reactor (EPR), W E R - 6 4 0 24 and Pebble B e d  Modular Reactor (P BM R) .
India is in the process of developing a reactor. India is excluded from participation 
under the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (1970) and is attempting to utilise 
indigenous thorium resources through developing a nuclear reactor that uses thorium 
as a feel.
In 2002, design and construction began o n  a S O O M W e  Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) to 
be operational in 2010. It is to be fuelled using plutonium -uranium oxide with a 
blanket of thorium and uranium to breed fissile feel. 3 m o r e  F B R s  are planned for 
construction by 2020. [93].
Thorium-232 is a fertile nuclide that on addition of a neutron is transmuted to 
uranium-233. The problem with uranium-233 is that it is a highly active g a m m a  
emitter that makes handling difficult. [94]. This problem has yet to be overcome.
23 Pressurised light w a t e r  reactors,
24 R u s s i a n  pressurised w a t e r  reactor.
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Economically extractable global thorium resources are shown:
Country Reserves (tonnes)
Australia 300 000
India 290 000
N o r w a y 170 000
U S A 160 000
Canada 100 000
South Africa 35 000
Brazil 16 000
Other countries 95 000
W o r l d  total 1 200 000
Table 17: Global extractable thorium resources.
Source: U S  Geological Survey (1999) [95].
India has 67 000 tonnes of extractable natural uranium deposits [96], so it is in India’s 
long-term interest to continue R & D  into the thorium nuclear-feel cycle.
6.4: European Union Research Fr am ew or k P r og ra mm e 6:
F P 6 is an attempt to create a ‘Research Area’ that will support future science and 
technological innovation in Europe. F P 6 (2002-2006) supports R & D  into nuclear 
fission (€190 million) but this is divided between radioactive waste ma na ge me nt (€90 
million), radiation protection (€50 million) and €5 0 million for nuclear technologies
25 *
and safety . Research on innovative reactor design will be a minor part of this 
category. [97].
6.5: Global Nuclear Fusion R & D :
In contrast to nuclear fission, R & D  into nuclear fusion technology has domestic 
financial support. In 2003, the U K  fended domestic fusion research (£14 million p.a.) 
and supports E U  research (£23.5.million p.a.). [98],
25 T h i s  area includes: innovative c o n c e p t s  to i m p r o v e  reactor p e r f o r m a n c e  a n d  viability o f  n e w  designs, 
financial support for education a n d  training a n d  reactor safety.
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The chart below shows that U K  expenditure (in 2001) is low compared to other 
developed countries:
2001 Domestic fusion R & D  budgets (in millions of $US)
33B 
2311 
230 
130 
130 
30 
0
SOLVie. tr-j&g/Ag&Oiyi UKAt A
Fig. 20: Domestic fusion R & D  budgets for 2001 (in millions of $US).
Source: International Energy Agency; U K A E A  (2003) [99],
It is not clear w h y  the U K  spends less than the other countries in figure 20. Yet it 
does typify the general lack of conviction that the U K  Government has shown 
towards nuclear energy in all its technological manifestations. A s  already 
highlighted, the 2003 Energy White Paper supplies further evidence of a fundamental 
lack of courage where nuclear matters are concerned.
in 2003, the E P S R C  took charge of the U K  fusion programme with funding of £48 
million over 4 years. Funding is via the U K  Office of Science and Technology. This 
funding will go to U K A E A  at Cu lh am for the Joint European Torus26 project and 
w o r k  on the U K ’s o w n  M e g a - A m p  Spherical T o k a m a k  ( M A S T )  project27. [100],
Therefore, for the period 2003-2007 domestic U K  funding for fusion will be £12 
million p.a. compared to £14 million in 2001. This represents an annual 14.3% 
reduction in funding.
"6 £6 million o f  d o m e s t i c  f u n d i n g  g o e s  to J E T .  T h i s  p r e m i u m  is for hosting the J E T  project that is then 
f u n d e d  aga i n  b y  the U K  t h r o u g h  E U  research contribution (£23.5 million). [101]
7 Thi s  is a  long-term U K  project that receives £ 7 . 6  million o f  d o m e s t i c  fusion binding. [101]
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6.6: Research Programmes:
T h e  J E T  project based in the U K  at Culham, Oxfordshire, uses a T o k a m a k  (toroidal 
magnetic configuration) device with a 3 m  radius and has been operated solely by 
U K A E A  since 2000. Since success in 1997 achieving a breakeven *Q* value (where 
total output and input energy is equal) [98] the size of the apparatus prevents further 
energy output but operations are to be continued to carry out preparatory tests for the 
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER).
ITER: W h e n  built this reactor will have a T o k a m a k  device with a 6m  radius. 
Participants in this project include: China, E U  ( E U R A T O M )  India, Japan, Korea, 
Russia, and the United States. T h e  aim of this project is to better understand plasma 
behaviour such as stability. Components, technologies and procedures will be tested 
for a demonstration/prototype power plant ( D E M O ) .
I T E R  will be located at Cadarache, France. Th e costs are estimated to be €4.57 
billion28. After the U S  withdrew from the project in 1999 the original designs were 
scaled d o w n  but in January 2003, the U S  rejoined the project. I T E R  is scheduled to 
be constructed by 2016 and to operate for 21 years. [103],
D E M O  is at present a concept that is in the process of design in the U K  and US. It is 
anticipated that D E M O  would take 10 years to build and have an operational life of
OO    ^ ^
20 yrs . [97]. T h e  E U  Council of Ministers expressed that commercialisation could 
follow directly from the D E M O  project. [98]. This is likely to require additional 
short-term funding.
“Fusion generates no radioactive fusion products or transuranic elements and the 
unburaed gases can be treated o n  site, there would be a short-term radioactive waste 
problem due to activation products30.” [98], However, the radiotoxicity of those
28 E U  a n d  F r a n c e  will p u t - u p  5 0 %  o f  the €  4.57 billion costs to b e  s p r e a d  o v e r  1 0  years. T h i s  deal 
arose f r o m  the selection o f  C a d a r a c h e  a s  the location for I T E R .  [102].
29 T h i s  c r u d e  timescale will b e  d e p e n d e n t  u p o n  the success o f  I T E R .
30 T h e  L i 20  breeder blanket will p r o d u c e  h i g h  short-term activity at s h u t d o w n  f r o m  28A l  ( T 1/2= 2 . 2 5  
min), 29A 1  ( T1/2= 6 . 5 5  m i n )  a n d  2fM g  ( T 1/2= 9 . 4 5  min), 3lSi ( T 1/2= 2 . 6 2  hr), 24N a  ( T 1/2=  14.96 hr) a n d  ^ M g  
(Ti/2^21 hr). Intermediate-term activity is d u e  to ^ N a  (Ti/2=2.605 y), 54M n  ( T 1/2= 3 1 2  day), 55F e  
CIj/2= 2.7 y), ^ C o  ( T l/2= 5 . 2 7  y) a n d  3H  (Ti/2= 1 2 . 3  yr). L o n g - t e r m  activity f r o m  10B e  ( T 1/2= 1 . 6  x  1 06y),
14C  ( T li2= 2 5 7 3 0  y) a n d  26A l  (Ti/2~ 7.3 x  1 05 y). T h e  biological shield’s short-term activity derives f r o m  
54M n  ( T 1/2= 2 . 6  hr). Intermediate-term activity derives f r o m  54M n ,  ^ C o  a n d  3H .  L o n g - t e r m  activity
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wastes would be minimal compared to actinides (a-emitters with long T 1/2) produced 
from fission reactors.
Safety concerns have been raised due to potential accidents with the magnetic 
configuration (100 x 109J of energy would be stored in the magnetic field). T h e 
pyrophoric31 property of lithium is a further safety consideration. 3H  (T1/2 12.4 yrs) 
release would be problematic due to incorporation into water. A  pollution route 
through the hydrological cycle and eventually into body tissues would be extremely 
difficult to clean-up.
6.7: Global Nuclear Waste Management:
“Th e intractable problem is to secure public agreement on the design and siting of a 
secure long-term repository. Considerations of inter-generational equity32 embedded 
in the concept of sustainable development demands the solution of the waste 
ma na ge me nt problem, to the satisfaction of both the scientific community and the 
general public, before n e w  nuclear power stations are constructed.” [105],
Public opposition to deep geological repositories has been in evidence in the U K .  
Intervention by the Secretary of State to stop a deep rock chamber facility being built 
by Nirex (17th Ma rc h 1997) was achieved after m u c h  protest from E N G O s  
(Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations) and local me mb er s of the public.
The cN o t  in m y  backyard’ ( N I M B Y )  culture is such that it seems difficult to foresee 
future public acceptance of deep rock chambers in the U K .  Th e absence of policy on 
long-term radioactive waste disposal is a major barrier to the expansion of nuclear 
power.
It should be acknowledged that N I M B Y  culture fights planning permission for wind 
power turbines on the grounds of visual blight and noise. W i n d  power is at the heart 
of the ‘green’ agenda yet opposition is vibrant. There is a recognised need for
derives f r o m  14C, 93N b  (Ti/2= 16.1 yr) a n d  94N b  (Ti^=2 x l O 4 yr). S i C  is a  l o w  activation material that is 
best suited for fusion reactor structure. [104].
31 Fire hazard.
32 F u t u r e  generations h a v e  access to natural resources that c a n  pr o v i d e  a  quality o f  existence that is 
e q u a l  to the present generation.
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electricity generation that is consumed by amongst others those of a N I M B Y  
viewpoint w h o  reject nuclear power, wind power and think fossil fuels dreadful for 
contributing to global warming. So what do they want? This situation is termed 
‘cognitive dissonance’ where a person/group can hold two views that are logical 
contradictions.
It is finding ways to reduce this ‘dissonance’ that holds the solution to public 
agreement over issues such as the locations of future nuclear power stations and/or 
waste facilities in the future.
There is a range of waste mana ge me nt options available for countries. Economics 
and safety underpin the waste management process yet as table 18 shows different 
waste management approaches are used in different countries:
C o u n t r y Policy Facilities a n d  p r o g r e s s  t o w a r d s  final repositories
B e l g i u m R e p r o c e s s i n g
Central w a s t e  storage &  u n d e r g r o u n d  laboratory 
established
Construction o f  repository to b e g i n  a b o u t  2 0 3 5 .
C a n a d a Direct Disposal U n d e r g r o u n d  repository laboratory established. 
R e p o s i t o r y  p l a n n e d  for u s e  2025.
C h i n a R e p r o c e s s i n g Central u s e d  fuel storage in L a n Z h o u .
F i n l a n d Direct Disposal
S p e n t  fuel storages in operation.
L o w  &  intermediate-level repositories in operation since 
1992.
D e e p  repositoiy for u s e d  fuel u n d e r  construction near 
Olkiluoto, o p e n  in 2020.
F r a n c e R e p r o c e s s i n g
T w o  facilities for storage o f  short-lived wastes.
Site selection studies u n d e r w a y  for d e e p  repositoiy for 
c o m m i s s i o n i n g  2020.
G e r m a n y
R e p r o c e s s i n g  b u t  m o v i n g  
to direct disposal
L o w - l e v e l  w a s t e  sites in u s e  since 1975. 
Intermediate-level w a s t e s  stored at Aliaus.
U s e d  fuel storage at Aliaus a n d  Gorleben. 
High-level repository to b e  operational after 2010.
I n d i a R e p r o c e s s i n g R e s e a r c h  o n  d e e p  geological disposal for H L W .
J a p a n R e p r o c e s s i n g
L o w - l e v e l  w a s t e  repositoiy in operation.
High-level w a s t e  storage facility at R o k k a s h o - m u r a  since 
1995.
Investigations for d e e p  geological repository site b egun, 
operation b o m  2035.
R u s s i a R e p r o c e s s i n g
Sites for final disposal u n d e r  investigation.
Central repository for l o w  a n d  intermediate-level wastes 
p l a n n e d  f r o m  2008.
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T h r e e  low-level w a s t e  sites in operation.
2002 decision to p r o c e e d  w i t h  geological repositoiy at \ 
Y u c c a  M o u n t a i n .
Table 18: Waste management for spent fuel from nuclear power reactors.
Source: W N A  (2006). [106]
D e e p  geological repositories are planned in a number of the above countries. The 
Yucca Mountains (US) in 2012 and Olkiluoto (Finland) in 2020 are considered in 
more detail to compare and contrast methods of public engagement in the decision­
making process.
6.7.1: Yucca Mountain Repository
“President Bu sh formally recommended the Yucca Mountain site to Congress on 15 
February 2002”. (Nuttall, 2005) [92], T h e  U S  Senate gave its approval 5 months 
later. Th e 1 1111 September 2001 attacks presented the U S  Government with the 
perceived need to exercise ‘top-down’ leadership to reduce the risk of potential 
terrorist attacks that could involve nuclear waste. Despite local opposition to the 
proposal it is clear that the non-inclusion of local concerns does produce decisions.
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6.7.2: Olkiluoto Repository
Unlike the Yucca Mountains, Olkiluoto’s community does have long-standing 
associations with the nuclear industry through the nuclear plant. “The key attribute of 
the Finnish process for the management of radioactive wastes is a policy of 
transparency, community voiunteerism and local engagement” (Nuttall, 2005) [92]. 
This ‘bottom-up’ approach is the antithesis of the U S  approach but the effect is the 
sa me that permission wa s granted.
Clearly there m a y  be cultural factors or perceived security imperatives that favours 
one approach above another. This is an area that requires further research and would 
be particularly relevant to the U K  situation.
6.7.3: T h e  Waste Legacy
T h e  table below shows the amounts of stored heavy metal waste that require disposal.
Total Stored Spent Fuel
(1 January 2003)
Region A m o i m t
(Tonnes of Heavy Metal)
We st Europe 36 100
East Europe 27 700
America (North &  South) 83 300
Asia &  Africa 23 900
World 171 000
Table 19: Overview of Global Spent Fuel Storage.
Source: I A E A  (2005) [107].
If nuclear power expands in the future then the need to m a k e  decisions about suitable 
sites for final disposal and storage capacity will be co me more pressing. In the 
absence of current U K  public acceptance of geological repositories it is imperative 
that the skills needed to design and construct repositories are not lost.
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In response to the above scenario the I A E A  Network of Centres of Excellence ( C O E )  
is an international working group33 that aims to pursue advancement in deep chamber 
technologies. Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, U K  and U S  are engaged in developing 
confidence and knowledge through the use of shared underground rock laboratories 
and surface facilities. T h e  advantage of this programme is that countries that do not 
possess underground facilities to train operatives will be able to utilise these resources 
elsewhere.
I A E A  (2005) estimate; “Global spent fuel storage capacity is about 244 000 tonnes of 
heavy metal. This capacity will be filled by 2017 if no n e w  facilities are built by that 
time.” [107].
T h e  prospect of regional storage of radioactive waste m a y  offer future solutions to 
countries without the social will or technology available to dispose of the waste at 
h o m e  (e.g. UK). Grimston &  Be ck (2002) argue that Russia and Australia have 
considered importing waste for profit. In 2001, Kazakhstan34 announced that the 
importation and storage of low-level waste wa s under consideration, [88],
Russia passed legislation to import High Level Waste in 2001 and Krasnokamensk 
was suggested as location for storage in 2003. In contrast, Australia has rejected the 
proposition. [109]
Despite no international standard definition of radioactive waste, international 
environmental law as it stands would not acquiesce to the regional solution as 
described. Grimston &  B e c k  (2002) inform; “Export to Africa, Caribbean, Pacific
and Antarctic countries is expressly banned international law and political
opinion have for so me time been moving towards a position according to which the 
exportation of hazardous waste should take place only in those cases where the 
country of origin is technically or financially incapable of disposing of that waste 
safely...”. [88].
33 M e m b e r s  include: B e l g i u m ,  C a n a d a ,  U K ,  U S A ,  S w i t z e r l a n d  a n d  S w e d e n .  T h e s e  countries’ o w n  
facilities. O t h e r  m e m b e r  states that d o  n o t  o w n  facilities b u t  w i s h  to participate m a y  d o  so.
34 P r o p o s e d  location is M a n g i s t a u  P r o v i n c e  ( W e s t  K a z a k h s t a n ) .  [108].
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Reprocessing is the preferred method of treating spent fuel in the U K .  A s  the U K  
does not have indigenous uranium resources it is sensible to utilise as m u c h  of the fuel 
as a possible. This approach is not proliferation resistant and there remains the 
potential problem of theft.
Table 20 shows global reprocessing capacity:
L W R  fuel: [France, La  Ha gu e 1700:
U K ,  Sellafield (THORP)i 900
Russia, Ozersk (Mayak) 400
Japan 14 J
total approx 3000j
Other nuclear fuels:; U K ,  Sellafield 1500! ....!
India 275 ;
total approx 1750!
Total civil capacity 4750
Table 20: World Commercial Reprocessing Capacity (tonnes/y)
Source: O E C D / N E A  (2004) [110].
In contrast, untreated spent fuel containing 239P u  is of little use to those intent on 
developing nuclear weapons because the activity of fission products contained would 
m a k e  handling difficult. The ‘once-through’ cycle is gaining m u c h  support in the U S  
The perceived increased risk of transportation of reprocessed fuel since the September 
1 1th 2001, attacks is a further problem that needs consideration.
“The reprocessing system n o w  used in Europe, Japan and Russia that involves 
separation and recycling of plutonium presents unwarranted proliferation risks. W e  
conclude that, over at least the next 50 years, the best choice to meet these challenges 
is the open, once through fuel cycle.” (Deutch &  Moniz, 2004) [111].
Despite opposition to reprocessing on grounds of security this approach has 
reprocessed >9 0 000 tonnes of spent fuel globally (2004 figures). [112]. There is 
clearly an economic case for countries to reprocess if they do not have their o w n
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indigenous resources or have secure resources from neighbouring nations such as the 
U S  benefits from Canadian uranium resources.
It is the Author’s view that the case for reprocessing is strong and that the U S  and 
Canadian preference for the ‘once-through’ cycle is in part due to the secure 
availability of natural uranium resources that contrasts with most other nations that 
utilise nuclear power. Given the sensitivity of security issues in the U S  it should be 
understood that proliferation resistant techniques d o  c o m m a n d  great attention and 
support from the U S  at this time.
6.8: Partition and Transmutation (P&T):
R e n e w e d  enthusiasm for this so far undemonstrated method of managing High Level 
Waste ( H L W )  is enjoying a renaissance. P & T  has the potential to minimise the 
inventory of long-lived radionuclides contained in radioactive waste and reduce 
approximate storage times from 100 OOOyrs to lOOOyrs.
Partitioning is the physical separation of radionuclides using aqueous, pyrochemical, 
electrochemical or magnetic systems and transmutation involves changing one 
nuclide into another through nuclear reactions.
The partitioning process includes:
• Partitioning of uranium for storage or re-use.
• Separate short-lived heat producing products (e.g. 137Cs and 90Sr)35.
• Separate actinides and long-lived fission products for long-term storage.
35 C a e s i u m  is p r o d u c e d  in w a s t e  as a n  array o f  isotopes. 137C s  is problematic b e c a u s e  it is highly 
radioactive ({T de c a y )  a n d  h a s  a  half-life =  30.2y. l3SC s  is the m o s t  problematic long-lived fission 
p r o d u c t  d u e  to h a v i n g  a  T i n  =  2.3 x  1 0 6y  (p' decay). C a e s i u m  presents particular p r o b l e m s  in t e r m s  o f  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  protection b e c a u s e  it is water-soluble. ^ S r  is prob l e m a t i c  b e c a u s e  it is highly 
radioactive (P' d ecay) a n d  h a s  a  T i /2 =  28.8y. S t r o n t i u m  b e h a v e s  similar chem i c a l l y  to c a l c i u m  a n d  
therefore presents radiobiological p r oblems.
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Transmutation consists of 2 processes:
# Conversion of long-lived radioactive waste products to stable isotopes by 
neutron capture (e.g. 99Tc).
"T c  + n -* ■  100Tc— ► 100Ru >
ti/2 ~ 2-12 X 10.5y tj/2 = 15„8secs stable
# Inducing the fission of actinide wastes.
Historically, it w a s  envisaged that a fast neutron transmutation scheme would be 
utilised but there are unresolved problems concerning the slowness of the 
transmutation rate using neutrons at those energies36. However, transmutation of 
actinides would benefit from a fast neutron flux and resolve the difficulty of neutron 
capture at epithermal energies that produce higher actinides.
R & D  interests are gaining m o m e n t u m  in the design and utilisation of particle 
accelerators for transmutation of H L W .
Accelerator-driven transmutation of waste ( A T W )  is being actively researched37 in 
Europe and Japan. T h e  system works through the ionisation of hydrogen where 
negative hydrogen ions are accelerated onto a thin foil that strips off the electrons 
leaving protons. These protons are accelerated to produce a b e a m  (1-2 G e V )  and a 
current of 50 mA . [92]. The proton b e a m  will then strike a target consisting of a 
eutectic38 mix of lead-bismuth liquid where neutrons will be liberated from heavy 
nuclei (spallation reaction). These neutrons will possess a wide energy distribution m  
the fast and epithermal neutron energy ranges. [92]. These neutrons can be used for 
transmutation of H L W .  1
3 6 S m a l l e r  cross-section at fast energies.
37 E u r o p e a n  P & T  research is wit h i n  P P 6 ( € 9 0  million for radioactive w a s t e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f w h i c h  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  € 3 0  million is dedicated to P & T .  J a p a n  h a s  m a d e  considerable progress w i t h  c h e m i c a l  
partitioning at laboratory scale w i t h  the successful extraction o f  137C s  a n d  ^ S r  for u s e  a s  industrial 
radioactivejsouices. T h e  U S  a b a n d o n e d  A T W  research in 2 0 0 3 .  [ 1 1 3  j. N o  accelerators for this 
p u r p o s e  h a v e  b e e n  built in tlie U S  (2006).
8 A l l o y  ratio.
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The advantage of changing long-lived radionuclides include:
© Reduced inventory of long-lived fission products such as 99T c  and l29I [92].
Problems that need to be addressed:
® Existing vitrified waste could not be transmuted. Only future wastes could be 
put through the process.
© Radionuclides with low capture cross-sections would have low transmutation 
rates (e.g. 79Se). Transmutation of 5 0 %  of the isotope would take >1 00 years. 
[114].
® Neutron capture by 133Cs and I34C s creating further 135Cs.
® 135C s  will transmute to 136B a  (stable) but due to a relative small neutron-
capture cross-section compared to 133Cs and 134Cs there would be a net 
production in 135Cs with T 1/2= 2.3 x 106y. Therefore, transmutation of 135Cs is 
untenable.
® Doses from 137Cs are high. This presents handling problems.
® Unwanted transmutation products. 237N p  and 241 A m  through neutron capture 
and decay produces 238P u  and 239Pu.
• On ce sufficient R & D  has paved the w a y  for a P & T  facility the huge costs 
would require that a nation or group of nations be committed to long-term 
nuclear power to provide the economies of scale to assure financial viability 
for this technique.
King (2003) explains; “ ....Europe39 have already produced roadmaps of costs and 
timescales. The European roadmap estimates that in 2040 Europe could possibly 
have a demonstration facility available at a cost of €0.5 billion.” [114].
Th e need for international co-operation in the R & D  of P & T  is clear given the range of 
expertise and the costs involved. The costs will be enormous to m o v e  P & T  from the 
scale laboratory experiments to industrial process. It is essential that a renaissance in 
nuclear power in Europe is to a sufficiently large scale to justify continued economic 
investment up to 2040. Japan has a long-term commitment to nuclear
39 This includes the UK.
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energy and P & T  m a y  prove to have long-term benefits in terms of waste reduction. 
However, the decision by the U S  in 2003 to abandon its A T W  endeavours on the 
basis of cost despite the dawning of a nuclear renaissance shows the uncertainty 
inherent in the future success of this waste management approach.
6.9: Spin-Off Nuclear Technology:
R & D  presents opportunities to take newly developed techniques and equipment and 
apply these to n e w  problems. In the Author’s view the technology that represents this 
achievement most and given the evidence of climate change articulated in chapter 2 
m a y  have a significant role in North Africa and Asia over the coming century is water 
desalination.
There are 12 500 water reverse osmosis desalination plants worldwide with 5 0 %  of 
these located in the Middle East. [115]. Desalination is an energy intensive process 
that has been traditionally powered by fossil fuels but small-medium sized nuclear 
reactors are suitable for this process and could co-generate electricity using low- 
pressure steam. [115].
In Aktau (Kazakhstan) a B N - 3 5 0  reactor produces 1 3 5 M W e  of electricity and 
80 0 0 0 m  /day of potable water. This plant has been operating for 29 years. Japan has 
10 desalination facilities linked to P W R s  that produce 1000 - 3 0 0 0 m 3/day of potable 
water.
6.9.1: N e w  Water Desalination Projects:
• Spain is in the process of building 20 desalination plant,.
• India is planning to build a demonstration nuclear desalination plant joined 
with two P H W R s  ( 1 7 0 M W e )  at Kalpakkam (southeast India).
• China is considering the feasibility of a desalination plant in Yantai.
• Pakistan is to create a demonstration project near Karachi.
• Egypt is assessing the feasibility of co-generation at El-Dabaa on the 
Mediterranean coast.
• South Korea has developed a small co-generational reactor ( 3 3 0 M W e  P W R )  
to produce 40 OOOnrVday of potable water. [115]
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The I A E A ’s ‘technical co-operation project’ on nuclear power and desalinisation that 
c o m m e n c e d  in 1998 has had input in these projects and is co-ordinating research to 
review reactor design for co-generation and the advancement of advanced 
desalinisation technologies. [116].
The role of nuclear powered water desalinisation has huge potential in North Africa, 
Asia and elsewhere n o w  and increasingly in the future. International R & D  that 
involves nuclear technology is subject to the problems of geo-politics but examples 
have been sh ow n that prove that international co-operation in R & D  can succeed. The 
Author anticipates that the role of nuclear* powered water desalinisation will grow in 
significance over the coming century.
i
6.10: The Outlook for Nuclear R & D :
This chapter has sh ow n that investment in nuclear R & D  is in decline in the U K .  The 
U K  Government’s reduction in support for long-term projects necessitate 
international efforts that combine the finance and expertise of nations. This is 
exemplified by GI F and FP6/7.
Future development of nuclear technology will depend upon the success of these 
international efforts. Moreover, the resear ch skills base can only survive if there is a 
purpose for researchers talents and financial security. This can only be achieved with 
greater public investment to overcome economic hurdles and political commitment to 
nuclear* power.
France, Japan and South Korea benefit from the energy security that nuclear power 
provides and a confident nuclear workforce because their talents are in d e m a n d  and 
enhanced through government support for their industry. The U K  Government would 
do well to do likewise and reverse the decline in funding.
Political commitment is determined to a great extent by public attitude. Nuclear 
safety has always been of great concern to the public since its inception. However, 
the September 11th 2001 attacks have produced a n e w  emphasis on security.
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T h e  following chapter considers the state of global nuclear security and its 
implications for the industry’s survival.
Chapter 7
Nuclear a n d  Radiological Security:
“Mass-destructive terrorism is n o w  the greatest non-traditional threat to international 
security, and of these, nuclear terrorism poses a real danger. A  terrorist use of a 
nuclear-yield device is the most devastating type of terrorism conceivable and a 
radiological attack is the most likely variety of non-conventional terrorism.”
Gavin Cameron, (1999), Nuclear Terrorism: A  Threat Assessment for the 21st 
Century. [117].
T w o  yeai-s after C a m e r o n ’s book wa s published an event occurred that m a d e  the 
subject of nuclear terrorism mo re than academic supposition.
“The tragic terrorists’ attacks on the United States were a walce up call to us all. W e  
cannot be complacent. W e  have to and will increase our efforts on all fronts -  from 
combating illicit trafficking to ensuring the protection of nuclear materials -  from 
nuclear* installation design to withstand attacks to improving h o w  w e  respond to 
nuclear emergencies.”
I A E A  Director General M o h a m e d  ElBaradei, 21st September, 2002. [118].
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate nuclear security across spatial boundaries 
and to assess the prospects for nuclear power given these uncertain conditions.
Events of magnitude highlight vulnerabilities and threats creating the need to 
reappraise models of protection and the efficacy of safeguards.
Terrorism has been an activity on the geopolitical landscape for centuries. Yet the Al- 
Quaedia attack on the World Trade Centre on 11th September 2001 w a s  by far the 
most audacious and severe act of terrorism to have been inflicted on the contemporary 
Western world.
The scale of impact that terrorist acts produce are likely to increase because the 
greater the destruction/disruption, the mo re media coverage and the greater the 
attention drawn to the ideological or political view of the terrorists. Biological or 
chemical weapons would not convey the same prestige as a nuclear attack. [117].
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B a m a b y  (2003) contends that there are 5 types of terrorist:
• Individual terrorist (e.g. Theodore Kaczynski [The Unabomber])40.
• Nationalist terrorist (e.g. IRA).
• Political terrorist (e.g. fascists)
• Single-issue terrorist (e.g. animal rights)
• Religious fundamental terrorist (e.g. Al-Quaedia). [119].
Greater freedom of m o v e m e n t  internationally (with the exception of the U S )  has as 
never before provided the conditions whereby states and sub-state actors intent on 
malicious acts have the mobility to implement such operations from within the 
confines of the victim state.
7.1: W e a p o n s  of Ma ss Disruption and Destruction:
T h e  following will evaluate h o w  terrorists could obtain materials/expertise to produce 
a nuclear/radiological weapon. Although nuclear weapons could be stolen this is 
considered to be the most problematic option from the terrorist viewpoint, therefore, 
the 5 significant potential threats to international security are:
• Illegal trafficking of weapons grade nuclear' material.
• Creation and deployment of dirty bombs.
• Sabotage and destruction of nuclear facilities.
• Sabotage of radiological materials in transit.
• Creation and deployment of nuclear weapons.
7.2: Trafficking of W e a p o n s  Grade Nuclear Material:
T h e  trafficking of weapons grade nuclear material presents a serious threat to 
international security. Smuggling of drugs, precious stones and more recently h u m a n  
traffic has been increasing over recent decades. Nuclear smuggling is consistent with 
this trend and although attempts thus far have been in the main ‘amateurish’ it is
40 F o r m e r  lecturer a n d  post-doctoral researcher in the U S  w h o  w a s  responsible for a  b o m b i n g  c a m p a i g n  
b e t w e e n  1 978 - 1 9 9 5 .  Centr al to his reasoning w a s  the idea that m o d e m  society is e n s l a v e d  to 
technology. Thi s  t h e m e  has historical roots in the beliefs o f  eco-activism t h r o u g h o u t  history. T h e  
Luddi t e s  in the early 1 9 th century h a d  similar misg i v i n g s  a b o u t  industrialisation a n d  t o o k  to direct 
action.
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likely that more competent smugglers will endeavour to acquire Highly Enriched 
Uranium ( H E U )  > 2 0 %  or plutonium. (Woessner &  Williams, 1996) [120],
Woessner &  Williams (1996) assert; “N o n e  of the radioactive contraband that has 
been confiscated by Western authorities has been traced unequivocally to weapons 
stockpiles. S o m e  of the plutonium that smugglers try to peddle comes from smoke 
detectors.” [120], There is evidence that smugglers have attempted to deceive 
potential rogue buyers by offering m o c k  fissile material.
The I A E A  established an Illicit Trafficking Database (1TDB) in 1993 to record 
incidents of illicit trafficking. Eighty-nine (64.5%) I A E A  m e m b e r  states participate 
in the database. A s  of December 31, 2005, I A E A  listed 827 confirmed incidents 
involving the illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, including weapons-usable 
material. [121].
Confirmed incidents. 1993-2005
□  Nuclear Material ■Other Radioactive Material
□  Both Nudearand Other Radioactive Material □  Rad ioactivel y Contam ina led Ma terial
□  Other
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Figure 21: Confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. 
Source: I A E A  (2006) [121].
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Incidents involving nuclear materials confirmed to the ITDB. 
1993-2005
□Highly enriched 
uranium (5*>a
| Unidentified 
category of 
nuclear materials
□Natural uranium, 
depleted 
uranium, and 
thorium (6
J Plutonium (2%
□  Lew -enriched 
uranium i26%)
Figure 22: Incidents involving different categories of nuclear materials confirmed to 
the I T D B  1993-2005.
Source: I A E A  (2006) [121],
The U S  General Accounting Office ( G A O )  in 2003 stated that “20 involved either 
H E U  (>20%) or plutonium-239”. [122]. M o r e  than half of these incidents occurred 
during 1993-95. The remaining cases occurred during 1999-2001. In addition, I A E A  
( I T D B  data) shows 1 further case of trafficking that involved 170g of H E U  in Georgia 
(June 2003) [121].
This trend is of serious concern because the prospect of undetected weapons grade 
nuclear material being trafficked across borders is beyond accurate estimation.
It should be noted that I A E A  m e m b e r  states that contribute to this database m a y  not 
disclose all incidents. Illegitimate reasons for non-disclosure m a y  include an 
unwillingness to share sensitive details that m a y  undermine political confidence with 
implications for external relations. However, there m a y  be legitimate reasons such as 
reluctance to publicise confidential material that might undermine current criminal 
investigations.
The U S  G A O  (2003) state a number of key observations about 20 incidents involving 
weapons-grade nuclear material:
104
« M a n y  of the incidents involved material that c a m e  from countries of the 
former Soviet Union, primarily Russia.
• Discovered nuclear material was seized primarily in Russia and Eastern 
Europe. There appears to have been an increase in trafficking in weapons 
grade nuclear material through the Caucasus (Georgia), Central Asia 
(Kyrgyzstan), Greece and Turkey. According to IA E A ,  it is uncertain whether 
the increase represents m o r e  trafficking in this material or better detection and 
reporting of activities that m a y  have been going on in earlier years.
• Mo s t  of the smuggling incidents involved relatively small quantities of 
weapons-grade materials that were insufficient to construct a nuclear bomb.
In so me cases, the small quantities of material involved m a y  indicate that the 
seller wa s trying to attract a potential buyer with a ‘sample’ quantity of 
material. In other cases, it appears doubtful that the traffickers had access to 
larger quantities of nuclear material.
• T h e  incidents do not appear to be part of an organised criminal or terrorist 
activity or organisation41.
• In most of the incidents, the weapons-grade material w a s  seized as a result of 
police investigation. Th e material was not detected by equipment or personnel 
stationed by border crossings. O n e  notable exception involved material 
detected b y  customs agents at a Bulgarian border crossing. This incident 
represents one of a few reported instances where nuclear material w a s  shielded 
or protected to avoid detection. [122].
41 Incidents s e e m  to b e  t oo a d  h o c  to b e  associated w i t h  o r g a n i s e d  crime. H o w e v e r ,  this m a y  b e  a  v i e w  
d r a w n  f r o m  insufficient e v i d e n c e  a n d  is therefore o p e n  to criticism.
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The 21 incidents involving H E U  (>20%) and plutonium-239 referred to above are
detailed chronologically below:
Date Details of interception
M a y  1992 Russia (Luch Scientific Production Association);
1.5 kilograms ( 9 0 %  H E U )  w a s  discovered by police investigation.
M a y  1993 Lithuania; 0.1 kilogram ( 5 0 %  H E U )  was discovered by police 
investigation.
July 1993 Russia; 1.8 kilograms ( 3 6 %  H E U )  discovered by police investigation.
N o v  1993 Russia; 4.5 kilograms (2 0 %  H E U )  discovered by police investigation.
M a r c h  1994 Russia; 3.05 kilograms (9 0 %  H E U )  discovered by police 
investigation.
M a y  1994 Germany; 0.006 kg of plutonium-239 discovered by police 
investigation.
Ju ne 1994 Germany; 0.0008 kg (87.8% H E U )  discovered by police 
investigation.
July 1994 Germany; 0.00024 kg plutonium-239 discovered by police 
investigation.
Au gu st 1994 Germany; 0.4 kg of plutonium-239 discovered by police 
investigation.
D e c e m b e r
1994
Czech Republic; 2.7 kg (87.7% H E U )  discovered by police 
investigation.
Ju ne 1995 Czech Republic; 0.0004 grams (87.7% H E U )  discovered by police 
investigation.
Ju ne 1995 Czech Republic; 0.017 kg (87.7% H E U )  discovered by police 
investigation.
Ju ne 1995 Russia; 1.7 kg ( 2 1 %  H E U )  discovered by police investigation.
M a y  1999 Bulgaria; 0.004 kg of H E U  interdiction at border by Bulgarian 
customs.
October 1999 Kyrgyzstan; 0.0015 kg of plutonium-239 discovered by police 
investigation.
April 2000 Georgia; 0.9 kg ( 3 0 %  H E U )  discovered by combination of radiation 
detection equipment at border and police investigation.
September
2000
Georgia; 0.0004 k g  of plutonium-239 discovered by police 
investigation.
D e c e m b e r
2000
Germany; <1 m g  of plutonium-239 discovered in a forensic test.
January
2001
Greece; 0.003 kg of plutonium-239 discovered by police 
investigation.
July 2001 France; 0.005 kg ( 8 0 %  H E U )  discovered by police investigation.
J u ne 2003 Georgia; 0.17 kg H E U  discovered by border police
Table 21: 21 cases of intercepted fissile material from trafficking (1992-2005). 
Sources: U S  G A O  (2003) &  I A E A  (2006) [121 &  122].
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Between 1992-2001 the U S  through a variety of agencies has spent over $86.1 million 
to enable over 30 countries (mostly the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) to 
defend against efforts to steal and smuggle fissile material. [122].
Radiation detection equipment such as hand-held detectors, stationary detectors at 
border crossings and airports, mobile vans with detection equipment and training have 
been provided. [122].
“While U S  assistance is generally helping countries combat the smuggling of nuclear 
and other radioactive materials, serious problems with installing, using and 
maintaining radiation detection equipment have undermined U S  efforts.” (US G A O ,  
2003) [122].
Detection equipment provided for Lithuania wa s unnecessarily stored in the basement 
of the U S  embassy. Furthermore, it wa s found that few countries systematically 
report intercepted contraband and therefore makes benchmarking and auditing of 
performance almost impossible.
It is estimated that the former Soviet Union amassed 30 000 nuclear weapons and 
600 -  650 metric tons of weapons-grade material before it collapsed. T h e  security of 
materials of key concern include:
• Caesium-137 (neutron reflector in reactors or bombs).
® Cobalt-60 (industrial and medical use but could be used in a ‘dirty b o m b ’).
• Lithium-6 (used in thermonuclear weapons).
® Plutonium-239 (used in nuclear weapons and reactor fuel).
• Uranium-235 (used in nuclear weapons and reactor fuel). [122].
It is acknowledged that the most likely smuggling routes are those established during 
the reign of the former Soviet Union to smuggle goods in, only in this instance it is to 
smuggle goods out. It is clear that e x - K G B  and Soviet networks could be used for 
clandestine matters given Russia’s impoverished workforce. Woessner and Williams
(1996) suggest; “S o m e  Turkish gangs appeal- to be engaged in the trade-having
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graduated from clandestine export of antiquities, they treat uranium as just another 
commodity.” [120].
It is understood that nuclear trafficking is in its embryonic stage but the potential for 
more sophisticated operations to develop grows with each passing year. Franchetti
(1997) reported that in Russia; “The industry is seriously and dangerously under­
funded -  7 0 %  of security devices at Russian facilities are outdated... S o m e  of the staff 
working at these plants are desperately depressed and haven’t been paid in months -  
and the temptation to smuggle nuclear material out is great. Th e situation is very 
serious.” [123],
Difficulties arise where practical matters of implementing policies are inhibited by 
corruption. In 1998,1500 Russian customs officials were dismissed for corruption. 
[117]. Moreover, the expanse of territory that borders Russia is im me ns e and in s o m e  
places treacherous. Border security is difficult and would be prone to opportunistic 
trafficking. W h e r e  borders lie in areas of hostile natural terrain, patrols and detection 
equipment act as a deterrent rather than as a solution.
Potter (1992) estimated that in the former Soviet Union there are between 1000-2000 
individuals w h o  have detailed knowledge concerning nuclear weapons design and 
between 3000-5000 w h o  have experience of producing plutonium-239 and H E U .  
[124]. M o r e  recent estimates have not been found.
In N o v e m b e r  1993, H E U  wa s stolen from the Sevmorput shipyard near* Murmansk, 
Russia. The material wa s recovered but the Investigation Officer, Mikhail Kulik 
asserted; “E v e n  potatoes are probably m u c h  better guarded today than radioactive 
materials.” [120],
The terrorist group A u m  Shinrikyo w h o  were responsible for the sarin gas attack on 
the Tokyo underground in 1995 have attempted to influence Russian scientists and 
research students through donating to leading facilities. It was further found that 
me m b e r s  of this cult had infiltrated the I. V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy 
and the Mendeleyev Chemical Institute. [117].
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O n  the issue o f ‘rogue states’ or sub-state actors recruiting Russian expertise,
C a m e r o n  suggests; ..the majority of scientists that are mo ving are doing so to states 
that already possess a nuclear capability, such as Israel or China, and are intent on 
upgrading the quality of that capability.” [117].
Furthermore, A u m  Shinrikyo in 1993 attempted to meet with the Russian Minister of 
Nuclear Energy but this request was denied. After this rejection the cult attempted to 
arrange the purchase of natural uranium from Australia without success. [117].
It is for these reasons that the U S  has offered assistance to the states of the former 
Soviet Union through funding, equipment and expertise. At the core of this assistance 
is that it is better that fissile material is stored safely and accounted for in situ and that 
stolen fissile material is intercepted at national boarders to prevent international 
trafficking. The U S  G A O  (2003) refer to this as the ‘first-line and second-line of 
defence’ respectively and financial aid is directed towards meeting those two 
objectives. [122].
T h e  prospect of a ‘sub-state actor’ mo ving components of a nuclear device to a target 
location and assembling a we ap on in situ must not be overlooked. Detecting H E U  is 
difficult if well shielded due to the low energy y-rays emitted that cannot penetrate 
2c m  of lead and therefore escape the detection of scintillator monitoring equipment42. 
Plutonium-239 is mo re difficult to handle than H E U  and has a pronounced signature, 
thus it would be mo re difficult to smuggle.
In addition, with regard to international action o n  potential nuclear terrorism threats 
the Pu gw as h Council (2003) reports; “ .. .for too long there wa s too little concrete 
action by national governments and the international community to prevent such a 
catastrophe from occurring. In recent months, this has begun to change, most notably 
with the decision in June 2002 by the G 8 countries to spend $20 billion over 10 years 
to eliminate large quantities of fissile material in Russia.” [126].
42 P r o b l e m s  arise at ports w h e r e  scintillation m o n i t o r i n g  e q u i p m e n t  c a n n o t  distinguish b e t w e e n  
containers that h o l d  p l u t o n i u m - 2 3 9  o r  containers that h o l d  b a n a n a s  that contain potassium-40. [125].
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This will involve the U S  pledging $10 billion and the remaining $10 billion matching 
this is to be pledged by the other G 7  countries. Concerns must be raised as to whether 
this timescale (10 years) is too long. Historically the U S  has been pragmatic on this 
policy through pioneering the Co-operative Threat Reduction Pr og ra mm e (Nunn- 
Lugar agreement) initiated in No v e m b e r  1991. Its purpose is as follows:
• Fund states of the former Soviet Union to dismantle and destroy weapons of 
mass destruction.
• Strengthen the security of nuclear weapons and fissile materials in connection 
with dismantlement.
• Prevent proliferation and to enable demilitarisation of the industrial and 
scientific infrastructure that could support the production of weapons of mass 
destruction. [126].
Estimated global stocks of nuclear weapons and materials are displayed below:
Country Total mtslear 
weapons3 
(including those 
in reserve)
HEll (metric 
tannest*
Separated plutonium (metrictonnes)
NiStary4 (1994) Military4 (1994) ChrSian5 (2080)
US -9,000 58(1-710 85 Q
Russia “20,000 735-13® 100-1® 34
UK <200 6-lG1 7.6 78.1
France “350 20-30 3.S-6.5 82.7
China 410 15-25 2-6 0
India 3Q-351 0 “0.3 0
Pakistan 30-521 0.6—0.8 0.001-0.01 (end 1999) 0
Israel 60-100 0 -0.4 0
Sduth Africa 0 0.4 0 0
North Korea 0 0 “0.03 0
Germany 0 0 0 7.2
Japan 0 Q 0 5.2
Other European 0 0 0 4.5
Total 30,085-30,152 1360-21404- 
“20 civilian
200-270 “200
1 Estimates based anthe amount of nuclear material these states are beiiercd to possess.
2 21.9 tonnes as published inthe Strategic Defence Review 1998
3 Carnegie Endowment far Intematianal Peace: http://Vrwvr.ceip.org/flles/UonprDlifAiumhers/default.asp
4 Federation of American Scientists. Public Interest ReportVol.54, No. 6.
5 Based on national declarations tothe International Atomic Energy Agency (Infcircs549 
http://*ww.laea.orgAroridatam/Qocumentsflnfclrcs).
Source: Nuclear Terrorism, Parliament a ly Office of Science and Technology; Numberl79. July2002
Table 22: Estimated global stocks of nuclear weapons and material. 
Source: P O S T  (2002) [127].
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There is huge scope for de-enrichment of Russian fissile material. A n  agreement 
between Russia and the U S  was reached in 1993. This complemented the N u n n  -  
Lugar Co-operative Threat Reduction Agreement (1991) and required Russia to de- 
enrich 500 metric tons and sell this material to the U S  for civil reactors.
U S  commercial and political interests hampered the progress of this arrangement by 
increasing the timescaie over a 20 year period, so as not to flood the international 
commercial uranium market resulting in the deflation of global uranium prices. [126].
Th e Pugwash Council (2003) states; “ ... .almost ten years after the original agreement, 
the L E U  transferred to the U S  corresponds to less than 150 tons of Russian H E U  (less 
than 3 0 %  of the target amount of 500 tons, and only 10-20% of all the H E U  in the 
former Soviet Union).” [126],
7.3: Dirty Bombs:
Th e U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2003) asserts; “A  ‘dirty b o m b ’ or 
radiological dispersal device ( R D D )  is a conventional explosive or b o m b  containing 
radioactivity. The conventional b o m b  is used as a means to spread radioactive 
contamination,.. .any type of material could be used in a dirty bomb, but in general 
this would be unlikely to cause serious health effects beyond those caused by the 
detonation of conventional explosives ” [128],
Th e  major threat of such a device is the impact of the explosion rather than the 
ensuing radiological contamination. Air dispersal would produce relatively low levels 
of radioactive contamination and consequently low doses to those exposed. Clearly, 
those in the vicinity of such an exposure would attempt to m o v e  a w a y  from the 
epicentre of the explosion and in so doing reduce the likelihood of prolonged harmful 
exposure.
T h e  detonation of a R D D  in a contained environment (e.g. L o n d o n  Underground) 
could present greater numbers of casualties depending on the date and time of 
detonation. Emergency response teams would need to act quickly to minimise the 
radiation dose received by casualties. It should be noted that this scenario did not
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occur in the 7th M y  2005 attacks on the Lo nd on Underground but this does not m e a n  
that it could not happen in the future.
Contaminated areas would need to be cleaned up and this would be costly and time 
consuming. Dependent up on the time and site of the explosion it is difficult to 
estimate the potential economic disruption that would be caused by such an act.
Sources of radiological material that could be used in a ‘dirty b o m b ’ could derive 
from waste by-products from a nuclear reactor or medical waste. ‘Orphan sources’43 
could be used that have b e co me lost from regulatory control and management.
The Center for Defense Information (2001) raise concerns about Russia’s security of 
nuclear waste. In 1996 Chechen rebels planted a ‘dirty b o m b ’ in M o s c o w ’s 
Izmailovo Park. The b o m b  wa s disengaged before detonation. It consisted of 
dynamite and caesium-137. [129].
7.4: Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities:
“ nuclear facilities and materials., ..must be protected from mass-consequence
sabotage. Seeming these facilities and materials must be a top priority on the 
international agenda -  something that must be pursued at eveiy opportunity, at every 
level of authority, until the job is done”. (Bunn &  Bunn, 2002) [130].
H a d  one of the hijacked aircraft involved on the 11th September 2001 crashed into a 
nuclear power station, spent fuel pond, or reprocessing facility the results could have 
been catastrophic. If such an assault were carried out two potential scenarios emerge:
• Meltdown of the reactor core.
• Extensive dispersal of waste fuel on-site and potentially off-site.
Either scenario would result in extensive casualties and within the terms of analysis, 
nuclear sites act as in situ nuclear devices awaiting detonation. This scenario was 
envisioned by R a m b e r g  (1984) in: Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons fo r  the Enemy:
43 T h e s e  are radioactive/nuclear materials that h a v e  b e e n  a b a n d o n e d ,  lost or stolen a n d  are outside o f  
regulatory control,
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An Unrecognised Military Threat. A t  the time R a m b e r g ’s view was dismissed as 
alarmist but times have changed. [131].
Nuclear power plants in most countries are designed with containment vessels several 
feet thick44. In addition, security includes armed guards and safety systems. Insider 
sabotage in co-operation with a well-armed terrorist cell would present a significant 
challenge to the most robust security systems. Moreover, the potential vulnerability 
of critical safety systems to truck b o m b s  detonated outside the protected area of a 
power plant has been widely postulated in the literature.
Russia possesses nuclear power plants that are based on early Soviet design and do 
not have ..western-style containment vessels or the same level of redundant safety 
systems”. (Bunn &  Bunn, 2002) [130].
Research reactors are at risk from an attack but the consequences would be minor in 
comparison to a power reactor due to meagre inventories. There are research reactors 
located across the world and m a n y  contain weapons grade fissile material that is 
poorly secured.
Moreover, sabotage of a spent fuel pool resulting in a loss of cooling water could lead 
to a temperature in excess of 900°C. A  zirconium fire ensuing could disperse radio­
nuclides including; caesium-137, into the atmosphere.
A  Design Based Threat ( D B T )  document (classified) is drawn-up by the Office for 
Civil Nuclear Security ( O C N S )  for all U K  civil nuclear sites. T h e  resilience of sites 
to attack is further advanced through the U K  Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 
that provide for the strengthening of security regimes.
T h e application of ‘strength in depth’ is further manifest by the U K A E A  
Constabulary. On-site armed police protect Sellafield and Dounreay. This facility is 
not extended to other sites, [132].
44 N u c l e a r  p o w e r  plants w i t h o u t  c o n t a i n m e n t  structures include: R B M K  (Soviet reactors), V V E R - s e r i e s  
(Soviet reactor) a n d  M A G N O X  ( U K  reactors). [132]
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Edwards (2004) warns that in the U K  “Evidence is emerging that the no-fly zones 
around nuclear plants are regularly breached by both military and civilian aircraft.” 
No-fly zones around nuclear facilities have a radius 3.7km. “Over the last five years, 
the operators of 19 nuclear sites around Britain have lodged more than 100 complaints 
about aircraft flying too close.” [133]. Th e Author considers that a no-fly zone of 
3,7km is insufficient to enable a military response to an aircraft enclosing 
upon/targeting a nuclear power plant.
In the U K ;  “Measures [post 11th September 2001] have been taken to enable 
intervention by R A F  interceptor aircraft in the event of an aircraft attack at a civil 
nuclear facility.” [127],
France installed anti-aircraft missiles around the C a p  de la Ha gu e facility in 
immediate response to the events of 11th September 2001 but has since removed these 
defences. This is due to a perceived reduction in risk.
7.5: Sabotage of Radiological Material in Transit:
“Under U K  regulations (based on I A E A  recommendations) highly radioactive 
material is transported in robust flasks that would be difficult for terrorists to rupture.” 
(POST, 2002) [127].
In the U K ,  the O C N S  regulates the transportation of radiological material as arranged 
by civil nuclear authorities. T h e  O C N S  operates under the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material for shipments sent and received.
Ships carrying radiological material (e.g. M O X  fuel) have “...deck-mounted naval 
guns and an armed escort provided by the U K A E A  Constabulary”. [134]. Moreover, 
air, train and road transportation of radiological materials are packaged to withstand 
accidents according to the radiological hazard presented. Three categories are used:
• Type A  -  survives a minor impact.
• Type B  -  survives a major impact.
• Ty pe C  -  survives an air accident.
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There are no U K  reports of deliberate sabotage of radiological material in transit. Tfle 
increased potential threat of sabotage has been acknowledged throughout the global 
nuclear community and revision of the Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material w a s  announced on 8th July 2005 by the I A E A  [135]. A m e n d m e n t s  
include: improved protection measures for international transportation of nuclear 
materials and provides clarification on the definition of nuclear facilities and sabotage 
and appropriate levels of domestic protection.
7.6: Development of Nuclear Weapons:
7.6.1: Fission Devices:
Natural uranium contains approximately 99.28% uranium-238, 0.71% uranium-235 
and 0.01% uranium-234. Energy production is based on the fission of uranium-235, 
whereas uranium-238 must be transmuted through neutron capture to form the fissile 
product plutonium-239. Uranium-238 is regarded as a fertile material.
The prospect of rogue states or sub-state actors acquiring weapons grade fissile 
material (Highly Enriched Uranium -  H E U  > 2 0 %  or plutonium) is of huge 
international concern. U-235 and Pu-239 in sufficient quantities can be used to 
produce weapons of mass destruction.
The Federation of American Scientists (2001) assert; ’’The m i n i m u m  mass of fissile 
material that can sustain a nuclear chain reaction is called a critical mass and depends 
on the density, shape and type of fissile material, as well as the effectiveness of any 
surrounding material (called a reflector or tamper) at reflecting neutrons back into the 
fissioning mass.” [136].
Uranium-235 Plutonium-239
Bare sphere 56 kg 1 1 kg
Thick tamper 15 kg 5 kg
Table 23: Critical masses in spherical geometry for weapon-grade materials. 
Source: F A S  (2001) [136].
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Uncertainty remains as to the m i n i m u m  amount of plutonium-239 required to m a k e  a 
bomb. The implosion technique functions on the principle that the critical mass of 
compressed fissile material decreases as the inverse square of the density achieved.
Therefore, due to the decrease of the critical mass of the material as density of the 
material increases, it follows that ‘Implosion’ devices require limited amounts of 
fissile material compared to other types of fission weapons. Estimates between 8kg 
1 lkg have been espoused in the literature surveyed.
The implosion principle is illustrated below:
(Before Detonation)
Active Material;
(After Detonation)
High Explosive
Normal Density . .
Subcritical ^
High Density ____. ^
Supercritical ' jm  efe
Figure 2-VtIl. Implosion Assembly Principle 
Fig.23: Implosion assembly principle.
Source: F A S  (2001) [136],
F r o m  the point of view of construction the ‘G u n ’ device would be the easiest to 
assemble. T w o  sub-critical masses are used in this device. O n e  acts as a projectile 
and the other as a target. A  propellant crashes these two sub-critical masses together 
to form a supercritical mass. Whereas plutonium-239 and H E U  can be used in the 
‘implosion’ design, only H E U  is used in the ‘G u n ’ design. Plutonium-239 is not 
conducive to the ‘G u n ’ design because it would only produce a small explosive yield 
equivalent to a few tonnes of T N T  (trinitrotoluene).
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The generic construction of a ‘Gun’ assembly is shown below:
Figure 2-VlI Gun Assembly Principle
Fig. 24: G u n  assembly principle.
Source: F A S  (2001)[136].
Techniques exist to enhance the radiation yield of a fission w e a p o n  and deuterium 
with tritium can be employed by means of fusion to generate increases in high-energy 
neutrons that encourage the fission process to increase its yield and decrease the 
overall size and weight of the weapon.
T h e  Pu gw as h Council (2003) advanced; “H E U  poses the danger that it is far easier to 
manufacture into nuclear weapons than is plutonium.” [126]. Moreover, the open 
literature detailing h o w  to construct a nuclear device is easily available, so that a 
technically competent team (e.g. non-state actor) with sufficient financial and 
technical resources could feasibly construct a nuclear weapon. (Allison, 2004) [137].
7.6.2: Fusion Devices:
Fusion (thermonuclear) devices utilise heavy isotopes of hydrogen (deuterium and 
tritium) to generate neutrons. W h e n  fused, intense heat and pressure is generated 
enabling the concomitant explosion to overcome the C o u l o m b  barrier.
Thermonuclear weapons utilise the properties of lithium-6 deuteride (6LiD, <ra=  70.5 
b a m s  at thermal energies -  2.2km/s) as a means of liberating tritium. Deuterium and 
tritium fuse creating alpha particles whose charge and high temperature assist in 
producing fire.
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6Li +  n =  3H  +  4H e  +  Energy
(breaking d o w n  lithium to liberate tritium)
2H  +  3H  =  4H e  +  n +  17 .6 Me V 
(fusion reaction that causes ignition and liberates energy)
Lithium-6 is a controlled material and requires technical experience and knowledge 
due to its complex two-stage design. Moreover, lithium-6 is produced by the C O L E X  
(column exchange) electrochemical process and few countries have the capability of 
making sufficient for large quantities of weapons. [136].
Deuterium (2H) is necessary for the production of lithium-6 deuteride and is therefore 
subject to export controls. He av y water (D O) is of relevance to issues of 
proliferation as it can be used in the production of weapons grade plutonium. Large- 
scale production of heavy water requires competent scientists and technical 
infrastructure because deuterium is 0.015% of the hydrogen in water and this 
percentage needs to be enriched to more than 99%. [136].
7.7: Preparedness and Emergency Response:
The I A E A  dictum; prevent, detect and respond to nuclear threats has been clearly 
communicated to the international community and m e m b e r  States. Increased levels of 
preparedness are in evidence in the U K .
In the s u m m e r  of 2004 the British Government sent-out the public information 
booklet: “Preparing for Emergencies: W h a t  Y o u  N e e d  to K n o w ”. This was supported 
with television broadcasts. Advice was provided about h o w  to prepare for an 
emergency such as a biological, chemical or radiological attack and helping to prevent 
a terrorist attack. M I 5  produced further advice on their website. [138].
The British Government published the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) [139] to 
improve civil protection. In addition, legislation has been consolidated in response to 
the 11th September 2001 attacks. The Terrorism Act 2000 is extended through the 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 [140].
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Governments across the globe are confronting the prospect that their citizens m a y  be 
subject to terrorist attacks. Those attacks could involve radiological or nuclear 
weapons. No t all states will be able to respond with the same efficiency. M u c h  
depends upon the quality of the afflicted state’s infrastructure and preparedness.
In the U K ,  contingency planning for nuclear accidents is well established. In the 
event of an accident detailed emergency response plans exist that extend to 1 5 k m  
from the nuclear facility. U K  Parliamentary judgements will have to be m a d e  to 
decide whether emergency planning needs require an extension beyond that 
boundary.
Contingency planning for a R D D  or nuclear device detonated in an urban area is in 
comparison a recent concern. The International Commission on Radiological 
Protection (ICRP) have drafted a report: “Protecting People Against Radiation 
Exposure in the Aftermath of a Radiological Attack” (2004). [141]. It is anticipated 
that this document will serve the authorities responsible for civil contingencies in 
every nation state at risk.
7.8: Outlook for Nuclear Security:
This chapter has sh o w n  that the threat of terrorism involving nuclear or radiological 
weapons is credible. The technical knowledge to create nuclear or radiological 
weapons is available in the open literature. Eliminating unauthorised access to fissile 
or radioactive waste material (for the construction of a R D D )  is the main safeguard.
However, terrorist organisations have attempted to obtain fissile material and 
trafficking remains a significant problem. Increased border control and international 
co-operation complemented with improved international and national legislative 
instruments will reduce the risk of an attack.
Nations with political and economic instability or theocratic governance are 
vulnerable to poor implementation of improved physical protection measures. Wh er e 
workforce morale and corruption reside (such has been the case in the former U S S R  
states) there is a danger that not enough will be done.
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Opportunities for nuclear or radiological terrorism remain despite best efforts of 
protection. A n  attack on a nuclear power station or reprocessing facility is feasible 
despite current safeguards in the U K  and worldwide.
If a nuclear attack were realised the prospect of a nuclear power renaissance in 
Western Europe would end. Th e consequences of a R D D  attack might be less 
damaging for nuclear power but would greatly reduce its chances of returning as a 
major source of electricity production. Inevitably, there would be implications for 
medical applications too.
The next chapter will discuss the evidence presented to determine the future role of 
nuclear power and the implications for environmental protection.
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Chapter 8:
Discussion:
All regions of the world are interconnected through the global economy and the 
shared physical environment. The global ec on om y is arguably the most complex 
system ever produced by humans and continues to grow but rates of growth and 
energy consumption will vary between regions and nations.
Region
1978-
2003
History 
2003 2004 2005
Projections
2005- 2015- 2003- 
2015 2030 2030
OECD North 
America 2.9 2.5 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.9 3.1
United States 2.9 2.7 4.2 3.6 3.1 2.9 3.0
Canada 2.8 2.0 2.9 2.9 2.6 1.8 2.2
Mexico 2.9 1.4 4.4 3.1 4.0 4.1 4.1
OECD Europe 2.4 1.4 2.6 1.9 2.3 2.1 2.2
OECD Asia 3.0 1.9 3.0 2.6 2.3 1.6 1.9
Japan 2.5 1.4 2.6 2.4 1.7 1.0 1.4
South Korea 6.7 3.1 4.7 4.0 4.7 2.8 3.6
Australia/New
Zealand 3.3 3.2 3.6 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.5
Total OECD 2.7 2.0 3.4 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.6
Non-OECD Europe 
and Eurasia -0.3 7.7 8.1 6.5 4.9 3.7 4.4
Russia -0.5 7.3 7.2 6.1 4.2 3.3 3.9
Other 0.2 8.0 9.5 7.0 5.9 4.0 5.1
Non-OECD Asia 6.7 7.6 7.8 7.5 5.8 4.9 5.5
China 9.4 9.1 9.5 9.2 6.6 5.2 6.0
India 5.3 8.5 6.9 6.8 5.5 5.1 5.4
Other 5.4 4.8 6.0 5.4 4.9 4.3 4.6
Middle East 2.6 4.8 64 6.7 4.4 3.7 4.2
Africa 2.9 4.8 5.1 4.9 4.8 4.1 4.4
Central and South 
America 2.3 2.1 5.9 4.5 3.8 3.5 3.8
Brazil 2.5 0.5 4.9 2.7 3.7 3.3 3.5
Total Non-OECD 3.7 6.4 7.2 6.7 5.3 4.5 5.0
Table 24: Average Annual Percentage Growth in World Gross Domestic Product by 
Selected Countries and Regions, 1973-2030.
Source: U S  Energy Information Administration [142],
The global economy is an open-ended system and subject to the ‘Entropy L a w ’ 
embodied in the Second L a w  of Thermodynamics [36], The global ec on om y will ‘run 
d o w n ’ until an equilibrium state is reached unless energy is continuously put into the
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system from outside to maintain order and growth. The term ‘outside’ denotes the 
physical environment.
The regional E n F  results (tables 3 and 4) demonstrate that inequalities of global bio- 
productive land consumption exist between regions and fossil fuel consumption is 
primarily responsible for high E n F  values. Consumption of fossil fuel resources 
reduces the natural energy store and the waste produced places a burden on 
environmental systems to assimilate pollution.
The fossil record shows that environmental systems are dynamic and adjust to 
external pressures over time and space. Species either adapt to the n e w  environmental 
conditions or go extinct.
The rate of global climate change is an environmental adjustment to current and 
historical fossil fuel consumption. Th e future global ec on om y will be characterised 
by a larger population and increased productivity with the developing world moving 
into a period of industrialisation.
He av y industries m a y  relocate to the developing world where labour is cheaper and 
environmental regulation is weaker. F r o m  a global perspective there will be increased 
energy demand.
There are four policy options to ma na ge future supply and demand:
• Reduce the rate of fossil fuels consumption
• Continue with fossil fuels and adapt to environmental change
• Develop renewable energy
• Build and extend the use of nuclear power stations
8.1: Reduction in the Rate of Fossil Fuel Consumption:
Reduction in the regional rate of fossil fuel consumption is needed. Th e E n F  varies 
between regions and demonstrates inequalities. Oceania, North America and Europe 
exceed 1.12 global ha/capita, therefore, reduction in fossil fuel energy consumption 
would help to reduce regional E n F  inequalities.
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The future consumption of fossil fuel that will produce economic growth could be 
used mo re efficiently if financial instruments in response to international agreements 
are used to encourage energy conservation and the development of less energy 
intensive technology.
The graph below shows energy intensity trends for a range of countries that typify 
different stages of industrial development through time. Energy intensity peaks and 
then declines as technologies become mo re efficient and productivity increases. It is 
encouraging that each successive industrialisation peak for each country is lower. 
This suggests that each country has learned from other countries’ mistakes.
Year
Fig. 25: Energy intensity peaks for a range of countries as they have industrialised 
(commercial energy/GNP). [143].
Whether the industrialisation of developing countries (sometimes referred to as L D C s  
-  Less-Developed Country) continue this trend remains to be seen. Moreover, lower 
; energy intensity values do not detract from continued global growth in energy 
demand.
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8.2: Continue with Fossil Fuels and Adapt to Environmental Change:
Continuation of fossil fuel use to support the maintenance and growth of the global 
ec on om y will produce increased E n F  values and environmental change that will affect 
s o me regions and nations more than others.
Th e A1 F I  scenario envisions a future ec on om y powered by fossil fuel with the rate of 
population growth declining as economic inequalities between regions are reduced. 
This scenario presents the ‘worst case scenario’ from the viewpoint of managing 
global climate change.
Environmental and economic inequalities have always existed between nations and 
regions. Global climate change will exacerbate those inequalities and greatly impact 
upon those nations and regions that have not the wealth, political or technical 
capability to adapt. Developing nation^ are those most vulnerable to climate 
change45. Increased frequency of drought, famines, floods and landslides are to be 
expected.
The E n F  model has s h o w n  that the environmental impact of nuclear power is minimal 
and that fossil fuel consumption must decrease to reduce regional E n F  values. Th e 
rate of global climate change cannot be reduced without renewable and nuclear 
energy providing increased contributions to the global energy mix. T h e  ratio of that 
mix will be determined to a great extent by the indigenous resources available to 
regions and nations.
T h e  Kyoto Treaty encapsulates the global response to climate change but without U S  
and Australian ratification and China and India’s exemption it will remain an 
incomplete response. Moreover, if global C O 2 emissions are reduced by 5.2% below 
1990 levels for the period 2008-12 will that be an adequate response?
Elliot reports; “T o  put the situation in context, the International Panel o n  Climate 
Change has suggested that net reductions in global emissions of up to 6 0 %  below 
1990 levels would be required in order to stabilise climate change.” [145].
45 H o u g h t o n  ( 2 0 0 5 )  suggests that there c o u l d  b e  1 5 0  million extra refugees b y  2 0 5 0  d u e  to climate 
ch a n g e .  {144].
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The Kyoto Treaty rejects support for nuclear power. The Clean Development 
Me ch an is m ( C D M )  enables developed nations to support projects in the developing 
world (who are exempt from emissions targets) that reduce C 0 2 emissions. The 
developed nation (investor) can then claim Certified Emission Reduction Credits 
(CERs) against its o w n  C O 2 reduction targets. The C D M  does not include nuclear 
power.
Assuming ‘business as usual’ the A 1 F I  scenario contends that regional economic 
inequalities will be reduced but does not estimate the extent of that reduction. 
L o m b o r g  (2001) argues that increased fossil fuel consumption and climate change are 
inevitable and that research and international funding should be directed towards 
adaptation to climate change rather than to prevent it from occurring. [146].
Acceptance of this view would have huge social and political ramifications as the 
Houghton (2005) assertion attests [144]. Mountainous, coastal regions and small 
islands will be severely affected by climate change requiring migration.
Planning in Northern countries would have to take account of climate change for 
future infrastructure projects (e.g. housing development) and attempt to protect 
existing structures (e.g. property on flood plain land). Moreover, water shortages, 
n e w  diseases (e.g. malaria) and meeting the demands of immigration pressure would 
provide enormous challenges.
Increased use of renewable and nuclear energy complemented with increased energy 
efficient technology is the only mitigating option available that will enable the global 
ec on om y to grow46 and ma na ge the rate of climate change.
8.3: Development of Renewable Energy:
Grob (1994) predicted in the long-term that the fossil fuel era will soon pass and be 
replaced with renewable energy production. [148]. Nuclear technology is not 
considered in G r o b ’s (1994) long-term forecast presented below.
46 Environmentalists s u c h  as S c h u m a c h e r  ( 1 9 7 4 )  h a v e  questioned the validity o f  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  a n d  
h a v e  p r o p o s e d  alternative m o d e l s  s u c h  as ‘B u d d h i s t  E c o n o m i c s ’ b a s e d  o n  the notion o f  the ‘Right 
L i v e l i h o o d ’ a n d  ‘S m a l l  is Beautiful’ concept. T h e s e  ideas h a v e  failed to gain universal support. [147].
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Fig 26: Long-term scenario in global energy supply. [148].
Renewable energy could provide clean energy supplies for m a n y  regions. Renewable 
energy technology for wind and w a v e  energy is attractive because no waste is 
produced47. Moreover, there is an inexhaustible supply of these natural resources. 
Increased supply would reduce E n F  values.
47 B y  contrast, h y d r o p o w e r  projects are u n d e r t a k e n  w i t h  large local e n v i r o n m e n t a l  costs a n d  are 
therefore n o t  a f a v o u r e d  r e n e w a b l e  s o u r c e  b y  environmentalists.
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W a v e  and wind power is set to rise in the European Union:
E U  Country
Electricity Targets f r o m  Re ne wa bl e 
En er gy ( % )  (Excluding Large 
H y d r o p o w e r  Plants)
D e n m a r k 29.0
Finland 21.7
Portugal 21.5
Austria 21.1
Spain 17.5
Sw ed en 15.7
Italy 14.9
Greece 14.5
Netherlands 12.0
Ireland 11.7
G e r m a n y 10.3
U K 9.3
France 8.9
Belgium 5.8
Luxembourg 5.7
Table 25: E U  Directive 2010 Targets for E U  15 Countries. 
Source: Elliott (2003) [145].
Th e percentage of electricity generated in 2004 from renewable sources in the U K  
wa s 3.6%. [149]. The Renewables Obligation Order (2002) stipulates that renewable 
energy production must reach a target of 1 0 %  by 2010. [150]. Moreover, the U K  
Government is aspiring to reach a target of 2 0 %  by 2020. [151].
T h e  U K  is well positioned to take advantage of the wind and waves at its disposal. 
Hills and coastline provide m u c h  potential for a shift towards renewable energy but 
intermittency of supply is problematic. Supporters foresee a future where renewable 
technology will be used for the electrolysis of water and hydrogen used for transport 
fuel.
T h e  British W i n d  Energy Association ( B W E A )  states that there are 89 wind power 
projects (producing 8 8 9 M W e )  in the U K .  [152]. Opposition to wind po we r has 
developed in response to recent U K  wind power projects. Campaign group ‘Country 
Guardian’ has been vociferous in their opposition to wind turbines on account of the 
noise pollution generated and blight to the landscape. [153].
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D r  David Bellamy and Sir Bernard Ingham are t w o  high profile supporters of 
‘Country Guardian’. Sir Bernard has long been affiliated with B N F L  and is an 
advocate of nuclear expansion. [154], D r  Bellamy is heralded as a champion of 
conservation and environmental protection.
This alliance in response to the wind power issue is redrawing the boundaries between 
polar opposites - those whose values rest with industrial development and those 
whose values rest with environmental protection.
Installed wind energy capacity in Europe (see table 24), Japan (1078 M W e  (2004)), 
U S  (9149 M W e  (2004)), China (1000 M W e  (2004)) and India (4430 M W e  (2004)) 
contribute to a global total of 59 322 M W e  (2004). [155]
E U  Country
Electricity Production fr om W i n d p o w e r  ( M W e )
Ye ar 2003 2004
De nm ar k 3115 3117
Finland 52 82
Portugal 296 520
Austria 415 606
Spain 6203 8263 '
Sweden 399 442
Italy 904 1262
Greece 375 465
Netherlands 910 1078
Ireland 200 342
Germany 14609 16629
U K 649 889
France 249 406
Belgium 67 93
Luxembourg 22 35
Table 26: W i n d  P o w e r  Capacities Installed in E U  15 Countries.
Source: European Commission (2006). [156].
Europe is following Germany, Spain and D e n m a r k  in its commitment to renewable 
energy, D e n m a r k  has been a pioneer since the 1970s. Danish ‘W i n d  Guilds’ are co­
operatives that facilitate local ownership of wind projects. 8 0 %  of wind projects are
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o w n e d  by local co-operatives48. [145]. However, G e r m a n y  is leading the World in 
electricity production from wind power. This is a governmental imperative to replace 
electricity production from nuclear power.
T h e benefit of renewable energy production extends beyond global environmental 
protection. It has the potential to develop local ownership of energy production. 
Decentralisation of energy production enables peripheral communities found in 
coastal or rural regions to be co me self-sufficient and local generation is more efficient 
in terms of transmission. T h e  problem that faces localised electricity production 
enterprises such as the Danish W i n d  Guilds is start-up capital. Self-reliance projects 
are not an attractive commercial proposition, therefore start-up funds must be granted 
or acquired by the community through savings or prior trade of goods and services 
with other communities.
There still remain millions in developing countries that have no access to electricity. 
Photovoltaic projects m a y  serve as an option for electricity production in those 
nations. Successful projects include: the Australian outback in desert areas and 
African villages for water pumping, refrigeration of medical supplies and 
telecommunications equipment [145]. T h e  biggest impediment to the wide spread 
use of this technology is cost but this m a y  reduce with time making this technology 
mo re affordable to developing nations.
T h e  benefit of renewable energy is not in doubt. Th e problem of reaching optimistic 
production targets over relatively short timescales is considerable. It is expected that 
renewable energy will contribute more to the energy m i x  but not to the extent that it 
will replace other energy production methods.
48 T h e s e  a r r a n g e m e n t s  d o  not lend t h e m s e l v e s  to large-scale capital investment that results in limited 
g r o w t h  in production. This is s h o w n  in te r m s  o f  p e r centage g r o w t h  in D a n i s h  w i n d  p o w e r  production 
b e t w e e n  2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 4  o f  0 . 0 6 % .  C ontrast this w i t h  the s a m e  pe r i o d  in G e r m a n y  a n d  S p a i n  w h e r e  there 
w a s  13.8 %  a n d  3 6 . 4 %  g r o w t h  respectively.
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Nuclear power has a minimal environmental impact compared to fossil fuels. There 
are safety and security risks as well as waste issues compared to renewable energy bqt 
fuel is plentiful49 and can be stored. Uranium resources can be found across the world 
with Australia, Canada and Nigeria having so me of the largest deposits. Moreover, 
nuclear power can supply electricity on demand.
The four extrapolated forecasts of future global generating capacity (see chapter 4, 
fig. 10) sh o w  disagreement over future prospects. Th e I A E A  (low and high) forecasts 
s h o w  expansion whereas the other forecasts s h o w  decline.
Forecasted long-term futures are vulnerable to sudden change. Therefore, continuous 
data collection and analysis are required to reduce error in predictions. Future 
accidents, sabotage, energy shortfalls or market imperatives (e.g. increasing oil/gas 
prices) m a y  redirect the trend in either direction. The future prospects for nuclear 
power is still open to debate.
R & D  in nuclear power has been concerned with extending reactor longevity and 
increasing capacity. For nuclear power to be central to the mitigation of climate 
change governments must provide extensive funds and international financial 
institutions (e.g. World Bank) must pledge support for increased nuclear build. 
Nuclear skills and education provision must have the capacity to train and educate 
n e w  generations w h o  m a y  be given the task of constructing or operating n e w  nuclear 
facilities.
In the U K ,  HSE/NII (2003) reported an imminent expansion in nuclear skills, training 
and provision. The following nuclear modules and courses are in development:
• Cambridge University -  Electricity and Environment Mo du le - MPhil in 
Technology Policy.
• City University -  Decommissioning and Risk Analysis Mo du le -  M S c  in 
Energy, Environmental Technology and Economics.
49 I A E A / N E A  (2 0 0 5 )  estimate that there are 4.7 million tonnes o f  conventional u r a n i u m  deposits 
globally b e l o w  U S D  1 3 0 / K g  ( a r o u n d  current spot price). Thi s  provides 8 5 y r  fuel b a s e d  o n  global 
u r a n i u m  c o n s u m p t i o n  for 2 0 0 4 .  [157].
130
• U H I  Millennium Institute -  Decommissioning - H N C  with degree level and 
post-graduate research provision planned w h e n  becoming University of 
Highlands and Islands in 2007.
• Lancaster University -  Decommissioning and Environmental Clean-Up -  
MS c.
• Manchester University -  (proposed) Nuclear Engineering -  MS c.
• Middlesex University -  Integrated Risk M a na ge me nt -  MS c.
• H M S  Sultan -  N e w  bespoke courses for Babtie, British Energy and Rolls 
Royce Naval Marine.
• Surrey University -  Discussion with H M S  Sultan about developing a Nuclear 
Decommissioning course -  MS c. [158].
Intermediary organisations between regional development agencies, nuclear education 
and training providers and industry are to be set-up in the U K .  ‘Cogent’ is a Sector 
Skills Council (SSC) charged with liaising between industry and nuclear education 
and training providers to develop solutions to perceived skills gaps. Furthermore, the 
National A c a d e m y  for Nuclear Skills ( N A N S )  to be funded by the North-West 
Development Ag en cy will be responsible for securing the development of nuclear 
skills infrastructure in the U K .
F r o m  the international perspective the World Nuclear University ( W N U )  was set-up 
in September 2004 with the purpose of advancing nuclear science and technology and 
to link-up international nuclear education and training. Facilitating greater global 
communication and co-operation between academics and institutions is central to their 
purpose. T o  that end it has organised a S u m m e r  Institute for me mb er s from Industry 
and Academia to interact and the School of Uranium Production near Prague in the 
Czech Republic
In addition, the Nuclear Technology Education Consortium ( N T E C )  has been set-up 
to meet future decommissioning and clean-up, reactor technology, fusion and nuclear 
medicine skills needs. Partner organisations include: Birmingham University, 
Lancaster University, Leeds University, Liverpool University, Manchester University,
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Sheffield University, City University (London), H M S  Sultan, Imperial College 
(London) and the U H I  Millennium Institute and Westlakes Research.
N T E C  offer postgraduate programmes leading up to MS c. M S c  courses have been 
offered since September 2005 and comprise 4 compulsory and 4 elective modules 
delivered at different institutions. There are full-time and part-time options. Stand­
alone ‘short-fat’ modules are offered through Continuing Professional Development 
(CPD) with one w e e k  of contact time per module supplemented by 201irs pre-course 
reading/preparation. These can count towards an MS c.
A s  advocated in chapter 5 the use of open learning materials is anticipated to replace 
face-to-face delivery of so me modules by 2007. This approach combines 
customisation with a potential global market. However, it is unclear h o w  the E U  
Bologna Declaration will affect postgraduate course development. [159]
The U K  signed the E U  Bologna Declaration in 1999. Its purpose is to harmonise 
European higher education and sets out aims for 2010 that include inter alia:
• Higher education course systems shall be based on two consecutive cycles: 
the undergraduate cycle, lasting three years, shall qualify students for 
employment, whereas the graduate cycle shall lead to masters and/or doctorate 
degrees.
In Europe, masters degrees are 2yrs full-time compared to lyr in the U K .  This makes 
the U K  attractive to international students. International students’ fees are essential to 
making the delivery of m a n y  postgraduate courses financially viable.
Th e Bologna Declaration as it stands recognises: 3yr undergraduate, 2yr masters and 
3yr doctorate. The mandatory 2yr masters would have to be adopted by universities 
in the U K .  This would m a k e  university study in the U K  less attractive to international 
students with ramifications for delivery of postgraduate courses. Moreover, M P h y s  
degrees would have to be reviewed to enable the qualification to be recognised by 
Europe.
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Critics of the Bologna Declaration maintain that postgraduate study should be based 
upon learning outcomes and not time served. If the U K  is unable to m a k e  the case to 
the E U  for lyr masters degrees then the implications could be damaging for 
postgraduate nuclear courses.
A n y  future failure in nuclear or radiological security would frame political and social 
attitudes and reduce the likelihood of investment in future expansion of nuclear power 
or further decisions on locations for underground repositories.
A  nuclear or radiological terrorist attack of greater magnitude than September 11th 
2001 would produce a climate of instability. Fear of what could happen is justified. A  
nuclear device or R D D  deployed by terrorists, irrespective of the magnitude of the 
physical impact, would cancel any prospect of a renaissance in nuclear power in 
North America or Western Europe and severely hinder the prospects of nuclear 
expansion in the developing world and hinder medical diagnosis and treatment.
International security initiatives need to be matched with national and local 
implementation to maximise protection. The International Safeguard Agreement 
( I NF CI RC /153(Corr.)) [160] and the ‘Additional Protocol’ (INFCIRC/540 (Coir.)) 
[161] rely too heavily o n  the co-operation of each signatory state to implement 
safeguards.
“Great variation from country to country seems to exist, perhaps in part because there 
are no required international standards for physical protection50. M a n y  countries are 
n o w  unwilling to release information about their physical protection standards for 
security reasons.” [162].
Th e I A E A  illicit trafficking database has serious limitations highlighted in chapter 7. 
According to the I A E A  only 64.5% of me mb er s co-operate on the illicit trafficking 
database. [121].
50 e.g. Unlawful taking of nuclear materials.
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T h e  I A E A  perform a dual role as inspectorate and advisor. In their capacity as 
‘inspectors’ problems have arisen in the D P R K  (North Korea), Iraq and Iran over 
recent years. Without the co-operation of the inspected state the I A E A  have a very 
difficult duty to perform.
In their advisory capacity the I A E A  have set-up the following:
• International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) -  O n  request will 
assist m e m b e r  states to strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of their 
physical protection of nuclear material and facilities.
• International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) -  O n  request will 
identify a m e m b e r  states nuclear security needs and m a k e  recommendations 
for improvements.
• State System of Accounting for the Control of Nuclear Materials Advisory 
Service (SS AS ) -  O n  request will assist m e m b e r  states in the production of 
DBTs.
• Emergency Preparedness Re vi ew ( E P R E W )  -  O n  request will assist m e m b e r  
states to conduct a review of preparedness for nuclear or radiological 
emergencies.
• Illicit Trafficking Database P r og ra mm e (ITDP) -  Ke ep track of illegal 
movements and trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials.
In addition, the I A E A  (2003) devised a security plan with 8 key activities:
1. Improvement of physical protection regimes.
2. Improvement of detecting malicious activities involving nuclear or 
radiological material.
3. Strengthen SSAS.
4. Strengthen the security of all nuclear and radiological materials.
5. Improved assessment of the safety/security vulnerabilities of nuclear 
facilities.
6. Improved response to malicious acts and threats.
7. Further ensure compliance with international agreements and guidelines.
8. Improved co-ordination on nuclear security. [163].
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Long-term commitment is needed to confront the terrorism threat. T h e  G 8 Global 
Partnership Against the Spread of W e a p o n s  of M a s s  Destruction Initiative (2002) 
intends to raise $20 billion to operate for a lOyr period. [132], M u c h  of the $20 
billion has been pledged with $10 billion by the US, $2 billion by Russia and other 
partners have pledged $5 billion. [164]. B y  2004, there was still a shortfall of $3 
billion. N o  current figures have been m a d e  available.
Attention will be directed towards Russia to resolve non-proliferation, disarmament, 
counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Dismantlement and decommissioning of 
nuclear submarines, secure disposal of fissile material and employment opportunities 
for former weapons scientists will be provided.
T h e  U K  Parliamentary Office for Science and Technology (2004) published the 
report: ‘Assessing the Risk o f  Terrorist Attacks on Nuclear Facilities ’. [165]. This 
report used public domain information to s h o w  contrasting analysis regarding the 
vulnerability of nuclear facilities to terrorism. French and U S  approaches to security 
were discussed and contrasted with practices in the U K .  The report was inconclusive 
due to important documents being classified.
Europe’s vulnerability to attack was highlighted in the Black Dawn terrorism exercise 
earned out in Brussels in M a y  2004. [166]. T h e  exercise focused on prevention and 
sh owed that terrorists could acquire H E U  from civilian reactors in Europe, produce a 
crude device and explode it close to N A T O  Headquarters. Details of the exercise are 
classified.
Securing nuclear skills and knowledge is more than ensuring the global workforce is 
equipped for any future developments in nuclear energy. Reducing the risk of nuclear 
skills and knowledge falling into the hands of malicious state or sub-state actors is 
essential.
This challenge was highlighted with the case of the Pakistani nuclear scientist D r  
Abdul Qadeer Khan. D r  K h a n  was central to Pakistan’s development of nuclear
135
weapons51 in their arms race with India and was a special advisor to President 
Musharraf before his arrest for the sale of nuclear materials, confession and pardon. 
Pakistan still refuses to permit the I A E A  to question Dr Khan. [132]
“Further revelations about the sale of nuclear materials and expertise to Iraq, Iran, 
Libya and North Korea have brought these ominous developments to a head.” 
(Allison, 2004) [137], This is alleged to have occurred during the 1990s.
U S  intelligence raises concerns about Pakistan as a nuclear proliferator. Libya 
declared and agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme in 2004. North 
Korea confessed to possessing nuclear weapons and discussion between the I A E A  
and Iran is continuing. South Korea have admitted attempts to enrich uranium and 
separate plutonium between 1982 and 2000.
Since 2001, President Musharraf has aligned himself with U S  policy to the cost of 
internal support. Assassination attempts have been m a d e  by Islamic Extremists and 
analysts fear that if President Musharraf were removed an anti-US government might 
emerge. [137].
T h e  threat of such a government sharing nuclear skills and knowledge with rogue 
states or sub-state actors is considerable given the highly charged political 
circumstances of the time.
T h e  N N P T  (1970) and Kyoto Treaty (2005) are optional and subject to national 
commitment and international inspection that is problematic without the co-operation 
of the inspected state.
T h e  energy d e m a n d  of the developing world is forecast to g r o w  and nuclear power 
must be an essential component of the future energy mi x but this necessitates the 
globalisation of nuclear skills and knowledge. Nuclear expansion in developing 
countries would increase the risk of proliferation.
51 Successful testing w a s  p e r f o r m e d  in 1998.
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T h e  experience of former Soviet states and Middle Eastern countries going through 
political reform and economic transition demonstrates that centralised c o m m a n d  and 
control governance is difficult to maintain. Corruption, black markets and organised 
crime emerge where governance is weak.
H o w  could nuclear expansion in the developing world be reconciled with enhanced 
protection from proliferation or the acquisition of radiological/nuclear materials by 
malicious sub-state actors?
Nuclear power must be secure to enable expansion. R & D  needs to produce nuclear 
power units that are secure against proliferation, economically viable and operate to 
economies of scale. T h e  ‘once-through’ nuclear fuel-cycle would afford greater 
protection from proliferation but would not eliminate the risk. [167].
8.5: Protection and Environmentalism:
E N G O s  have at their core either a ‘radical’ or ‘reformist’ agenda. Radical E N G O s  
use ‘direct action’ to bring media attention to environmental issues of concern. [168],
Greenpeace is the largest ‘radical’ E N G O  and wa s created w h e n  a group of peace 
activists fried to sail into the U S  nuclear weapons testing zone near Amchitka, Alaska 
in 1971 [169]. The 11th September 2001 attacks have redirected their efforts from the 
abolition of nuclear power to raising concerns about the protection of the environment 
from nuclear sabotage or terrorism.
T o  highlight the need for increased protection a group of environmental activists from 
Greenpeace at 06:00hrs o n  12th January 2003 broke into the central control building of 
Sizewell B. The B B C  (2003) stated; “T h e  group said the break-in was to highlight 
poor security at Britain’s nuclear po we r plants and their vulnerability to terrorist 
attacks”. [170]. This w a s  the second occupation in four months. There had been an 
earlier occupation by 40 activists in October 2002.
T h e  consequences of global climate change due to fossil fuels will impact upon 
biodiversity. Extinction rates will increase due to species being unable to adapt to 
changing environmental conditions. H o w  can biodiversity be protected?
137
E N G O s  are aware of this issue and broadly support renewable energy options in 
response but as the case of Country Guardian (UK) highlights support is not 
universally agreed. W h a t  choices remain to satisfy global energy consumption and 
meet the desires of E N G O s ?
Increased energy efficiency is heralded by E N G O s  as the basis to the solution. This 
fits well with the ‘conservation’ agenda that is at the centre of environmental 
protection. Energy conservation and switching to renewable energy sources would 
lower regional energy footprints. These principles are enshrined in G r o b ’s (1994) 
scenario.
E N G O s  values consist of viewing the physical enviromnent as an end in itself. Those 
with consumption based values view the physical enviromnent as a means to 
achieving an end. H o w  can those contrasting values be reconciled to form the basis of 
future policy and action?
8.6: Developing Consensus on a Policy of Nuclear Expansion:
E N G O s  are crucial to questioning the policies and judgements of decision-makers and 
giving a voice to the powerless. However, reducing environmental, economic and 
social inequalities between regions m a y  not be possible where environment resources 
are unevenly distributed.
National and regional energy solutions will vary and decisions must be m a d e  in terms 
of fixture energy demands and the risks and uncertainty inherent in the methods of 
supply. Balances must be struck between investment in n e w  electricity generation 
capacity and maximising the productivity of current capacity without jeopardising 
economic growth and environmental resources.
Nuclear power offers the me an s to seeming fixture energy supply anywhere in the 
world without constraint on consumption. A  reduction in the national and regional 
E n F  would be the corollary of such action.
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There are nations and regions that would be better served by renewable energy due to 
their local environmental conditions52. There is a moral obligation on all nations and 
regions to reduce the impact of its o w n  waste upon others. This involves phasing-out 
fossil fuels but is this possible?
Sustainable development advocates this approach but if L o m b o r g  (2001) is correct 
then attention given to mitigating global climate change is misplaced and sustainable 
development an irrelevance.
It is important to stress that if regions reduce their E n F  this only accounts for current 
emissions and does not address the problem of prior emissions that are currently 
forcing global climate change.
Despite international environmental policy it is the growth of the e c o n o m y  that 
dominates the decisions of those w h o  govern. Therefore, energy security will 
inevitably be an important factor in determining the future role of nuclear power in 
the UIC and elsewhere.
Th e ‘hydrogen e c o n o m y ’ 53 m a y  in the long-term replace oil for vehicles on the basis 
of energy security and nuclear power could have a major role to play. Th e greatest 
impediment to this scenario would be the cost of providing n e w  infrastructure for fuel 
delivery but this could be co me mo re economically attractive if the price of oil 
continues to rise due to geo-political instability and consumers are unwilling to pay. 
Economic growth would inevitably slow stimulating d e m a n d  for alternative fuel 
sources.
Th e  democratisation of decision-making is a tenet of sustainable development and 
must be central to any future nuclear expansion. Reconciling competing values at the 
local level will need to be addressed through greater community involvement in the 
decision-making process.
e.g. M a l t a  -  it is a  small island w i t h  a  w i n d y  coastline located in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n  Sea.
53 N u c l e a r  p o w e r  c o u l d  b e  u s e d  for the electrolysis o f  water, liberating h y d r o g e n  that c o u l d  wit h  
technological innovation pr o v i d e  a  pollution free source o f  fuel.
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Historically, U K  nuclear site planning w a s  based on the ‘decide, announce, defend’ 
( D A D )  model of centralised decision-making. [171] This approach would not 
persuade the public to respond favourably towards nuclear power in the event that U K  
Government policy changes.
Environmental impact assessment (EIA) would need to be employed to determine the 
suitability of a site for nuclear development. C o m m u n i t y  involvement in the E I A  
process is problematic and can result in either of the following:
• Power broking by coercion -  Legitimation is the process through which 
authorities receive justification for an act. Th e outcome of the E I A  is pre­
determined and the quasi-independent scientists’ use selective information. 
Therefore, the findings of the quasi-scientists’ are regarded as a chimera.
• Power broking by manipulation -  Consultation is the process where it is a legal 
requirement to obtain the views of all the stakeholders’ to avoid legal challenge, 
or obtain consent for an act through active participation without reaching a 
legitimate consensus.
• Sharing of power —  Building institutions fo r  participation requires all the 
stakeholders to be enabled to understand and contribute to complex technical 
decision-making. This requires education and training of the community and 
empowering alienated parties to a point of mediation from which constructive 
consensus can be achieved.
• Devolving power —  Preparing communities fo r  empowerment. Education and 
training develop to a point where the community have an attitude of confidence 
about a type of development and a feeling of security and self-reliance concerning 
their security and well-being. [17].
Democratisation of decision-making is mo r e  possible in s o m e  nations and regions 
than others54. It necessitates a mature functioning democracy with sufficient 
standards of education and training that extend beyond the me re pedagogue of
54 In the U K ,  social/environmental scientists are a p p l y i n g  ‘action research’ m e t h o d s  to e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
decision-making. T h i s  research m e t h o d  has b e e n  u s e d  as a  standard m e t h o d o l o g y  in educational 
research for m a n y  years a n d  e x a m i n e s  h o w  u n derstandings are d e v e l o p e d  a b o u t  p r o b l e m s  a n d  h o w  
antithetical attitudes m a y  b e  o v e r c o m e  to find solutions that are supported b y  all stakeholders.
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commercial propaganda53 and demands a willingness of all parties to learn and reflect 
o n  their o w n  understanding.
8.7: The N e e d  for Decisive Political Judgement:
Decisive political judgment demands rigorous assessment of all the issues that 
surround a proposed course of action. In the case of nuclear power expansion failure 
to act will have severe consequences on a global, regional and national scale.
T h e  strengths, weaknesses, opportunity and threats associated with expansion of 
nuclear power must be considered and a timetable for action constructed. 
International efforts must be galvanised by mitigating the potential future impact of 
global climate change and eliminating the prospect of nuclear terrorism.
T h e  concluding chapter will critically evaluate the evidence to determine the future 
role of nuclear power and the implications for environmental protection.
55 Multi-National C o m p a n i e s  h a v e  b e e n  criticised for advertising products in the d e v e l o p i n g  w o r l d  that 
w o u l d  b e  subject to regulation or b a n n e d  in E u r o p e  (e.g. pesticides s u c h  as D D T ,  etc).
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Chapter 9:
Conclusion:
9.1: Nuclear Power -  A n  Evaluation of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and 
Threats:
The S W O T  analysis below produced by the Author shows the strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats that confront potential nuclear power expansion:
Strengths:
• Provi d e s  secure fuel supplies.
• N o n - C a r b o n  b a s e d  e n e r g y  production.
• N e w  generations o f  reactors e m e r g i n g .
• ‘S p i n - o f f  technologies f r o m  research.
• L o w  operating costs.
• B u m - u p  o f  w e a p o n s  g r a d e  material.
• M a t u r e  technology.
• L o w  f r e q u e n c y  o f  accidents.
• L o c a l  w a s t e  m a n a g e m e n t .
• Potential for nuclear fusion.
•  D e v e l o p m e n t s  in nuclear education a n d  
training.
•  M i n i m a l  E n F
Weaknesses:
• N o  c o n s e n s u s  o n  final w a s t e  disposal.
• W e a p o n s  proliferation.
® T e r r o r i s m  / trafficking.
• H i g h  plant construction costs.
• Internalised pollution costs.
• Public mistrust.
« Exclu s i o n  f r o m  C D M .
• H i g h  profile o f  accidents.
• Potential h i g h  m a g n i t u d e  o f  
accidents.
• D e c line o f  skilled workforce.
« H i g h  d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g  cost.
•  W e a k  international institutions.
•  Uncertain future.
O p p o r t u n i t i e s :
• Assist in demilitarisation.
• D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  smaller units w i t h  l o w e r  
construction costs a n d  greater efficiency.
• E x t e n s i o n  o f  lifespan o f  current units.
• G r eater co-operation in R & D  b e t w e e n  
private, public a n d  international agencies.
• D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  public conf i d e n c e  in nuclear 
technology.
• Contribute to the international r e s p o n s e  to 
global w a r m i n g .
• D e v e l o p  nuclear fusion.
• C u r r i c u l u m  d e v e l o p m e n t  in nuclear 
education a n d  training.
• R e d u c e  global, regional a n d  national E n F .
T h r e a t s :
• Public a n d  political rejection o f  
nuclear technology.
• L a c k  o f  private or public investment 
in R & D  a n d  commercialisation.
• L a c k  o f  political will to tackle global 
w a n n i n g  w i t h  robust policy.
• Increased production o f  fossil fuels.
« Increased c o m m i t m e n t  to alternative
fuels.
® Geopolitical instability in regions o f  
potential nuclear expansion.
• Skills shortages are not resolved.
• O p p o s i t i o n  to plans for final disposal 
o f  waste.
• Future accidents.
• Ineffective role o f  I A E A .
• A c t s  o f  nuclear terrorism.
• Increased trafficking.
Table 27: S W O T  analysis showing the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats that confront potential nuclear power expansion.
9.1.1: Analysis of Strengths:
Nuclear power can offer solutions that could form part of the response to global 
environmental and energy supply problems. Energy security is critically important
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where energy markets are volatile. Environmental protection needs are served 
through local waste production that is ‘internalised’ and carbon free.
The technology is mature and R & D  has improved reactor capacities and longevity. 
‘Spin off technologies used for desalination and medical purposes continue to be 
derived from nuclear R & D .  N e w  generations of reactors are emerging that are 
smaller and more cost effective.
Demilitarisation benefits in ‘burn u p ’ of weapons grade material for civilian reactors 
assist security. [172]. Nuclear power has had high profile accidents (e.g. Chernobyl, 
Three Mile Island and Windscale) but its safety record over 50 years must be judged 
to be good. Moreover, as the technology matures through ‘Generation III and I V ’ 
projects, safety systems will be further improved. There remains the potential for 
advancement of nuclear fusion technology but it should be noted that fusion remains 
an unfulfilled promise from the past.
There is evidence of nuclear expansion in Asia. Europe m a y  be about to change the 
trend of nuclear decline. Finland and France will be building EPRs. This m a y  
encourage other European nations to do likewise in due course.
There has been a clear change in attitude from the U K  Government towards nuclear 
power that has been set out in: The Energy Challenge: Energy Review Report 2006 
( C m  6887) [173]. This report states that the U K  Government intends to provide a 
framework to be published in 2007 that will attempt to remove regulatory barriers to 
energy projects such as nuclear projects. This m a y  include: pre-licensing and limiting 
the terms/duration of planning inquiries. However, there is no sign of financial 
support from the U K  Government for nuclear projects w h o  maintain that it is up to the 
market to decide the economic viability of nuclear power.
Moreover, the Committee of Radioactive Waste Ma na ge me nt ( C O R W M )  reported to 
the U K  Government in 2006 their recommendations for managing radioactive waste. 
[174]. C O R W M  m a d e  15 recommendations of which 10, 11 and 12 showed a n e w  
approach to tackling community opposition to any n e w  proposals for burial of 
radioactive wastes:
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Recommendation 10: C o m m u n i t y  involvement in any proposals for siting of long­
term radioactive waste facilities should be based on the principles of volunteerism, 
that is an expressed willingness to participate.
Recommendation 11: Willing to participate should be supported by the provision of 
community packages that are designed both to facilitate participation in the short term 
and to ensure that a radioactive waste facility is acceptable to the host community in 
the long term. Participation should be based on the expectation that the well-being of 
the community will be enhanced.
Recommendation 12: C o m m u n i t y  involvement should be achieved through the 
development of a partnership approach, based on an open and equal relationship 
between potential host communities and those responsible for implementation. [174].
‘C o m m u n i t y  packages’ where the local community gains something for hosting a 
development is not new. Th e concept of ‘planning gain’ was provided for in statute 
during the mid-1980s to quell local opposition to large projects such as out of town 
supermarkets that were in the ascendant at that time. Supermarkets in return for 
planning permission would provide a n e w  school or other social amenity to offset the 
imposition of their development.
This approach m a y  provide the means through which the issue of final disposal of 
radioactive waste m a y  be finally resolved in the U K .  If this were to be successful it 
would aid the case for nuclear power.
Developments in nuclear education and training are emerging in the U K  and each 
s u m m e r  the W N U  will be delivering a S u m m e r  Institute for 60 nuclear students to 
attend. This demonstrates the progress of international efforts in nuclear education 
and training.
This research has shown that increasing the role of nuclear power to replace fossil 
fuels would reduce global, regional and national E n F  values. This would support the 
process of sustainable development and contribute to the mitigation of global climate 
change.
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9.1.2: Analysis o f Weaknesses:
Weapons proliferation, trafficking and terrorism raise concerns about the implications 
o f nuclear expansion. The global institutions charged w ith safeguarding nuclear 
matters are perceived as impotent in the face o f national non-compliance and 
opportunities for nuclear trafficking are too great.
Nuclear power is excluded from the CDM and this disadvantages nuclear expansion 
in the developing world. Moreover, nuclear power expansion in the developing world 
could present security issues.
Public perception o f nuclear power is all too often mistrustful and that impacts on 
workforce recruitment. This is compounded by uncertainty over the future o f nuclear 
power and may act to dissuade those who might consider a career in the nuclear 
industry.
Those w ith skills in  physical science and mathematics are highly prized by other 
industries such as financial services because there is greater demand for those skills 
and the supply o f graduates w ith those skills is perceived as inadequate. Industries 
such as financial services can offer greater economic rewards to those possessing 
those skills compared to the nuclear industry.
Final disposal o f nuclear waste remains unresolved and the costs o f commissioning 
and then decommissioning make the economic competitiveness o f new build d ifficu lt 
to determine. Clearly, uranium prices are stable and this presents advantages over the 
price o f gas and o il that by contrast are vulnerable to geo-political events. However, 
is that enough? Economists continue to debate the detail o f the ‘economic case’ for 
nuclear power but there is far from clear agreement. It is clear that w ithout UK 
Government subsidy the market w ill decide to support or reject new nuclear build 
based on financial arguments alone without due regard for the global environmental 
advantages nuclear power provides.
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9.1.3: Analysis o f Opportunities:
The opportunities can only be realised i f  strengths are built upon and weaknesses 
reduced. In 2004, Electricite de France announced that it would build an EPR at 
Flamanville. This development combined w ith the Finnish EPR construction 
demonstrates that next generation reactors could have a future i f  the political and 
economic conditions shift.
The mitigation o f climate change and energy security is fundamental to the argument 
for nuclear expansion. The UK Government has made it clear in The E n e rg y  
C h a lle n g e : E n e rg y  R e v ie w  R e p o r t 2 0 0 6  that .nuclear has a role to play in the future 
UK generating m ix alongside other low carbon generating options.”  [173].
U tilising nuclear power to ‘burn up5 weapons grade material provides a useful means 
o f destroying material that the nuclear* weapons states are obliged to under the terms 
o f the NNPT (1970). There is no timetable for this and that is arguably a weakness o f 
the treaty. Moreover, proliferation issues in North Korea (DPRK) attest to the 
difficulties that face the United Nations and IAEA in enforcing the tenns o f the 
Treaty.
Increased UK Government support for nuclear education and training w ith curriculum 
development would provide the expertise to research, develop and maintain nuclear 
power in the future. This needs to be applied by the Department for Education and 
Skills at every tier o f the education system with financial support for knowledge 
acquisition and skills development.
Strong governmental support is needed across the world to invigorate the nuclear 
power industry. Economic support from public funds would be necessary to 
encourage nuclear expansion because the commercial attractiveness o f nuclear power 
under current conditions remains unclear. Energy security is essential to the 
maintenance o f the state and as such should command public funds where commercial 
funds are unforthcoming.
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9.1.4: Analysis o f Threats:
Proliferation, waste, security and economic viab ility are the key threats to nuclear 
expansion. Each threat needs international and national governmental leadership. 
Recognition o f nuclear power in the CDM and national incentives for nuclear power 
investment combined w ith greater international co-operation on nuclear education and 
skills, waste and security would reduce the threats to nuclear expansion.
The prospect o f a large nuclear disaster (accident or terrorist attack) is the greatest 
weakness o f nuclear power. Safety is well understood and is w ithin the terms o f 
statistical measure but terrorism is not. The fear generated from a nuclear or 
radiological attack beyond the physical impact would set back plans for nuclear 
expansion and would diminish public, governmental and commercial confidence. 
Nuclear power would be considered a ‘pariah’ technology and might never recover.
International action on global climate change may fa il. It may be decided that 
Lomborg’s argument holds true. In this case fossil fuels may be used without 
restriction on the basis that the precautionary principle that characterised action on 
climate change is futile because the damage has been done.
9.2: Timetable for the Re-Emergence o f Nuclear Power in the UK:
The following is a timetable that i f  followed would enable the re-emergence o f 
nuclear power in the UK.
Short-term (<5yrs):
• Increased transparency and more public involvement in site identification for 
waste disposal and potential nuclear power station construction.
• Development o f new reactor designs that demonstrate economic benefits and 
lower investment costs.
• Raise the public and political profile o f nuclear power as a response to global 
warming and insuring secure energy supplies.
• Greater surveillance o f international borders that are vulnerable to nuclear 
theft and smuggling.
•  Further security measures to secure nuclear facilities (e.g. armed guards).
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© Stimulate an increase in the level o f international, public and private 
investment in  R&D.
© Encourage co-operation in R&D between nations and regions.
• Invest and revise curriculum design to accommodate the future education and 
training needs o f the nuclear industry.
Medium-term (<15yrs):
® Continued development o f public understanding o f the industry and inclusion 
in decision-making that affects society.
• Combine international nuclear skills, knowledge and experience to extend 
R&D and build in  regions o f development.
® Political support for final disposal o f waste and financial aid for R&D that has 
the potential to reduce the environmental impact o f waste products (e.g. P&T).
• Negotiate changes to international law that w ill enable countries to provide 
permanent waste disposal services for other nations that do not have the 
necessary geological conditions, infrastructure or public/political confidence 
to permanently dispose o f their own waste.
• Raise the profile o f nuclear science as a career for graduates’ that promises 
intellectual satisfaction, professional rewards and job security.
© Clear partnership between investment, R&D and commercialisation.
Long-term (>15yrs):
•  Reinforce the achievements o f nuclear power and its contribution to energy 
security, economic prosperity and environmental protection.
•  Celebrate the emergence o f new technologies that have improved production 
and safety as well as spin-offs that may resolve health and environmental 
problems (e.g. water desalination in the Middle East). Desalinisation 
technology w ill inevitably be in greater demand as the global climate changes.
• International trade in nuclear waste w ill have to be tightly regulated and issues 
o f proliferation w ill have to be resolved
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9.3: Regional/Global Nuclear Power Expansion or Decline:
The four extrapolated global scenarios presented in fig. 10 show a range o f potential 
outcomes for nuclear power over the next 50 years. Extrapolation o f the trend from 
each model’s short-term outcome is prone to error (see fig. 10) because the nexus o f 
economic, social and environmental change that underpins the future utilisation o f 
nuclear power remains uncertain. These four scenarios confirm that the future o f 
nuclear power is far from determined.
Opportunities exist for nuclear power expansion in every region. There is evidence o f 
nuclear expansion in Asia. Two reactors are to be built in Europe but there is no 
planned nuclear build in the US. However, there is a shift in attitude in the US 
towards nuclear power that may result in new build over the next decade.
The rapid economic growth displayed by China and India may necessitate further 
rapid nuclear expansion. Europe and US w ill have to consider energy security in the 
long-term and nuclear power may be the most tenable investment option.
The IPCC (2001) forecasts shown in fig. 3 ,4 &  5 provide a range o f future climate 
change outcomes. This thesis has placed emphasis on the A l F I scenario because this 
presents the scenario for a fossil fuel intense future that would have the greatest 
impact on climate change. The eventual outcome o f global climate change may prove 
to have been better described by another scenario but in view o f the precautionary 
principle56 the A1F1 scenario has been used.
9.4 Response: Risk and Uncertainty:
There is inevitably risk and uncertainty inherent in the response outlined for the UK. 
Concerns about nuclear power used to be w ith safety but now it is w ith security. The 
risk and uncertainty has shifted from calculable safety arguments based on 50 years o f 
nuclear electricity generation to incalculable security arguments based on the prospect 
o f terrorism performed by state or sub-state actors.
56 Precautionary Principle -  insists that it is better to take action now based upon incomplete evidence 
despite the risk o f over-estimation o f the hazard rather than to wait until conclusive evidence is 
produced but it being too late to take preventive action.
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Nuclear or radiological terrorism in whatever manifestation w ill be a high impact - 
low frequency event. It is the effect o f that scenario that presents the greatest threat to 
the future o f nuclear power and the environment because not only would an attack 
contaminate the locality but would impair or eliminate the future prospects for the 
most tenable means o f mitigating global climate change.
Global expansion/decline o f nuclear power have been described and trends used to 
envision future scenarios. Nuclear power w ill have to compete against other energy 
production technologies on issues o f economics, safety, security, skills and 
environmental protection.
Opportunities for future development w ill arise in response to the weaknesses 
inherent in  competing energy production options and increased energy demand.
9.5: The Implications for Environmental Protection:
The principles o f utilitarianism that undeipins environmental protection insists that 
where there is a conflict between local and global environmental protection that action 
should be taken in favour o f global environmental protection.
Global climate change could affect billions o f people. Flora and fauna w ill be put 
under great environmental pressure w ith increased rates o f extinction. I f  nuclear 
power can aid the mitigation o f global climate change then waste concerns 
surrounding nuclear power become local challenges that are insignificant by 
comparison.
Proliferation and security present challenges that are manageable w ith strong global 
governance and national implementation o f safeguards. In the worst case there could 
be regional disputes and acts o f terrorism inside nation states but the environmental 
impact would be less compared to global climate change where inaction now could 
have huge consequences over the next century.
Increased use o f nuclear power should complement greater use o f renewable energy 
and energy saving technology. A  shift in ‘energy m ix’ from fossil fuels to non-carbon
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based energy generation and more efficient end-point use o f energy is pivotal to 
mitigating global climate change.
Arguments have been made that action on global climate change is too late and 
without US or Australian support for the Kyoto Treaty that efforts should be directed 
towards adaptation to the anticipated environmental conditions. The validity o f that 
argument is far from proven.
I f  nuclear power is not expanded the implications for environmental protection w ill be 
long-term and severe. Environmentalist thinker James Lovelock has argued the 
environmental case for nuclear power and it is time for others to do likewise.
151
A1F1 Climate Scenario: Assumes rapid global economic and population growth that 
peaks in 2050. Intense use o f fossil fuel provides the energy for this growth.
AGR: Advances Gas-cooled Reactor
AP600: Westinghouse Advanced Passive Pressurised Water Reactor.
AP1000: Westinghouse Advanced Passive Pressurised Water Reactor.
APW R: Advanced Pressurised Water Reactor
AOGCM : Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Model
AW BR: Advanced Boiling Water Reactor
BNFL: British Nuclear Fuels
BW R: Boiling Water Reactor
CDM : Clean Development Mechanism
CER: Certified Emission Reductions
CORWN: Committee on Radiological Waste Management
DAD: Decide, Announce and Defend
DBT: Design Basis Threat
DEM O: Demonstration fusion power plant
EF: Ecological Footprint
EnF: Energy Footprint
ENGO: Environmental Non-govemmental Organisation.
EPR: European Pressurised Water Reactor 
FBR: Fast Breeder Reactor
FP6: 6th European Union Research Framework Programme 
FP7: 7th European Union Research Framework Programme 
GCM : General Circulation Model 
G IF; Generation IV  International Forum
Glossary of Terms:
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HGP: Human Genome Project 
HSE: Health and Safety Executive.
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
ICRP: International Commission for Radiological Protection
IEA: International Energy Agency
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITDB: Illic it Trafficking Database
ITER: International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
LCA: Life-cycle Analysis
LDC: Least Developed Countries
MAGNOX: Gas-cooled Reactor.
Nil: Nuclear Installations Inspectorate 
NNPT: Nuclear* Non-proliferation Treaty.
NIMBY: Not In My Back Yard 
OCNS: Office for C iv il Nuclear Security
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PBMR: Pebble Bed Modular Reactor
P&T: Partitioning and Transmutation
PWR: Pressurised Water Reactor
RDD: Radiological Dispersal Device
UKAEA: United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
VVER: Russian Pressurised Water Reactor
WCED: World Commission on Environment and Development
WNA: World Nuclear Association
WWF: World W ild life  Fund
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R e v i e w  R e p o r t  2 0 0 6 ,  C m  6 8 8 7 , H e r  M a je s ty ’ s S ta tio n ery  O ffic e , 2 0 0 6 .
174. C o m m itte e  on R ad ioactive  W a s te  M an a g e m e n t, M a n a g i n g  O u r  
R a d i o a c t i v e  W a s t e  S a f e ly ,  C o R W M  D o c  7 0 0 , 2 0 0 6
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